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The Partisan’s Violence, Law and Apartheid: The Assassination of Matthew Goniwe 




This dissertation is a study of an instance of political violence that took place during 
1985 in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa, but which had a wider resonance 
across the country. It involved the killing of four prominent anti-apartheid activists, 
known as the Cradock Four, by a state security death squad.  It is an instance of 
political violence that allows us to ask ontological questions about the relationship 
between law, rights and violence;  colonial violence and the Cold War, as well as 
questions about the epistemologies that surround violence in relation to questions of 
justice.  Revisiting this violence, as mediated through the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, this study asks: how does this violence relate to the law itself,  since 
apartheid was after all explicit in its claim to being the product of a legal regime?   It 
argues that we need to think about how this violence against the Cradock Four, 
committed by a  ‘death squad’—and therefore orphaned through denial by both law 
and an official political narrative—related to the constitution of a South African 
political community, a political community we also have to remind ourselves, which 
had a colonial genealogy.  
 
To answer these questions I have traced the figures of Matthew Goniwe and his 
political comrades in two ways. The first half of the dissertation is a study of how 
they are fashioned in legal discourse – over time mainly as victims of human rights 
abuses through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  The second half of the 
dissertation is a study of their constitution in political discourse, where they become 
 transformed from activists to absolute enemies of the state. In my discussion of this 
latter transformation, I trace and wish to recover what has become a subaltern 
narrative: thinking about these activists as instantiations of the forms of what I have 
called ‘the natives revolt’, and therefore apartheid’s concrete enemy: they are 
reluctant urban native subjects; neither properly rural and neither properly urban. It is 
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The Cradock Four:   




I am not quite sure when Mathew Goniwe slipped into my consciousness. In 1985, I 
was thirteen years old and attending Rylands High School in Athlone where I had 
grown up. It was an Indian group area, and the school was classified as an ‘Indian 
School,’ and fell under the administration of the House of Delegates, the separate 
administrative and legislative parliamentary chamber introduced under the 1983 
tricameral parliamentary reforms of the Apartheid government. 1985 was also a year 
that South Africa was under a State of Emergency. A national school boycott had 
started in 1985, and whilst one part of South Africa lived a ‘normal’ existence, 
another was in open and violent revolt, and the object of state repression authorized 
under the State of Emergency. 
 
 That year had started quietly, with the prospect of my second, year in high school. In 
July a State of Emergency was declared in 36 districts of the country. There had been 
a boycott of classes by 30,000 students in the Eastern Cape and Transvaal. They were 
the responsibility of the Department of Education and Culture that had been deputed 
to administer and educate students classified as black African. Within days of the 
declaration of the State of Emergency, solidarity action took place in Cape Town. By 
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the end of July students in the greater Western Cape area formed an organization, and 
at the end of that month the school boycott had spread to black schools in Cape Town.  
 
 We organized mass rallies, we traveled in busloads to other schools, we picketed and 
we held marches. At every step there was an incredibly violent police response that 
provoked even more support for student resistance. At that stage the student resistance 
was largely peaceful even though symbols of state administration had become targets. 
By the end of October, the State of Emergency was extended to Cape Town and the 
army came to occupy our neighbourhood. Any attempt at gathering as a group quickly 
brought a police or army vehicle. As one teacher noted in relation to one such 
incident,  
Half an hour later, two Casspirs arrived containing about fifteen heavily 
armed policemen. This resulted in the students becoming extremely 
agitated. They armed themselves with planks from the back of their desks, 
tied hankies around their faces for the teargas and got ready, naively, to 
defend themselves.1 
 
At the time there were three schools in the Western Cape that were classified as 
‘Indian’ schools: Rylands, Cravenby and Pelican Park, the latter being the most recent 
creation. I have not given sufficient thought the question, but of all the three, only 
Rylands, and the community of Rylands really actively got involved in ‘the struggle.’ 
This is not to say that ‘activists’ were not present communities of Cravenby, or 
Pelican, nor is it to say that everyone in Rylands was one. For reasons that I also am 
not entirely sure of, I was drawn to a student protest meeting called one afternoon 
                                                
1 Quoted in ‘Inside Boycotts- A teachers story’, Deduct, UCT Education Faculty, October, 1985 
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after a walk-out of class rooms was declared by a group of older students. Most of my 
friends in my class, actually all of them, decided to go home. I went to the meeting, 
and student ‘leaders,’ addressed us on a topic that I can’t recall. However I do recall 
feeling that it was the right thing to do to become actively involved, that there was a 
just cause. It seemed self-evident. From then on I attended many meetings.  
 
The school ‘Prefect’ system of monitoring was rejected in favour of democratically 
elected Student Representative Councils and each class elected a class representative. 
By that time, normal schooling had been suspended; students now ran the school 
against the wishes of most parents and teachers. It was decided that the boycott of 
classes was not a boycott of education or school. We ran what was called ‘Alternative 
Education’ classes, awareness programmes, and actively pursued knowledge that was 
not given to us in the formal racialized curriculum of the apartheid education 
curriculum. Our slogan was  ‘Each One Teach One.’ As one newspaper editorial at 
the time noted: “They are very frustrated and very angry. In a critical moment of our 
history, these passionate, dedicated immature, politically untutored students have 
taken over. Now they are getting their political education weekly”.2 
 
At the time I was not really aware of the national landscape of resistance politics, 
organizations or ideological positioning. In our area the figure of Dullah Omar 
loomed large as a political influence. ‘Uncle Dullah’ or Com D, as he was 
affectionately known, was an unassuming, quiet man of extraordinary presence, and it 
was at the library in his house on Mable Road that I first saw many works banned in 
South Africa. For that matter it was probably the first time I had seen a personal 
                                                
2 City Press, 20 April, 1986, quoted in Linda Chisholm’s (1986) ‘From Revolt to a Search for 
Alternatives’, Work in Progress, No. 42, p15 
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library as such, and the allure of a space in which one is surrounded by books has not 
left me. As an advocate Comrade Dullah could have in his legal, even though 
restricted possession, the collected works of Marx, Lenin and Trotsky – writers and 
writing otherwise banned in the country. As a lawyer he represented many victims of 
political repression including Nelson Mandela, and had regular contact with him. 
Dullah Omar was also in detention for long periods at the time for his activities in the 
newly launched United Democratic Front, which was established in 1983 as a broad 
front of organizations, from civic, to youth, to religious organizations.  
 
I had joined the Thornhill Youth Congress where some younger, mostly teachers at 
the time, activists, had contacts with students and recruited us. There was also the 
older Thornhill Residents Organisation, of which Dullah Omar was chair, and through 
these meetings I was introduced to a world of ideas, ethics, and ideological 
orientations that have fundamentally shaped the way I look at the world. In post-
apartheid South Africa, many who shaped my own political and ethical convictions 
have undergone remarkable transformations. However I could not have anticipated 
that change back then.  
 
In retrospect, because I was the only person in my class at that time who really 
showed an active interest in the political activities, my classmates probably thought it 
expedient to elect me as the class representative. This trend followed its course when I 
was elected Deputy, and then later Chairperson of the SRC. My memory of the time is 
neither detailed nor chronological. We spent a large amount of time trying to 
construct an image of South Africa that we felt was being denied us, by seeking out 
the prohibited histories, and by circulating information and reports that were not to be 
  
5 
found in the muzzled press. The press was especially forbidden from reporting events 
going on in black townships or police actions under the State of Emergency. As many 
who reflect on the period have noted, it seemed that the outside world could watch 
daily events South Africa much more easily. But unlike, for instance, the Iranian 
activists who recently turned to mobile phones, the internet or ‘twitter’ to spread word 
about their emergent political movement, back then we had to resort to all manner of 
methods to spread information and circulate news.  
 
Repressive actions, killings, detentions and torture of comrades and activists, and of 
students, became campaigns against which to mobilize and rally around. In our area 
one such event that has become known as the ‘Trojan Horse shootings’ took place in 
October 1985 on Thornton Road. A group of policemen had concealed themselves in 
a cargo container on the back of a delivery truck belonging to the South African 
Railways, and driven down a street known to be crowded with thousands of students 
who had congregated there to protest on a daily basis. Government vehicles had 
become targets and so this was a deliberate provocation, particularly since vehicles 
belonging to the SAR were a deep and very conspicuous egg-yolk yellow. As the 
truck slowly traveled down the road, stones were hurled at it; in turn, policemen 
popped out and opened fire with live ammunition, killing three students whose names 
can still roll off my tongue without thought because we repeated them so often in 
rallies, in memorials in our pamphlets, as we sought to draw attention to the injustice 
of the apartheid government and its policies. 
 
Death in political struggle takes the dead person away from the intimacy of a family 
as victims of the violence of the police and the army are transformed into martyrs of a 
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just struggle, “their blood nourishing the tree of freedom” . Mamphele Ramphele has 
written about ‘political widowhood’ in a similar vein:  
 
To be widowed: the loss one’s partner, husband, lover, friend, interlocutor 
due to the irreversability of death. Unlike divorce, to be widowed is to 
mark a lack of choice, an almost prematureness to the inevitableness of 
separation. But ‘political widowhood’? At what point does death, this 
wretched violence of loss, become the concern of ‘politics’ I now ask 
myself? 
 
We were accumulating martyrs to commemorate and to recall these deaths and the 
stories of repression. These stories took us out of the confines of our relatively middle 
class and comfortable existence in Rylands, and to the furthest corners of the country: 
to townships whose names we would have rarely encountered otherwise. Solidarity 
with the death of an activist allowed us to transcend the ethnic and racial identities 
imposed by apartheid, and no one was allowed to be an African, coloured, Indian or 
white person. The project of non-racialism adopted by the UDF proclaimed all of us 
South Africans, following the injunction of the Freedom Charter of 1955, that South 
Africa “belonged to all who live in it, Black or White”. Going beyond the Freedom 
Charters’ recognition of race, the UDF aligned movement I was drawn into, dissolved 
us all into ‘comrades’ – a corporatized identity of solidarity that brooked no 
differences along racial, ethnic, religious or gendered lines. We would not note or 
speak of these state sanctioned forms of differences. Hence a detained comrade, or a 
comrade killed, evoked in us a sense of solidarity, a humanizing gesture that allowed 
us, to ‘imagine’ forms of community that we had not imagined before. A student 
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killed, shot or arrested who may have been a bystander or a curious onlooker became 
a ‘comrade’.   
 
There were other ideological and organizational forms of resistance to apartheid, 
some aligned to the Black Consciousness movement and Azapo, the PAC, or the New 
Unity Movement or the National Forum and Neville Alexander’s Cape Action 
League. As I recall it, these were not really discussed except to be dismissed for the 
error of their beliefs and futility of their organizational ways. It is only much later that 
I came to understand and learn about these differences, get a fuller picture of the 
violence between the UDF and Azapo, the ‘Zim-zims’ and the ‘Warara’s’, in other 
parts of the country, and come to appreciate some of the beliefs behind them. But it 
was in the context of the Emergency, of youthful student organizing of alternative 
education programmes, of rallies and funerals, that Mathew Goniwe, Fort Calata, 
Sparrow Mkhonto, and Sicelo Mhlauli entered into my roll call of names, and that I 
came to learn about the city of Cradock.  
 
Goniwe’s name had been circulating as a key protagonist in a small activist legend. 
Indeed, many people often spoke of the Eastern Cape and him in the same breadth. 
My earliest recollection of their deaths is associated with the poster that circulated to 
mark the killings on June 27 1985. The poster, perhaps anticipating a later personal 
interest in photography, was remarkable for me because of the image that adorned it. 
A black and white photograph (that I discovered later was taken by the Rhodes 
university historian Julian Cobbing) was captured from a kneeling position with a 
wide-angle lens that elongated Goniwe’s lanky frame, and gave his raised arm and fist 
an added power. The deep black and white hues heightened the impenetrable tint of 
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the sun reflected in Goniwe’s eyeglasses, as he looked up but also hid his eyes from 
the sun with his fist raised into the cloudy sky. To his right is a priest in full robes 
since the picture was taken at a funeral.  
 
Goniwe was probably going through the regularized set of slogans that preceded any 
political speech by an activist, of saying ‘Amandla’ (Power), to which the crowd 
would respond ‘Ngawethu’ (to the People).  Although a ritual that would be repeated 
by every speaker on a platform, successively and repetitively in every meeting, it 
never lost its evocativeness, it’s subversive character. Different leaders became 
known for bringing their own trademark nuance to how they would say ‘Amandla’, 
some giving it an ark that raised and fell slowly, some like the charismatic youth 
leader, the now late Peter Mokaba, rendered it in a chopped staccato cadence. And so, 
he gave it the tone of a military command, which no doubt added to the militant 
persona Mokaba had come to establish for himself, along with his particular style of 
leading the toyi-toyi, as he implored us to “Roar, Young Lions, Roar!”  
 
Looking at Goniwe’s image then, I can imagine one arm moving out of the frozen 
frame and completing its full sweep skywards, his words echoing back to him from 
the crowd, the songs, and the smell of the time, the feeling of defiance that 
accompanied the mere act of having a gathering of people, let alone being allowed to 
speak. It was an exuberant precariousness – a fragile moment as the police could 
teargas or pump rubber bullets and lead pellets from shotguns and bring it to an end 
very quickly. Yet there was somehow a sense of an indestructible energy, the same 
energy that was received by another South Africa as a destructive energy that could 




Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkhonto and Sicelu Mhlawuli had set out from 
Cradock to a meeting in Port Elizabeth and returned in Goniwe’s white Honda 
Ballade on June 27. Mathew Goniwe was a school teacher in Cradock who had risen 
to local prominence as a founding member of the Cradock Residents Association 
(CRADORA) and as a tireless organizer for the United Democratic Front, a national 
umbrella organization of anti-apartheid organizations informally affiliated to the 
banned and exiled African National Congress. Goniwe, Calata and Mkhonto left Port 
Elizabeth for a meeting with fellow UDF activists, aware that they were taking a 
perilous journey. Mhlauli it turned out was on a school break and along for the ride. 
All had been victims of state repression, detentions and banning orders before. 
Around noon the following day,  June 28, their bodies were found in a veld near the 
picturesque Algoa Bay coastline, badly burned and mutilated, and separated from 
each other over a small expanse of Blue Water Bay just along the St George’s Strand 
Holiday Resort. The car had also been burnt. It was found some distance away just off 
the R102 national road. The registration number plates had been removed, and 
replaced with a different set, one of which seemed to have been inadvertently left 
behind and spared by the fire that had gutted the car.  
 
Leaders of the movement, in my eyes as a thirteen year old at the time, were 
extraordinary people. I could only want to emulate them in their actions, words and 
lives. When we had to organize meetings to mark the death or detention of a leader, of 
a comrade, the moment was filled with anger, but also a certain detachment from the 
person. The dead person was subsumed in the wider narrative of an unjust act, what it 
would mean for the rest of us, in the need to go on, and in the need to be defiant rather 
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than defeated. In that space, as leaders of revolutionary struggles, political movements 
and armies well know, contemplating death as loss cannot be encouraged.  
 
Why were Mathew Goniwe, Sparrow Mkhonto, Fort Calata and Sicelo Mhlawuli 
killed? I could ask this question about countless others. At the time however we did 
not pause to ask such questions. It was a dangerous question for us partly because we 
had not grasped the meaning of mortality and partly because the answer seemed self-
evident. By then I had read Lenin who wrote that you have to crack an egg to make an 
omellette, marveled at Trotsky’s ability to move from writing about poetry to 
mobilizing the Red Army into a ruthlessly formidable force, and accepted the 
inevitability that Marx oracled – that the old order would give way to the new, but not 
without the necessity of overcoming its violently terminal convulsions. I found 
evidence that backed up these insights in the world around me where a system of 
power and privilege was being threatened, but was also defending itself with force. It 
seemed self-evident too, that the only way to change the system was through the 
barrel of a gun, through violence since power, conceived of as we did then, would not 
cede power without a fight.  
 
 And this reminds me of the second slogan of the student movement:  ‘Action, 
comrades, Action!’ At our school we called them ‘the A-team’, the action team. Their 
faces were always covered when they went out to stone or petrol bomb a police or 
army vehicle. And we had a regional network of action committees.  By 1986 the 
army had been permanently installed in our areas and there was an abundance of 
targets and battles to plan, as successfully blocking off a road for a few hours became 
a huge cause for celebration in our world.  For a few hours it was a liberated zone. 
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The physical perimeters of the school became borders whose integrity had to be 
protected, and protection required preparedness and weapons, and new kinds of 
knowledge. The historian Colin Bundy, who has written one of the most widely 
authoritative articles on the student protests in Cape Town during this period, 
observed that,  
There were thousands in Cape Town who learned the practical science of 
making a petrol bomb, the street sociology of taunting armed soldiers, the 
pavement politics of pamphlet distribution and slogan painting, the 
geography of safe houses and escape routes, and the grammar and 
dialectics of under-cover operations.3  
Bundy’s analysis of the student uprising, utilizing the framework of a political 
economy approach, situated the protest within a Molotov cocktail of structural 
determinations which lent the moment an inevitableness:  a population explosion, a 
massive increase in black students in the school system, an inadequate schooling 
infrastructure, and a dire shortage of jobs to absorb youth who have completed 
schooling or university. Stir in an overproduction of intellectuals and this must 
explode in a country as structurally clogged in class and racial terms. “At its heart,” 
Bundy observed, “is a crisis of capital accumulation” (1987: 13). 
 
This may be have been the case. However I do no not think that Bundy’s analysis 
grasps many aspects of the moment – the sensibilities that were put into play – that 
can illuminate the particular paths to social change chartered, as it were, in the event 
of history. And since my interest here is to reflect on the violence that saturated this 
moment, I want to turn from modes of production to the meter of poetry, and to the 
                                                
3 Colin Bundy (1987) Street Sociology and Pavement Politics: Aspects of Youth and Student 
Resistance in Cape Town, 1985, Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 13, No. 3  
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last two stanzas of a poem written in 1987 by Keith Gottschalk, a political scientist 
and activist in Cape Town that captures something of the sensibilities and practices 
that that I am getting at: 
They walk through the furnace, they measure 
distance by army roadblocks, 
And time by section twenty-nine. 
Their names: comrade organizer 
Comrade delegate 
Comrade rank and file 
Their address: a suitcase 
Between here and there, 
A secret cell 
And the catacombs of silence. 
 
Their meals: tension and cigarettes 
Their personal lives: the interstices of 
committees and agenda. 
Their lovemaking: under matters arising 
Their destiny: death – and our liberation. 
 
Note the twinning of death and liberation, as conditions of possibility for each other. 
As the slogan of the South African Youth Congress, formed in 1987, was to put it, 
“Freedom or Death, Victory is Certain!” A sympathetic newspaper reported,  
Every block, every school, has an ‘action squad’, coordinating action, 
providing direction, helping build petrol bombs and seeking material for 
  
13 
barricades…Children who have not yet reached puberty tell you ‘I wish I 
had a hand grenade’; teenagers talk of AK 47’s, RPG-7’s, and bazookas’.4  
 
Rummaging through my collection of material from that time I find a magazine titled 
The Dawn (1986) produced by students at a neighbouring school containing their 
poems. One, written by a young student, Premesh Lalu, now a Professor of History at 
the University of the Western Cape, titled ‘In Memory of….’  
The shots clattered 
The comrades ran, 
The mothers screamed, 
Some children cried, 
Others through (sic) stones 
Some shouted ‘Aman…dla! 
 
Then there was silence. 
Everybody stopped, 
Turned & looked around 
Astounded, a mother knelt; 
At her knees 
Lay a child 
The pride and joy of a mother 
Dead, Dead. 
When one is killed; 
Another 1000 will rise. 
                                                




In the script of a play, typewritten, developed by a student grouping I was part of, a 
trinity of sorts, battles it out between Good and Evil. A young student, an encouraging 
devil and the chorus as conscience constitute the trinity. The student has finished 
school for the day and is faced with a dilemma:  whether to go to a political meeting 
he was invited to or just enjoy himself lounging about at home. The chorus acts as the 
confused student’s conscience, recalling the names of students killed by the 
government, and anti-apartheid activists sentenced to death while the devil goads him 
on to a life of youthful indulgence, encouraging him to put his leisurely needs first 
rather than take life too seriously. The play ends, predictably of course, with the 
student merging with the chorus, declaring to the devil:  
Go away, keep quiet! I know what I am going to do. I am going to attend 
that meeting this afternoon. And yes, I am young! And I’m proud to be 
one of the fearless young lions who have dedicated their lives towards 
establishing a South Africa free of racism and capitalism. 
 
June 16 1976 became an event of immense importance for students to commemorate. 
It was an instructive reminder of the necessity of sacrifice, of the ethical burden 
young people carried based on the idea that their blood, the blood of the students shot 
in 1976, was not spilt in vain. An often quoted slogan was a saying by Amilcar 
Cabral, the Guinea-Bissauan anti-colonial leader, that the youth were the flowers of 
the struggle. A pamphlet issued by the Athlone Student Action Committee (ASAC) 
on June 16 1987 declared boldly at the end, ‘Youth must not only be the flowers but 




Another pamphlet is of a church service held to commemorate June 16, since overt 
political meetings were banned, cultural and religious activities became nominally 
legal ways of organizing. The hymns to be sung include ‘O Young and Fearless 
Prophet’, ‘We shall overcome’, and ‘Onward Christian Soldiers’, with those 
memorable lines ‘Onwards Christian soldiers, marching as to war, with the Cross of 
Jesus going on before. At the sign of triumph Satans ghost doth flee; and then 
Christian soldiers, on to victory’. 
 
Skipping the country to become a guerilla fighter was the ultimate sacrifice you could 
make as we saw it. It was widely aspired to, but few of us summoned the courage to 
progress from stones, petrol bombs and militarist posturing to taking ‘to the bush’, as 
it was called. At the end of the day, for most of us boys, I suspect that our mother’s 
cooking and the girl we had a crush on proved more captivating. Others who did so, 
and who were captured or lost their lives were our heroes. To ‘go to the bush’ was to 
step beyond the pale into a social death where no laws or community could protect 
you and thus the pinnacle of bravery and selflessness. Not that this was only confined 
to boys. In an interview one of the leaders of the United Democratic Front, who went 
on to become a senior figure in the ANC, Cheryl Carolus describes the genesis of her 
own political awareness,  
I was quite young in fact. I was around 13 or 14 years old….In the same 
year, it must have been 1970 or ’71, I bought my first political book- 
Leila’s Hijack War. You know, Leila Khaled! I had this incredible 
romantic adoration for her, the picture with her Arab doekie (scarf) and 
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the machine gun…[laughing]. I think some people were very disturbed 
about it! I was in standard six then.5   
A political activist who was inside the country and was not a member of the armed 
resistance could still seek recourse to the truncated provisions of the Emergency laws. 
South Africa was not a signatory to the Geneva conventions. That left someone 
considered an armed combatant in a precarious zone of non-existence that I explore 
later in this work. That said, people would and were going to die. All of us, in very 
different scales and proportions, were putting our lives on the line when we decided to 
become activists. This narrative, normalized in ‘struggle’, thus prevented me from 
posing the question of why certain people were killed. It did not seem a difficult 
question to answer because it also implied that we would also have to do some killing 
of our own, made right by the name of a just cause. The slogan of our youth 
movement triumphantly declared, “Freedom or Death, Victory is Certain!” 
 
However I do not regard this narrative as self-evident any more. Furthermore, I don’t 
accept without reservation that violence is an integral option necessary for radical 
political change. From the overwhelming coincidence of violence and political 
change, the empirical evidence of modernity might indeed suggest a naturalized 
relationship between the two. At the same time, I believe that we need to always ask 
questions about the particular conditions and histories that summon violence from 
potentiality to actuality and bring it into existence. When we begin to reflect on and 
think of violence as something to pause about, to think about, to doubt and be 
skeptical of as a form of instrumental reason made sharp, we often have to sit with the 
                                                
5  Youth Express: Grassroots publications. n.d  
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evidence of its existence. We have to open ourselves to its materiality, to the tangible 
results of its labour, and above all, most visibly, to the body. 
 
I am aware that the violence of which we speak here, this violence performed on the 
body, compels us today for particular reasons that a different kind of violence does 
not. That is to say, a normalized violence, a structural violence that exercises itself 
upon the ‘human condition’ in less tangible physical ways, like the slow pangs of 
hunger, the terror of poverty, the shame of being poor or the racialization of crime, 
remain more structurally enduring and more challenging as forms violence to make 
the object of popular outrage. The violence on the bodies we are talking about here 
occupies for us for very distinct imperatives, which have to do with the production of 
a certain modernist subjectivity. Thus, Michel Foucault’s Discpline and Punish 
(1979) intentionally opens with that famously gruesome episode:  
 
On 2 March 1757 Damiens the regicide was condemned ‘to make the 
amende honorable before the main door of the Church of Paris’, where he 
was to be ‘taken and conveyed in a cart, wearing nothing but a shirt, 
holding a torch of burning wax weighing two pounds...then in the said 
cart, to the Place De Greve, where, on a scaffold that will be erected there, 
the flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms, thighs and calves with red-
hot pincers, his right hand, holding the knife with which he committed the 
said parricide, burnt with sulphur melted together and then his body 
drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs and body consumed by 
fire…. Finally he was quartered…. This last operation was very long, 
because the horses used were not accustomed to drawing; consequently, 
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instead of four, six were needed, and when that did not suffice, they were 
forced, in order to cut off the wretch’s thighs, to sever the sinews and 
hack the joints…. (1979: 3). 
 
No doubt Foucault sought to startle a certain sensibility we now take as doxa. But it’s 
not only the violence that is meant to unsettle us. Foucault’s point is also that this 
event is administered by an official religio-legal apparatus that sanctions it, and that 
the event takes place in a public setting with spectators cheering the violence on. 
Foucault’s interest is not to show the horror of torture, but with the relationship 
between sovereign power and the forms of punishment it administers, and to trace 
how this relationship shifts over time:  
One no longer touched the body, or at least as little as possible, and then 
only to reach something other than the body itself...Physical pain, the pain 
of the body itself, is no longer the constituent element of the penalty. 
From being an art of unbearable sensations punishment has become an 
economy of suspended rights (1979: 11). 
This is not to suggest that new forms of disciplinary power do away with torture or 
the infliction of pain. As Talal Asad astutely points out in his reading of this 
argument, torture is now linked to policing and has entered the realm of secrecy and 
scandal. In Asad’s words,  
Modern torture linked to policing is typically secret partly because 
inflicting physical pain on a prisoner is considered “uncivilized’ and 
therefore illegal…. My argument here is that “torture” as now used in the 
law is a form of cruelty that liberal societies do not approve of. That’s the 
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main reason why modern authorities typically generate a rhetoric of 
public denial.6 
When the secret becomes public knowledge, rather than generating the spectacle that 
Foucault describes above, it is more likely to provoke a ‘scandal’. It is this aspect of 
violence questioned and interrogated, which can be compelling in its own way and 
bring out within us the need to hold onto, to make visible, the traces of the work of 
violence, to collect, to catalogue, to not wash away the blood at the scene, but to 
preserve it. This is the impulse to think, to hold on to the effects of the work of 
violence in order to work against violence – to mirror the work of violence back onto 
itself – and, to turn its work into a dossier of evidence against it. It is the archival 
material of indictment. In the recalling, in the rehearsing, there is the repetition of the 
moment of violence in order to turn the work of violence back against itself, a form of 
doubling, like a mechanical reproduction, first time as necessary, but second time as 
horror. This seems to me the modernist seesaw, as we shift between necessity and 
horror or, between necessity and terror. The horror lies in realizing how terror 
appeared necessary and the necessity with which it exercised itself upon certain 
bodies producing certain practices and actions at certain moments of time.  
 
I have come therefore to the question of Why. And I am aware that I also have come 
to the question of why ask the question ‘why’? What is this ‘why’ of violence’s work 
as performed on the bodies of Goniwe, Mhkonto, Calata, Mhlawuli, mutilated and 
mangled? Why the need to ask why? The self evidence of a narrative, of resistance 
and repression, of a cycle of repetition, is no longer sufficient. And in that deficiency 
the space has opened up for questions to emerge. But then there is the looking back. 
                                                
6 Asad, T (2003) Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, California: Stanford 
University Press, pp104-105 
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What will become of us if we look back? Of course it surely matters who is looking 
back, and whether it is from the vantage point of a sense of victory or a sense of loss. 
The loss of life in victory, and the loss of life in defeat distinguish the calculus of 
looking back. The looking back might also be a dangerous thing to do if we are to 




Hence, the body seems to be political insofar as it always demonstrates as a last 
resort, the evidence of power  
Didier Fassin (2005: 597) 
 
My questions therefore revolve more around the Why, not so much, ‘Who?’ Yet we 
remain haunted, so to speak, by the question of ‘who,’ and it is a question I wish to 
address by reframing our understanding of what is at stake in the way in which we ask 
this question from the vantage point of justice. When the student movements and 
civic associations marked the death of the Cradock Four in mass rallies and 
commemorations in 1986, the question was not why they were killed. It was the 
question of who killed them?  This was the injustice and it was the question that 
justice sought an answer to. The injustice was that those who did the killing were not 
possessed of the ‘right’ to kill them. Yet, when the question was asked, ‘who killed 
the Cradock Four?’, the answer was in some ways already known. The answer was 
that the apartheid state killed them.  This was common knowledge, for who else it 
would profit from such an action? There was also of course the benefit a rival political 
organization might derive from their deaths. But our answer to the question was clear: 




When the three young students were shot in Thornton Rd in the Trojan Horse 
incident, it was done in full view of witnesses. It was ‘public violence’, so to speak. 
Yet even then this would have been denied by the state, if it had not been for the 
presence of a television camera that brought it to the attention that very evening on 
news reports outside South Africa. The question of ‘who’, even when I say we ‘knew’ 
it was the state, requires us to think about the connection between the state and the 




There is thus reason to reopen the coffin,  




Where the deaths of the Cradock are concerned, the question of who killed them has 
in a way been answered. It is then perhaps best to establish this narrative, with a 
rendition of what happened on the night of June 27 1985, and the early hours of the 
morning of the 28th June. In presenting the ‘account’ of events, as narrated by the 
policemen involved, I am weary of attending to the deaths of the Cradock Four in a 
manner which borders on an ethically dubious detailing of gruesomeness. Yet I 
believe it is necessary to briefly recount that narrative about the killings that emerged 
after two inquests and commissions of inquiry, which provides details sought by 
certain forms of justice.   
 
                                                




Seven members of the Eastern Cape branch of the South African Security Branch 
applied for amnesty for the killing of the Cradock Four at the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission hearings in 1998.8 They were Eric Taylor, Gerhardus 
Lotz, Nicolas van Rensburg, Harold Snyman, Johan Martin “Sakkie” van Zyl, 
Hermanus Du Plessis and Eugene de Kock. The latter was already serving multiple 
life sentences for other convictions and his testimony was ultimately deemed most 
credible. The others were not considered as forthcoming, and amnesty was denied yet 
no criminal charges have been filed. The decision of the amnesty committee, 
mandated amongst other things, to find ‘political motive’, is a discussion that I take 
up later.  I do not claim to present this version as ‘the truth’; it is however a ‘legal 
truth’ whose status, imperatives and implications I discuss in the following chapter.  
What I am about to present is a synopsis of manner in which the killings happened, 
and who ultimately conducted them as established in the amnesty hearings. But I save 
for later parts of the narrative that establish the context of the killings as well as what 
is described in legal prosecutorial discourse as ‘motive’.  
 
In his testimony, Colonel Snyman testified that that all ‘normal’ processes available to 
them to curtail the activities of the Cradock Four had not met with the desired results. 
At a security briefing held in Cradock on the February 14 1985, the challenges that 
the Cradock Four presented were discussed. Goniwe and his fellow activists’ 
resistance was hampering the state’s attempts to ‘reform’ Black Local Authorities 
through a process of co-optation of local leaders. In attendance at the February 14 
meeting was the Minister of Law and Order, Louis Le Grange, Commissioner of 
Police, General Johan Coetzee, the Minister of Co-operation and Development, 
                                                
8 TRC Amnesty Committee Decision, AC/99/0350, 1999 
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Barend Du Plessis, the Divisional Commissioner of the Eastern Cape, Brigadier C. A 
Swart, and a number of other security police officials. The Minister of Law and Order 
described the Eastern Cape as the ‘eye of the storm’, emphasizing a total onslaught 
against South Africa as part of a communist expansionist war.   
 
Colonel Snyman was told that he had to do something about the activists.  Snyman 
gave permission for the “four people… to be urgently neutralized”. General Nick van 
Rensburg, along with Major Du Plessis and Captain Van Zyl were tasked with 
planning the operation. It was Van Rensburg’s idea to propose a simulated robbery or 
alternatively, to present the deaths as part of the rivalry between the United 
Democratic Front and the Azanian Peoples Organsiation (AZAPO). Lieutenant Eric 
Taylor and Sergeant Lotz were also included in the team. From the phone tap on 
Goniwe’s house, it was known that he would be attending a meeting at the house of 
fellow UDF activist Derek Swartz, in Port Elizabeth. Supplied with petrol and a set of 
false number plates, and two additional security police officers, Sergeant Faku and 
Glen Mgoduka, the security police team traveled in two cars towards the Olifants 
Hoek Pass. Around 11.00pm they spotted Mathew Goniwe’s white Honda Ballade 
driving in the direction of Cradock and followed the car. At a suitably quiet section of 
the route Taylor and Lotz overtook Goniwe’s car and signaled for it to pull off the 
road. The four occupants were ordered out of the vehicle and handcuffed.   
 
The number plates of Goniwe’s car were removed and the set that the policemen had 
brought along was attached. The four men where divided between the two cars with 
Sparrow Mkhonto and Sicelo Mhlauli traveling with Van Zyl; Fort Calata and 
Mathew Goniwe traveled in Goniwe’s vehicle along with Taylor and Lotz. All cars 
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then drove in the direction of the St George’s Beach resort area where they took a 
gravel road into the bushes. Lotz and van Zyl then drove Goniwe’s car a little further 
away, doused the vehicle with petrol and set it alight. They then returned to Taylor 
who was waiting with Goniwe and Calata. 
 
Van Zyl meanwhile drove away with Sparrow Mkonto whom he planned to kill by 
stabbing him after knocking him unconscious. According to Van Zyl, on route in the 
vehicle, Mkonto managed to grab him from behind with the intention of trying to 
strangle him. Van Zyl reached for a gun hidden under the car seat and fired at 
Mkonto. He pulled the car off the road, and fired an additional shot into Mkonto’s 
head to make sure that he had killed him. Leaving Mkonto’s body in the veld he drove 
back to collect the other policemen, Faku and Mgoduka along with a police 
informant, Shepherd Sakati, and they returned to the body. Faku then proceeded to 
stab the body, after which they poured petrol over it and set the corpse alight.  Van 
Zyl and his three colleagues then drove back to the meeting point where Taylor and 
Lotz were. Faku, Mgoduka and Van Zyl then transported Mhlauli about a kilometer 
away after which Faku hit him unconscious and the other two black policemen 
stabbed him.  A similar procedure was carried out with Mathew Goniwe. The 





For the activist invested in resisting domination, the politico-ethical stakes in political 
violence are self-evident. This dissertation’s opening lines, a declaration of a 
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disposition, a kind of confession perhaps, record the activist’s normalized conception 
of violence and its rightness when it is enacted ‘on the right side of history’. In 
disciplinary forms of knowledge, like anthropology, thinking and writing about the 
phenomenological forms of political violence present a more troubling ethical 
proposition.  The ‘scandalous’ practices we speak of here have been the subject 
anthropological research especially after 1960. This is not to say anthropologists of an 
earlier era were concerned with violence. But in the past, their sights were focused on 
non-state groups or non-modern forms of statehood. The intrigues of succession, the 
tribulations of ‘tribal warfare’ and the cycles of blood feuds animated those 
ethnographers. Violence, colonialism, and the modern state drift into focus much 
later, notably after the First World War. Hercules Read (1919) gave his presidential 
address to the Royal Anthropological Society on the anthropology of war. And then 
again towards the end of the Second World War, Bronislaw Malinowski (1941) 
addressed himself to violence and war.  
 
Later Ruth Benedict (1959) and others would follow. Anthropologist could, argued 
Malinowski, demonstrate with credibility that war was not part of a ‘natural order’, 
nor did it spring from an instinctual need, as some of their colleagues held. War 
between modern states and their citizens was especially exceptional in the so-called 
natural order.  Linda Green has noted that state terror itself did not until recently, 
“capture the anthropological imagination” (Green 1995: 107). And, as Carole 
Nagengast (1994: 112) argues, often it became a focus only after anthropologists had 
been ‘in the field’ and had to confront acts of violence practiced upon their research 
subjects that they re-oriented their concerns. The initial impulse of anthropological 
works on state terror was therefore to “write against terror”. Orin Starn noted that it 
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offered a way for anthropologists to “contribute to struggles for equality and justice” 
(1994: 1). Green (1995), Beatriz Manz (1995), and Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1992) 
have also put forward the view that writing about state terror was a way for 
anthropologists to “show who they cast their lot with”, and to turn their writings into 
“acts of resistance and solidarity”.   
 
The anthropologist, working at the field site, in touch with the “micro-level” of the 
experience of violence, could act as a witness, could record, could give voice to, those 
suppressed, marginalized and victimized. Coming as it did during what has been 
called the ‘self-reflexive turn’ in anthropology, in the wake of the collection titled 
‘Writing Culture’ by James Clifford and George Marcus, some saw taking an openly 
ethical position alongside victims of violence as a way to give what was an 
increasingly questionable disciplinary past a more palatable future. As Edmund 
Gordon was to passionately implore his colleagues:   
As more of us reach intellectual maturity, we find the contradictions of 
existence within a colonized discipline harder to bear…. To be an 
anthropology, which no longer serves the interests of the oppressors it 
must be one which actively serves those of the oppressed. We must make 
a decolonized anthropology positively the ‘anthropology of liberation’ 
(1991:153 ).  
This is not to suggest that all anthropologists who wrote on political violence or state 
terror shared Gordon’s vision or his intellectual anxiety, or his sense of complicity. 
But it does seem to me that a flourishing of work on state violence stepped into a 
discursive space opened up by the debates within anthropology about its association 
with colonial practices, an issue that had been raised for discussion in the early 1970s 
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by Asad (1974) and others. The works also coincided with what seemed to be a 
proliferation of practices labeled as state terror that had indeed begun to grow 
significantly between the late 1960’s to early 1990’s. The height of the Cold War 
conflict, the support for covert operations instantiated by the 1954 overthrow of the 
Arbenz government in Guatemala, and perhaps reaching its apex during the Reagan 
era of support and training in ‘counter-terrorism’, and ‘counterinsurgency’ meant that 
anthropologists increasingly found themselves confronting state terror as it intruded 
into their field sites in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This was evident in Latin 
American countries like Guatemala, where Robert Carmack (1988) produced an 
edited volume that looked specifically at state terror.  Contributions to this collection 
recounted experiences of the effects of violence systematically carried out on Mayan 
communities, with some of the contributors themselves later becoming victims of 
state violence.   
 
While World War II was still running its course, Bronislaw Malinowski observed that 
anthropology’s contribution to the study of war “insists on the cultural context of 
war” (1941: 542).  War carries with it a “total character”, that he noted with dismay,   
“… transforms every single cultural activity within a belligerent nation. It 
is enough to look at statistics of mobilization in man-power, in activity, 
and in public opinion to realize that at present it has become possible to 
transform some hundred million human beings into one big war machine’ 
(1941: 545).   
For Malinowski, war was an aberration that emerged from aggression; its effect was 
to paralyze culture. “Never,” he opined, “has the exercise of culture become so 
completely paralyzed. This means, in terms of individual psychology, that any 
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differential initiative, any formation of independent critical judgment, any building-up 
of public opinion through discussion, controversy and agreement, has been replaced 
by the passive acceptance of dictated truths” (1941: 547). For Malinowski then, 
certain forms of culture were reflected with acts of being a person, or a citizen. 
Absence of those activities and dispositions such as independence of mind was a sure 
sign of the absence of culture. And war, a total relation, a ‘machine’, had the capacity 
to enter into every mind and every relationship, freezing those it touched as it took 
hold of them.  
 
One of the most influential contemporary anthropologists working on terror, and 
explicitly ‘writing against terror’, is Michael Taussig. Both Malinowski and Taussig 
see in war a totalization of relations, a ‘machine’. In its zones of operation or, as 
Taussig calls it, in its “space of death” war attaches itself to the sensory capacities of 
every person. Taussig has introduced into the lexicon of anthropologists working on 
political violence and terror the idea of a “culture of fear” (1987, 1992). This notion 
has framed a number of subsequent studies (Corradi, 1987; Fagen, 1985; Freeman, 
1992; Green, 1994, Perelli, 1994; Sluka, 1996 & 2000; Villaveces-Izquierdo, 1997). 
Taussig too stumbled into the subject of terror as it played out amongst the Putumayo 
Indians of South West Colombia in the 1970’s.   
 
For Taussig there was a disjuncture between the economic interests of landowners, 
the state, and the local communities who made up the peasants and workers on farms 
and the kinds of violence meted out. In the history of the encounter between 
extractive colonialism, the plantation economy and the people of the Putumayo he 
found narrations of violence which were marked by ‘excess’, that is to say, killing and 
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brutality beyond any utilitarian function or proportion. Stated bluntly, why, for 
example, would landowners massacre Indians when there was a shortage of labour? In 
keeping with Malinowski’s observation that what anthropology could bring to the 
study of war were its cultural contexts, Taussig also seeks to study the culture of 
violence. For Malinowski however war signaled a paralysis of forms of culture; for 
Taussig terror signaled a paralysis in culture. And whereas the conceptual space in 
which Malinowski intervenes had structured the terms of the debate as between 
essentialist (although he might not have used that word) and constructivist 
determinations of the violence of ‘man’, Taussig’s conceptual space is prefigured 
within a set of debates about ‘interests’ and ‘ideology’, given the influence of 
political-economy inflected studies at the time.  
 
There were two related epistemic concerns for Taussig. Academic studies armed with  
‘reason’ were problematic because they went in search of reason and produced 
analyses that sought to insert reason into violence, most often as the product of 
material interests, and were therefore confounded by what was found. In Taussig’s 
own words, “the reality at stake here makes a mockery of understanding and derides 
rationality….” Rather one should seek to unravel “cultural logics of meaning- 
structures of feeling- whose basis lies in a symbolic world and not in one of rational 
in the name of…civilization” (1992: 164). An edifice of representations in which 
terror is mediated through narration thus sustains this totalized space of death where a 
culture of terror operates. In his words,  
Step by step, terror and torture became the form of life…an organized 
culture with its systematized rules, imagery and procedures, and meanings 
involved in spectacles and rituals that sustained the precarious solidarity 
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of the rubber company employees as well as beating out through the body 
of the tortured some sort of canonical truth about civilization and business 
(1992:164).  
This is an almost compelling narrative. In this narrative, violence is the product of 
mutual fantasy about the capacities and actions of the other. It is about the production 
of the Other as a fantastical entity capable of incredible acts of violence, and in a fit of 
nervousness acts of pre-emptive violence are necessary in order to preserve yourself 
and those with whom you share a collective identity - in this case the settlers. Being 
afraid beyond proportion to the ‘real’, is what the culture of fear engenders. It is 
simultaneously connected to real practices and out of touch with it, as it spins beyond 
the real into wild stories, jungle stories, travel stories, folk lore, and so on that take on 
a generative existence of their own. A culture of fear operates within what now 
becomes a space of death, not a site of inertness but a site of production and 
transformation. The space of the encounter produces, and is the site of the circulation 
and consumption of stories with brutal effects where meaning is made. Taussig’s 
account gives a materiality to consciousness by giving it autonomy as a site and realm 
which can produce things in and of it. It has an imminent productive capacity.  
 
The challenge therefore for ethically minded scholars and activists working to change 
relations in the space of death, itself an interpretive conceptual mechanism made 
material by discourse, cannot simply be to render the fantasy as fantasy since this is to 
miss the power of the fantasy. The challenge is find a way to produce a counter 
fantasy, a counter memory, in order to engender a counter practice. By objectifying 
fear as a construction that puts into motion its own logics of action, of killing and so 
on, Taussig denaturalizes it and turns its truths into myths while holding on to the 
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power of myths as not the opposite of truth, but a truth-effect. And one is therefore 
able to show it for something else and offer something different in the space that it 
occupies. One can fill that space with a counter-memory.9   
Taussig is of course not alone in making a strong case for the symbolic analysis of 
acts of violence within cultural spaces. James Dingley and Michael Kirk-Smith, for 
example, have argued cogently for the analysis of interpretation in acts of terror. For 
them, terror acts are simultaneously acts of blood sacrifice, “whereby acts of violence 
link with religion and with mans collective being” (2003:102). They share Taussig’s 
concern that you cannot grasp violence as a means-end fashion rationalization. For 
them one needs to take into account beliefs and the place of certain acts within 
symbolic systems of meaning. As they say, “we suggest that positing a rational and 
causal ‘means-end’ calculation may not be sufficient explanation for all terrorist acts 
by themselves. An understanding of how terrorists think on a subjective and culturally 
determined level is also required….” (2002: 3). And in an important work on the 
Argentine ‘dirty war’, Marcelo Suarez-Orozco (1987, 1992) was to take on the task 
of, as he put it, of  “giving voice to the voiceless”10 by developing a way in which to 
think about the ‘grammar’ of terror. In his words,  
Each time an agent discharges an electrical current through the body of an 
infant in front of his/her parents, or through the penis or vagina of 
‘subversives’ in front of their children, a perverse polysemantic ritual is 
                                                
9 Drawing on the work of James Scott and Vincente Rafael, Jane Margold (1999) argues that there is 
insufficient ‘agency’ displayed by the dominated in Taussig’s model. It seems to me that he does seek 
some form of ‘agency’, but differently conceived than Margold’s. I do not necessarily share her 
critique, which is based on a highly interpretive disjuncture between domination, action and 
consciousness, which operates in the same theoretical universe as Taussig’s, about which I express my 
reservations later. Secondly this line of thought coincides with Martin Sokefeld’s (1999) criticism that 
anthropology tends to ontologically see the West in terms of individuals and the Rest as ‘groups’. He 
argues that anthropologists should emphasise the ‘self’ in the Others too, since the Self as agent is 
universal.  This view seems to me to take one conception of the self, a particularly modern autonomous 
self, as the Universal conception of self without problematizing nor historicizing it.   
10 For a critique of the assumptions of history making in this gesture see Talal Asad (1993) 
Genaelogies of Religion, pp 9-14. 
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enacted. These rituals can be explored as meaningful ‘texts’ telling a 
horror story about our times. Our task here is to decode messages, both 
hidden and overt, in the historical rediscovery of torture in the Argentine 
chambers of death (1987: 227).  
This work is a useful example of what can be seen as a body of anthropological work 
which takes violence in both its material and symbolic manifestations, and ‘reads’ it 
textually in order to explore its hermeneutical dimensions  (see in particular Feldman, 
1991; Daniel 1996). The work of the anthropologist, as Clifford Geertz had so 
influentially stated, was after all ‘interpretive’. Productive forays of subsequent 
writers into literary, linguistic, semiotic (Valentine Daniels work on Sri Lanka, or 
Veena Das in India, 1987 & 1990) and psychoanalytic theories, from Freud to Lacan 
(as in the case of Allen Feldman’s 1991 work on terror and ‘embodied transcripts’ in 
Northern Ireland), while often in disagreement with Geertz, continued and continue to 
pose questions in a space it, could be argued, that Geertz had whittled open earlier.   
 
One such writer, Michael Gilsenan, draws on Geertz’s famous analysis of the 
Balinese cockfight to make a case for anthropological fieldwork that allows us to see 
that “a specific and highly bounded arena of violent play can be taken as a condensed 
frame and ‘text’ in which are revealed, to the trained reader, otherwise elusive 
cultural and social patternings” (2002:109). He goes on to suggest that  
[s]ocieties have elaborate practices, codes, rules and representations of 
violence. On closer examination, however, these cultural practices may 
turn out to have less visible and far more ambiguous links to the realities 
of social life than people themselves say. Anthropologists look for the 
cracks in the social surfaces, those breaks in meaning and inconsistencies 
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in accounts and practices. Points of conflict and violence may signal such 
crucial fault lines (Gilsenan, 2002:103) (my emphasis).   
Three observations stand out:  Firstly, violence is considered a signifying practice. 
Acts of violence are embedded in economies of meaning as objects of consumption 
and production. Secondly, these meanings circulate within a bounded zone- ‘culture’, 
and the space of death. 11 Thirdly, the role of the anthropologist is to stand in a 
particular relation to his or her object of knowledge – to stand in relation to a set of 
practices in which a group of people, collectivities or particular individuals or 
institutions are involved – and to bring into relief the ‘meaning’ of those practices 
since those meanings are not necessarily visible or available to those involved.  
 
Indeed, those involved are believed to have interpreted those practices in particular 
ways in order to make ‘sense’ of them, as in a Freudian relationship to trauma, where 
it is made coherent to the self through acts of narration and where subjectivity as a 
repository of ‘truth’ is untrustworthy. That is to say, anthropologists are the ‘trained 
readers’ who are equipped (through academic certification) to ‘read’ or ‘decode’ and 
pick up the ‘cracks’, the slippages, the disjunctures and dissonances in representations 
of the experience and practices of violence that informants are in a relationship with. 
Anthropologists impute or process collected individual, and collective experiences (as 
oral, visual, performative and textual) while standing in an objective, yet as in the 
case of some, ‘committed’ relation, to a set of subjective experiences.   
 
How the act of representing, and thereby transforming, what the victims of violence 
experience through the discourse of the anthropologist can be interpreted as “giving 
                                                
11 ‘Culture’ is used here as in Clifford and Marcus (1986): it is textual, with heterogeneous internal 
contestations over hegemonic meanings.  
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voice to the voiceless” is not exactly clear. On the one hand there is an objectivist 
stance toward the object of analysis, while on the other hand there is a desire to 
channel subjective experience or experiences so that experience can be mobilised to 
make an ethical claim on a particular sensibility. That is to say, in this case, on the 
sensibility of humanism or a human rights discourse. One gesture places the scholar 
in a skeptical position to the local discourse-as-signifier and the other gesture appears 
to want to take the experience as something to be communicated unmediated. Both 
separate the act of violence from its meaning. The act is ethically reprehensible but 
the meaning is to be determined by the trained expert. In fact, it may be that only the 
scholar can determine both the ‘act’ and the meaning of the act. Since it is of course 
possible to envisage occasions where the anthropologist identifies an act as wrong 
within a particular discourse, and where the ‘victim’ might not, but it is the 
anthropologist who also then gives it an eligible meaning.  So both the ‘act’, which is 
identified as such, and the meaning it signifies can both come into view depending on 
the scholars conception of what constitutes an ‘act’, of illegitimate violence for 
example.   
 
My point is not to doubt the ethical saliency of drawing attention to these acts, nor to 
question motives, nor to diminish the undesirable ethical character of the practices 
that these encounters are confronted with. But it is, it seems to me, worthwhile to 
draw attention to the unquestioned role of the scholar in this encounter, particularly in 
the cases where this new role for the anthropologist – as committed, and 
emancipatory coincided with and is glossed as an opportunity to redeem the 
disciplinary future of anthropology where it was viewed as historically and 
questionably entangled with domination by bringing into its concerns new subjects.  
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The role of the anthropologist, even when self-consciously trying to ‘do the right 
thing’, has implications for the way in which the subject appears and is connected to 
the object that comes into view, as Pierre Bourdieu (1990) was to insist in his critique 
of objectivism and subjectivism (1990). And as Talal Asad observed in his discussion 
of anthropology and ideology, “anthropological texts construct for a whole society, or 
even a group within it, a total, integrated semantic system, which defines for that 
society what its essential identity is” (1979: 615). In this case, the culture becomes ‘a 
culture of fear’ or ‘terror’. A discipline’s impulse to ‘do the right thing’ can then run 
the risk of tripping over its own assumptions in its haste to be an agent of history.   
 
In my view this has a certain bearing on epistemic concerns broached by Taussig, and 
I think raises questions about whether he is able to find a way to think between the 
‘interstices’ of the real and the magical, and the implications of this gesture for the 
ethical project he seeks to undertake. Where one seeks to give the order of 
representation autonomy, one develops a conception of ‘consciousness’ as the site of 
intervention. This implies bringing attention to a disjunctive relationship between sign 
and signifier in order to effect a disruption of what appears as, in Saussurean terms, a 
‘motivated’, or stable relationship between sign and signifier, in order to open the 
space for different, more benign, or more progressive significations to circulate in the 
play of meanings.  
 
The Cartesian split Taussig seeks to avoid is still at work in what is supposed to be, in 
his case, a refusal of both a cultural relativism and a search for reason – that is to say, 
operating in the ‘epistemic murk’. Reason sneaks its way back in via the split between 
mind (representation in terror) and body (violence) and the rationalist-ethical 
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programme, which suggests that changing peoples ideas will change their behaviour. 
Behaviour is therefore still a cognitive act – an act of cognition, which responds to 
representations. But of course this is already a representation. That is to say, it is an 
epistemic representation: the representation of the scholars discourse and the way in 
which that discourse constructs the subject without recognizing how that subject 
comes into view with and in relation to specific objects of knowledge.  
 
Anthropology has made the study of state terror and unauthorized forms of violence 
an object of its study relatively recently. This moment broadly coincides with an 
important self-reflexive space that has been opened up by a number of compelling 
critiques. For some anthropologists the study of state terror offers an opportunity to 
redeem the anthropological project through a repositioning of its task in relation to 
power. That is to say, where anthropology might have been seen as the ‘handmaiden’ 
of colonialism, it could now, given its predilection for locality and ‘being-on-ground’, 
uniquely offer itself as a ‘voice for the voiceless’. It is not quite clear what 
anthropology’s role – if there was a singularity to it— was in relation to colonialism. 
It might not have been as benign as some think, or as complicit, and maybe even more 
differentiated. But as Talal Asad has pointed out, there is a quite different kind of self-
reflexiveness that should accompany anthropologies of the present. And that has to do 
with the anthropologists’ discourse and its relation to the kinds of objects it enquires 
into. It is not just a matter of the contiguity of knowledge to power or powerlessness, 
of a relationship to the dominated or the victims, but also of the saturation of 
knowledge production itself by relations of power. It is a matter of entering into a 
relationship of translation that through self-reflexivity opens us all to self-questioning 
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as much as the objects of knowledge are questioned about their naturalized practices 
and ways of doing things.   
 
South Africa: Writing Violence 
IV 
 
In the South African writing on political violence there are four broad ways in which 
the assassinations and the violence that I have described above, carried out by those 
worked for the security agencies of the South African government, is being written 
about. I deal with three of them briefly here, and the fourth in the following chapter. 
The first is a genre of investigative journalistic works. In these accounts of the 
violence perpetrated a distinction is made between a violence, which is graspable or 
reasonable, in contrast to acts of violence that can only be described as ‘evil.’ Indeed, 
the most prominent and pioneering of these accounts, written by an intrepid South 
African journalist of Afrikaner descent, Jacques Pauw (1991), makes a distinction 
between a kind of violence that can made be sense of and another kind which is only 
explainable through the pathologizing of the executioner- of the death squad killer as 
evil.  
 
In Pauw’s work we are taken through the details of operations and the skirmishes 
inside and outside the covert police unit, known colloquially as ‘Vlakplaas’, after the 
farm where the unit was headquartered. The violence is brought to us in the 
uncomfortable detail, which produces ‘scandal’. Victims were not only killed but also 
‘excessively’ mutilated even after they were medically ‘dead’. Pauw struggles to 
make sense of the excessiveness of the violence. Wrestling with the excessiveness of 
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this violence is a problem that can also be found in the work of Antjie Krog, a poet 
and journalist, also of Afrikaner descent, who reported on the proceedings of the TRC 
and authored ‘Country of My Skull’ (1998) that was subsequently turned into a motion 
picture. In one of the cases she narrates, a group of white policemen are to testify 
before the amnesty committee about the death of a former black policeman and his 
wife who were killed in their home. Each policeman will tell a different story, 
particularly as it pertains to the killing of the wife. Her death we are told was an 
unnecessary death, an excessive death, for which a ‘political motive’ could not readily 
be found: “When the amnesty hearing begins”, remembers Krog, “I go sit in a bench 
close to them, to look for signs --their hands, their fingernails, in their eyes, on their 
lips--signs that these are the faces of killers, of the Other. For future reference: the 
face of evil’ (1998: 14). For Krog, grappling to make the violence in their 
forthcoming testimonies intelligible, this violence is the product of evil, and she 
searches for clues to its presence, here to be read off the physiological bodies of the 
perpetrators. The excess of violence is evil because, as Humphrey argues in relation to 
“atrocity”, it “exceeds cultural discourses of law and morality which manage the 
circulation of everyday violence” (2002: 3). 
 
This medicalization of evil, as a pathological condition, is at the core of the work by 
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela’s (2003). A former commissioner of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and clinical psychologist, Gobodo-Madikizela spent 
many hours interviewing the Vlakplaas commander, Eugene De Kock in prison, in 
order to get at how “monsters are produced in a political system” (2003: 16). She 
reflects movingly that,  
  
39 
I saw De Kock in my tortured mind’s eye in his most vicious state- as 
prime evil. These images were too difficult to take in, too much to 
comprehend, even if I could imagine them. I had to remind myself that if 
it was that difficult for me, how much worse it must have been for the 
people who had faced evil directly and had been destroyed because of it. 
Here I was, reaching out with my human hand to touch the physical body 
that had made evil happen (2003: 38). 
Drawing the connection between medicalization and evil, she writes that,  
The distance between evil and sickness is not that great. The evil 
component of crimes against humanity is the moral failing. The sickness 
aspect is the defect in perspective, the distortion in mental processing that 
precedes the evil and is intensified by it (2003: 58).  
For Gobodo-Madikizela, ‘evil’ connotes a condition where particular acts become 
possible, and to an ability to commit those acts without having a ‘conscience’ bear 
upon those who commit these acts. This is the pathological dimension. The 
recognition of the categorical claims of ‘human’ is naturalized in this view. It takes as 
its foundation ethical boundaries concerning the integrity of what we know as the 
modern rights bearing subject of political discourse.12  This operates within a 
consent/domination binary and presupposes an ethically prior condition of humanity 
in which human beings are naturally predisposed against being ‘dominant.’  
 
Such interpretations of humanity are anchored in ideas about various dispositions and 
foundational sensibilities outraged by injustice. A sensibility that is not so outraged 
                                                
12 This is a widespread foundational assumption from which many studies of state violence proceed. 
The naturalization of the assumption often leads them focus on extra-judicial forms of violence as 
problematic while ignoring its relationship to ‘authorized’ forms of state violence (Mamdani, 2004).  
See Talal Asad (2003) for a useful problematization of this assumption as it pertains to the category of 
the ‘human’ in human rights discourse, and in relation to torture. 
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and does not recognize this ethical claim takes the subject across the threshold into 
‘evil’, since evil is the capacity to violate the sovereign and ethical boundaries of 
personhood beyond reasonableness. That excess of violence, the ability to not just 
take life, but mutilate the body, to do so without remorse or ‘feeling’, is for Gobodo-
Madikizela, intelligible if we translate the metaphysical ‘evil’, into a modern 
medicalized discourse of ‘illness’: evil is sickness.  
 
An illustrative example of the second approach is to be found in the chapter on 
perpetrators contained in the TRC report. Its attempt is to paint a more intricate 
picture of those identified as perpetrators. Concerned as it was with ‘gross violations 
of human rights’, the report also wrestles to “explain why and how these violations 
transpired”. It notes that it is “essential to examine the perpetrators as multi-
dimensional and rounded individuals rather than simply characterizing them as 
purveyors of horrendous acts”.13 In the TRC framing ‘perpetrators of gross violations 
of human rights’ are divided into three categories: 1) those who defended apartheid 
directly, as in state personnel, 2) those who fought against apartheid and used 
methods which were seen to be a gross violation of human rights and 3) violence 
perpetrated between those organizations who were resisting apartheid.  
 
There is another body of South African literature that also deals specifically with 
illegal state violence, and the institutionalization of covert agencies, and which 
constitutes the hegemonic narration of this violence in the 1980’s.  Most of these are 
studies were produced before the TRC hearings began in 1994, and sited in the TRC’s 
own construction of the recent apartheid past. These works map the institutional 
                                                
13 TRC Report, vol 5, chapter 7, p 259 
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forms of the apartheid state as a progression towards militarization.  In some instances 
it was work done with considerable risk to the authors.14   
This literature explains the turn to exceptional violence in the 1980s by the increased 
influence of the military over democratic and accountable civilian rule (Seegers, 
1996; Chidester1991; Grundy1986; Swilling 1990; Cock & Nathan 1989; Selfe 1998). 
Heuristically, ‘militarism’ acts in these studies like the bureaucracy in tension with 
the citizen as Hannah Arendt described it: “Bureaucracy is always a government of 
experts, of an ‘experienced minority’ which has to resist as well as it knows how the 
constant pressure from the ‘inexperienced majority” (1973: 214). The literature makes 
the point that it was the military, rather than the civilians who had the most influence 
over policy making. The State Security Council was in effect, ‘a government within a 
government’. Like Ivan Evans’s (1997) work on the Native Affairs Department 
(NAD) in the 1950’s, in which he argues the NAD became a ‘state within a state’, 
there is a tendency in this literature to allow the technology of rule to explain its 
rationale.  
 
In this literature ‘military’, and  ‘civilian’ are counterposed normatively, and each is 
naturalized as transcendental and distinct modes of governing, regardless of the 
historical particularity and social specificity of the forms and modes they take in 
different conditions. Secondly, the normative salience of ‘civilian’ is asserted in 
relation to ‘military.’ In a related argument the rise of the military is accounted for by 
the fact that the former Minister of Defence became the Prime Minister in 1978, 
bringing with him a Cold War discourse to mask their racialized interests (Pottinger 
1988; Hamann 2001; Roherty 1992). The belief in a communist threat was, this 
                                                
14 The anthropologist David Webster (1988) who was researching state strategy and death squads, was 
assassinated by a police covert unit. 
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literature professes, ‘ideological’, in the pejorative sense that it masked a set of real 
interests, and therefore was a strategically invoked (Gottschalk 2000; Van Vuuren & 
Liebenberg 1998; Lawrence 1990).  
 
The engagement with the communist threat is therefore seen as a strategic rhetorical 
deployment of a global Cold War discourse by the South African state which, 
according to these scholars, re-positioned South Africa in the geo-political ‘West’ in 
order to maintain its local aims: a racialized and ethnicized order of privilege.15  In 
this literature, Van Vuuren and Liebenberg’s is the most elaborated attempt to focus 
analytically on the ideological dimension of the apartheid state in the 1980’s. It makes 
displacement of the ‘real’ its mode of explanation.16  I am weary of following this 
way of thinking for the same reasons which make ‘false consciousness’ a problematic 
way in which to think about social phenomena.17 Furthermore, such explanations 
either psychologize the motives of individual agents (as with Krog and Gobodo-
Madikizela), or expect us to be able to find the ‘real’ motives.  
 
As Mahmood Mamdani has forcefully argued in his critique of the TRC, 
understanding apartheid in the post-apartheid era has become a matter of proving and 
disproving individual responsibility for individualized suffering, (Mamdani, 2001b).  
One could argue that ‘apartheid’ and ‘violence’ were in fact separated by the TRC. 
                                                
15 There is an ambiguity here which Michel-Rolph Trouillot calls constructivism’s dilemma: ‘[t]o state 
that a particular narrative legitimates particular policies is to refer implicitly to a ‘true’ account of these 
policies through time, an account which itself can take the form of a counter narrative…It is to admit 
that as ambiguous and contingent as it is, the boundary between what happened and that which is said 
to have happened is necessary. It is not that some societies distinguish between fiction and history and 
others do not. Rather, the difference is in the range of narratives that specific collectivities must put to 
their own tests of historical credibility because of the stakes involved in these narratives’ (1995, pp 13-
14).  
16 There are two important recent edited volumes in exceptions to this thinking about the Cold War in 
Southern Africa, Sue Onslow (2009) and Peter Vale and Gary Baine’s (2008) Beyond the Border: New 
Perspectives on Southern Africa’s Late Cold War Conflicts, Pretoria: Unisa Press 
17 See Bourdieu (1980) 
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Where Apartheid in a certain historical moment was a term that contained within 
itself the word violence, making a separation tautological, in the post-apartheid era 
this separation has produced complicated effects. Apartheid has been seen as a set of 
gross violations of Human Rights, rendering the latter liable and the former opaque, 
and in the process normalizing one kind of violence while pathologizing another. We 
have therefore been moved to study the bodies, search their remains for traces of the 
state that might have been left at the scene of the violence. This is the forensic work 
performed in the production of a counter-narrative to the state. We have been looking 
for the state on the body, for its fingerprints and its presence. We want to place it at 
the scene at that very time at that very place. Where was the state at that time? Did it 
have an alibi? Death as a result of political violence in South Africa under apartheid 
has produced ‘who’ questions that simultaneously had readymade answers. A popular 
answer is then sought to be turned into a legal certainty. The work of human rights 
organizations, victims support groups and ‘progressive’ lawyers working on political 
deaths focuses on the need for evidence. Evidence that is undeniable and made visible 
provokes at best an official inquest and a commission of inquiry, but also today, a 
potential criminal prosecution of those who did not apply for amnesty, or were not 
granted amnesty.  
 
The Goniwe killings were considered in an inquest hearing, two commissions of 
enquiry and featured as a prominent case at the TRC. The question ‘who did it’ drove 
one element of the TRC as part of a political settlement. A political settlement would 
have to answer the ‘who’ question for one side of a conflict, while at the same time 
set the other party at ease by reducing the repercussions of admission. In other words, 
it transformed justice into truth rather than punishment.  The relationship between 
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amnesty and truth-telling in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s mandate has 
been to answer the who question in its specificity by asking for confessions, which 
would perform the transaction between legal guilt and moral absolution.  At the end 
of this process we have been asked to think of the Cradock Four’s killings as  the 
result of the actions of seven individuals who violated the human rights of four 
individuals. 
 
As I yet again consider this instance of violence, a larger question poses itself: Can 
thinking about this violence unsettle certain narratives about apartheid? The TRC has 
encouraged us to think that most questions about apartheid have been answered. But 
how, for example, if we accept Mahmood Mamdani’s criticism, did apartheid shift at 
the TRC from being understood as a ‘crime against humanity’ to being understood as 
a cumulative and calculable number of ‘gross violations of human rights’?  
 
If we wish to think beyond the individualizing move that the TRC makes, we would 
need to reconsider this violence in relation to apartheid. We will need to think about 
how this violence relates to the law itself since apartheid was a legal regime. And we 
would need to think about how this violence—orphaned by both law and the official 
political narrative—relates to the constitution of political community in a society with 
a colonial genealogy. Pursuing these questions in the chapters ahead, I trace then the 
figures of Matthew Goniwe and his comrades as they are fashioned in legal discourse 
on the one had – as victims of human rights abuses, and as they are constituted in 
political discourse on the other – transformed from activists leading a community in a 








Mediations of Pain and Suffering and the Production of Apartheids’ Victim 
 
No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than the 
discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on 
regarding as ‘inalienable’ those human rights which are enjoyed only by citizens of 
the most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of the rightless 
themselves  
Hannah Arendt (1973: 278)  
 
 
What has been the social, legal and political life after death of the Cradock Four? 
When Matthew Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkonto and Sicelo Mlhauli were killed 
there was a deliberate attempt to erase not only the identity of the perpetrators, but 
also of the victims. The security apparatus of the apartheid state knew full well that 
deaths of activists gave life to resistance, through funerals that would become mass 
gatherings acting like coals in an inferno of anti-apartheid sentiment, and infuse life 
into anti-apartheid organizations often wilting under the weight of repression. In death 
and as victims of state violence, the Cradock Four have continued to come to life as 
symbolic representations that reside both in a time- as markers of late apartheid and 
the State of Emergency of the 1980’s—as well in ways that transcend the time of the 
event—as shapers of how justice would have to be imagined in a post-apartheid South 
Africa. In this chapter I seek to explore how the Cradock Four have come into being, 
and symbolically mobilized into life, within juridical discourses on pain, suffering and 
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justice which, in complex and cumulative ways, index the contours of a national 
political imaginary of justice in post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
Living, vital and alive, Matthew Goniwe and his comrades were by 1985 ‘enemies of 
the state’, later inaugurated into new identities in death: they became ‘victims’ of state 
violence, now counted among those who have come to stand in for the wrong of 
apartheid. This transformation, a material one from biological life to biological death, 
was also a transformation in identity at epistemic, ontological and juridical levels. 
Such a transformation occurred discursively as death was translated into the realms of 
the political, security, legal apparatuses and logics. These in turn produced varied 
subjects with differing social imperatives leading to different juridico-political 
consequences. The enemy, I will later show, is a political-military and corporatized 
identity, while the ‘victim’, framed within the human rights discourse, tends toward 
individualization. The understanding of the killing of the Cradock Four as ‘victims’ 
rather than ‘enemies’ has had substantive implications for the way in which we have 
come to understand the possibilities and forms of legal and political justice in post-
apartheid South Africa.  
 
 
In her study of sexual and criminal violence in post-apartheid South Africa, the 
anthropologist Rosalind C. Morris detects what she has called a ‘legal fetish’ amongst 
poor black communities. Morris notes that “[l]egal rhetoric suffuses everyday 
discourse in rural and urban areas, inflecting everyday idioms in many languages with 
the lexicons of legal procedure—and not infrequently, the clichés of American 
televisions courtroom melodramas. Such language often appears fetishistic, with legal 
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terms acquiring a near magical aura” (2006: 61). Morris’s synchronic analysis picks 
up on an important observation: that ‘legalism’, a certain awareness and recourse to 
law as a strategic domain of engagement, pervades certain ways of talking about 
‘crime’. She accounts for this legal fetishism through the globalization of American 
television and a discursive language put in motion in and through the TRC hearings, 
particularly those for amnesty.  
 
I find this to be an inadequate account for ‘legalism’ for two reasons. Whilst the 
popularity, particularly amongst poorer communities, of day-time American 
courtroom dramas, is indeed part of the story, it seems to me the case is overstated, 
along with the assumed discursively popular imprint the TRC exercises on the wider 
society. This attribution of a disproportionate purchase of the TRC’s discourse on the 
realm of the popular is due in part, I would suggest, to the failure to situate her 
argument historically.18 It seems to me that that what she describes as a legal fetish to 
describe the purchase of legal discourse springs not so much from a way in which to 
speak about ‘crime’, but rather as a way in which to speak about, contain and right a 
‘wrong’. Viewed this way, the pervasiveness of a certain recourse to legal discourse 
in relation to ‘crime’ should be seen as a way of speaking about what ‘crime’ 
signifies, both from the vantage point of communities who suffer higher levels of 
subjection and susceptibility to criminal victimization, and at the same time, in which 
higher levels of actual and potential ‘perpetrators’ might also be found. For most 
victims of crime, law is both a mechanism and an authorized discourse for speaking 
about righting the wrong which victimhood is coterminous with.  I suggest 
‘authorised’, because this can co-exist with other popular and legally ‘illegitimate’ 
                                                
18 Rosalind C. Morris (2006) ‘The Mute and the Unspeakable: Political Subjectivity, Violent Crime and 
the “Sexual Thing” in a South African Mining Community’, in Comaroff, J and Comaroff J. eds. Law 
and Disorder in the Postcolony, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
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mechanisms to right a wrong of crime, such as witchcraft or ‘informal justice’, meted 
out by sangomas, vigilante groups, taxi drivers or private security structures. This is 
not confined to victims only. For perpetrators, ‘law’ could be a mode of seeking 
justice too, used in order to prove one’s innocence, for being absolved of guilt, or for 
freeing oneself from prison. Both ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ therefore engage the 
law as a mechanism for righting a wrong.  
 
What I would hold onto from Morris’s argument is this pervasiveness of what I would 
describe as a will-to-familiarity with legal procedure.  This desire to know legal 
procedure I will argue is not inaugurated in the postapartheid era, nor is it inaugurated 
through the globalized circulation of day-time court room drama televisions series. 
Rather, it is a rationality that emerges from, and in relation to the apartheid state’s 
coming into being, its repressive implementation from the 1950’s onwards in 
particular, and the hegemonic and rights-based responses to this repression. The 
pervasiveness of a ‘legal fetish’ can therefore be located in an antecedent rationality 
that took recourse to law and invoked ‘rights,’ particularly ‘human rights’ and 
attendant notions of justice especially in the latter years of the anti-apartheid struggle.  
 
I contend that the will-to-familiarity with legal procedure and the ‘legal fetish’ Morris 
describes are linked by a legal and particularly human rights discourse that made its 
way into the apartheid victims’ imaginary; victimhood came to be inhabited as a 
human rights violation and apartheid became homologous to a human rights ‘wrong’. 
The question of ‘justice’ was therefore articulated as central to the actions and 
concerns of human rights lawyers more generally, and in the particularity of South 
Africa’s recent past. Justice for a brave coterie of mostly white human rights lawyers, 
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who had challenged the apartheid state within the legal parameters it set out, would 
have to have its day, so to speak, in court. The victims of apartheid had been victims 
of injustice, and this would have to be remedied in a ‘just’ and ‘democratic’ post-
apartheid South Africa if the wrong of apartheid as a ‘crime against humanity’ was to 
be undone.  
 
One of the vigorous concerns of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was to 
address itself to this question of justice, yet it would have to do so without 
jeopardizing a political compromise. The South African sociologist Deborah Posel 
has posed this as the challenge of and for the act of ‘truth telling’ in Truth 
Commissions.19 In her study on the forms and implications of ‘truth’, as produced in 
the TRC, Posel notes that Truth Commissions produce particular kinds of victims. 
“Being declared, and claiming the status of, a victim is also a positioning in 
contemporary political fields of rights and entitlements, obligations and 
responsibilities (Posel, 2008, p123).” ‘Truth Commissions’, she goes on, “then, are 
occasions wherein negative commemoration can route its discourses and ethical 
imperatives into the politics of fledgling democracies seeking to come to terms with 
recent histories of intensely violent and divisive conflict” (ibid).  
 
Posel footnotes a controversy around the interpretation of the mandate by the 
Commission of the South African TRC, and its decision to focus on ‘gross violations 
                                                
19 Posel, D (2008) ‘History as Confession, the Case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’, Public Culture, vol.20, no. 1; Leigh Payne has also taken up the concern with the 
‘confessional mode’ in a comparative study of state violence and truth commissions in Argentina, 
Chile, Brazil and South Africa. Her comparison of the ‘state violence’ of apartheid with three 
dictatorial military regimes in South America is ontologically flawed however, since it equates 
apartheid with its ‘exceptional’ violence, that of its death squads.  Cf. Leigh Payne (2008) Unsettling 





of human rights’, but she pursues no further the implications of this for the labour of 
‘Truth’ that she identifies in the mandate of TRC: ‘its rights, entitlements, obligations 
and responsibilities’. Instead she shifts focus to the role of the ‘confessional’ mode in 
the hearings themselves, as individual victims and perpetrators narrated their stories 
in exchange for amnesty.  
 
I would like to hold on to this notion of the TRC producing a particular ‘Truth’, which 
carries a moral-political burden, where ‘Truth’ is less about a metaphysical clarity but 
is rather an authoritative discourse (Asad 1979) – the product of contestation, sets of 
institutions and apparatuses, and discursive formations saturated with power 
relations20. The ‘Truth’ of the TRC therefore provides an account of the past, a 
narrative meant to provide a function for various expectations especially those of 
building a common political community out of a violent past; such a community 
would deliver justice for wrongs of that past. The ‘Truth’ of such a narrative is seen to 
have a life giving potential (potenza), the possibility of a birth, but also the fear of a 
miscarriage. That truth, could therefore shed light or cast a shadow, bring into 
existence, or diminish in potential, the possibilities of what justice might look like in a 
post-apartheid society.  
 
In one of the most challenging critiques of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, Mahmood Mamdani has argued that the interpretation of the mandate of 
the TRC by the Commission has had substantive implications for shaping the forms 
                                                
20 This formulation of the problem derives from Michel Foucault’s essay ‘Truth and Power’ in 




justice – of ethics and obligations – operative in the post-apartheid present21. He 
argues that the question of the injustice of apartheid was recast in a manner that might 
have brought into existence a form of justice not adequate to the righting of the 
wrongs of apartheid. Redefined by the TRC, apartheid’s injustice and the suffering of 
its victims, highlighted by human rights lawyers, became rather truncated, reshaping 
and restraining the forms and possibilities of imagining political justice in post-
apartheid South Africa. Mamdani argues that it did so in three ways. Firstly,  
The TRC individualized the victims of apartheid. Though it 
acknowledged apartheid as a “crime against humanity’ which targeted 
entire communities for ethnic and racial policing and cleansing, the 
Commission majority was reluctant to go beyond the formal 
acknowledgement…Where entire communities were victims of gross 
violations of rights, the Commission acknowledged only individual 
victims. If the “crime against humanity” involved a targeting of entire 
communities for racial and ethnic cleansing and policing, individualizing 
the victim obliterated this particular—many would argue central—
characteristic of apartheid. Limiting the definition of harm and remedy to 
individuals center-staged political activists as victims of apartheid, as 
indeed happened at the victims’ hearings (Mamdani 2002: 33-4).  
 
Secondly, in the emphasis on individual suffering the TRC obscured the corporate 
nature of victims by “obscuring the victmization of communities….”  
                                                
21 A less convincing critique of the TRC, as ‘an elite settlment’,  can be found in Richard A. Wilson’s 
(2001) The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South African. Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid 
State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; for an attempt to draw attention to the collective rather 
than individual nature of apartheid injustice, from an economistic perspective, see Sampie 
Terreblanche (2000) ‘Dealing with Systematic injustice’, in Villa-Vicencio, C & Verwoed, W. eds. 
Looking Back, Reaching Forward, Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South 
Africa, Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press. 
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…. The TRC was unable to highlight the bifurcated nature of apartheid as 
a form of power that governed natives differently from non-natives. If the 
apartheid state spoke the language of rights to the white population, it 
dissagregated the native population into tribal groups—each to be 
administered under a separate set of laws—in the name of enforcing 
custom…The TRC’s failure lay in focusing exclusively on the “civil” 
regime and in totally ignoring the “customary” regime.22 
And thirdly, while the TRC might have intended in its mandate to avoid impunity, in 
effect it “extended impunity to most perpetrators of apartheid. In the absence of a full 
acknowledgement of victims of apartheid, there could not be a complete identification 
of its perpetrators” (Mamdani 2002:33-4).  
 
This argument suggests that ‘injustice,’ ‘crime’ and ‘violation’ are conditions that we 
could argue had come to reside metonymically inside the word ‘apartheid’. That to 
speak ‘apartheid’, and to name it as such was also simultaneously to name a crime 
against humanity, a fundamental injustice, and an internationally recognized crime. 
To enunciate ‘apartheid’ was therefore to simultaneously enunciate a violation and 
violence, making it superfluous to supplement additional adjectives to its enunciation: 
one did not have to say ‘apartheid is wrong’ or ‘apartheid’ is ‘injustice’, or ‘apartheid’ 
                                                
22 It is a common short hand to describe apartheid by reference to racial classification and 
discrimination.  It is therefore worth recalling that the Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950, 
makes an explicit distinction between race and ethnicity in the legal identification of residents within 
the territory of South Africa. Section 5(1) notes that ‘Every person whose name is included in the 
register shall be classified by the Director as a white person, a coloured person or a native, as the case 
may be, and every coloured person and every native whose name is so included shall be classified by 
the Director according to the ethnic or other group to which he belongs. Section 7(1) notes that ‘There 
shall, in respect of every person whose is included in the register, other than native, be included in the 
register the following particulars and no other particulars…’, and it then lists a series of categories 
including age, sex, date of birth and so on. Section 7(2) in a separate subsection sets out the provisions 
for those defined as ‘natives’: ‘There shall be in respect of every native whose name is included in the 
register, be included the following particulars…’ and it then sets out a similar list, with a few additions: 
it adds ‘his citizenship, or nationality, the ethnic or other group and the tribe to which he belongs.’ 
(emphasis added) (Brookes 1968:19-20). 
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is a ‘crime’.  To articulate ‘apartheid’ was to simultaneously invoke, to bring into 
being in the very articulation, a composite wrong that had come to be part of the sign, 
as the semiotician Ferdinand Saussure would argue, ‘motivated’ into the very form 
and fiber of the sign itself (Saussure 1988). Yet, in the TRC’s operationalization of its 
mandate, it undid this, discursively disaggregating apartheid and ‘violence’, apartheid 
and ‘injustice’, and apartheid and ‘crime’. Apartheid now stood as an empty signifier 
shorn of its historically produced implicit and categorical meaning, and rendered 
available for reassembly. It would allow for choices to be made about what ‘wrongs’ 
or injustices to attach to it, and which forms could be placed in a homologous 
relationship to each other now not quite inside the word, but alongside and next to it, 
and requiring their own separate enunciation if they were to be recognized.  
 
In other words, apartheid and its significations were pulled apart in order to be 
reconstituted within the realm of the political, as meaning to be unmade and remade. 
In the process, apartheid itself, now rendered empty, gave way to that which was 
placed as supplement to it: the violence that was used to defend its existence rather 
than the violence that resided in its very being ‘thought’. As Mamdani notes “After 
mapping the nature of apartheid in three eloquent but summary pages, ‘the mandate’ 
section of the Report dismissed it in a single sentence as background to its real work. 
It is this systematic and all pervading character of apartheid that provides the 
background for the present investigation. Reduced to ‘context’ or ‘the background’ to 
gross human rights violations, apartheid was effectively written out of the report of 




In effect then, the TRC took as the focus of its mandate not apartheid as a ‘policy’, 
but rather the conflicts that emanated from the implementation of the policies, from 
the ‘excess’ of policy rather than policy itself, what Hannah Arendt referred to as 
‘persecution by law’ (Arendt 1963: 268). The conflicts between hegemonic desires 
and resistant practices produced actions and reactions which were categorized as 
‘gross violations of human rights’ by those implementing and defending the policies 
of apartheid, and also, the TRC decided, by those resisting the implementation of 
these policies. In effect then, it considered the violations in the actions between state 
agents and activists, as Mamdani notes, “Although there was debate within the 
Commission about the interpretation of the mandate, it was agreed upon that the Act 
which established the TRC prescribed that: 
[t]he Objectives of the Commission shall be to promote national unity and 
reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions 
of the past- 
a. establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent 
of gross violations of human rights which were committed during the period 
from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date,  including the antecedents, 
circumstances, factors and context of such violations, as well as the 
perspectives of the victims and the motives and perspectives of the persons 
responsible for the commission of the violations, by conducting investigations 
and holding meetings;…’ (TRC 1998 vol. 1, p55 para 31 cited in Mamdani 
2002: 39).  
The TRC went on to note that 
… “gross violations of human rights” means the violation of human rights 
through- (a) the killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment of any 
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person; or (b) any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or 
procurement to commit an act referred to in paragraph (a), which emanated 
from conflicts of the past and which was committed during the period 1 March 
1960 to May 1994 within or outside the Republic, and the commission of 
which was advised, planned, directed, commanded or ordered by any person 
acting with a political motive’ (TRC 1998 vol. 1,  p60, para 42 cited in 
Mamdani 2002: 39).  
 
Within this agreed upon definition the Commission would have to further refine its 
definitions. One of these would be how to define ‘severe ill-treatment’. As the 
Commmission report notes ‘the ordinary meaning of  “severe ill treatment” suggests 
that all those whose rights had been violated during the conflicts of the past were 
covered by this definition, and fell therefore, within the mandate of the Commission. 
This view was expressed in the submissions of a number of organizations and groups 
representing, for example, victims of forced removals and Bantu education. While 
taking these submissions very seriously, the Commission resolved that the mandate 
was to give attention to human rights violations committed as specific acts, resulting 
from severe physical and/or mental injury, in the course of past conflict’ (TRC 1998 
vol. 1, p64 para 54 cited in Mamdani 2002: 39). These specific violations were further 
refined. As Mamdani describes it, the ‘Commission majority made three further 
distinctions- between “bodily integrity rights’ and “subsistence rights”, between 
individual and group rights, and finally between political and non-political 
motivations behind each violation—and ruled that only politically motivated 
violations of bodily integrity (but not subsistence) rights of individuals (but not 




I have for the purposes of this chapter, reproduced a snapshot of the argument 
Mamdani makes. The argument itself is more extended and rigorous in its elaboration. 
I have found his overall critique of the interpretation of the mandate of the TRC by 
the Commission, and the resultant limitations it placed on how we understand 
apartheid-- as gross violations of human rights pertaining to bodily integrity-- and the 
implications it has for justice claims we can make in relation to apartheid in post-
apartheid South Africa, a compelling challenge.  The question that it raises, and which 
Mamdani is less forthcoming on in his critique, is one about how we might account 
for the decisions of the Commission to interpret its mandate in the way that it did? 
Why in the end the focus on ‘gross violations of human rights’ as individualized, and 
why the privileging of bodily integrity over other forms of severe ill-treatment, like 
forced removals, pass laws, and deliberate economic underdevelopment which 
affected millions more than the 22,000 people eventually identified as ‘victims of 
apartheid’?    
 
I want to suggest that a consideration of the case of the legal life after death of the 
Cradock Four- the first case heard by the TRC- might illuminate this question. I think 
that we may find a context for the decisions that the Commission of the TRC made in 
a certain genealogy of suffering and ‘severe ill treatment’ in South Africa’s recent 
past, and how ill treatment and suffering was mediated. We may of course take pain 
and suffering to be  purely individually experienced somatic bodily conditions, but 
pain and suffering experienced by groups are also socially mediated through 
institutions, languages and paradigmatically in modern societies, through law .  It is 




in this mediation of pain and suffering through law, that we may find the contours 
which have shaped a hegemonic conception of framing pain and suffering, which I 
want to suggest, established a legacy which exercised itself in various ways, into the 
life of the TRC, and the production of the ‘victim’ of apartheid wrongs, as an 
individual victim of gross violations of human rights.  
 
It seems to me that ‘Human Rights’ has emerged as the hegemonic discourse of that 
language which seeks to speak pain and suffering from a counter-hegemonic 
discourse of ‘resistance’ and ‘agency’. The valence of ‘Human Rights’ is central to 
the framing of the South African constitution that contains what it calls its ‘Chapter 
Nine’ institutions, which have institutionalized Human Rights through statutory 
bodies such as a Human Rights Commission, a Gender Commission, and a number of 
others, all centrally focused on the ‘protection of human rights’.24 A public holiday, 
previously commemorated as marking a police massacre of 69 black South Africans 
by the South African Police in the township of Sharpeville in 1961, is now 
commemorated as ‘Human Rights Day’ in South Africa. How then has ‘Human 
Rights’ become the dominant discourse for framing ‘injustice’, pain and suffering 
within the realm of the political? What happens in the post-apartheid present when we 
understand apartheid’s past as a series of episodic and individualized ‘human rights’ 
violations that occur after 1960? In other words, we might ask ‘what do human rights 
do’?25  
                                                
24 See ‘Chapter Nine’ of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 1996. 
25 I am drawing, for the framing of the question in this way, on Talal Asad’s discussion ‘Redeeming the 
“Human” through Human Rights’, in (2003) Formations of the Secular, Chritianity, Islam and 
Modernity, Stanford: Standford University Press. Hannah Arendt (1968) importantly raised the 
question of “human rights” as I note below. There is also a growing body of work in various 
disciplines, from Anthropology to Political Science, that are critically considering “human rights”, 
humanitiariansism, and the political dimensions of their invocation as the language of redemption and 
progressive politics, particularly after the Cold War and Bandung imaginaries have imploded. See 




It is important that I register at the outset that this is not the casting of easy aspersions 
or judgements on individuals or their motives. It is rather, a consideration of what we 
might think of as the complex ways in which historical conjunctures and confluences, 
geographies and imaginaries, knowledge and ethics, come together to produce certain 
effects. These are more often than not unintended consequences. And they carry with 
them sometimes when we look at them from afar, the narrative and emotive effect of 
historical actors and subjectivities inhabiting a drama where multiples narratives 
might be produced – the narrative of triumphalism in the way that national liberation 
movements that consider a past, re-order and repackage ‘the nations’ historiography; 
or, it might take on the narrative form of a tragedy26 so that some might mobilize it in 
the service of a critique of a present.  
 
Mahmood Mamdani’s criticism of the TRC is premised on an understanding of the 
apartheid state as a technology of colonial rule, a form of power that bifurcates 
political rule in order to create a realm of citizens and a realm subjects, a process that 
resides in the one hundred years and more prior to 1960. It is a view that places at the 
                                                                                                                                      
Jersey: Princeton University Press; Makau Mutua (2002) Human Rights: A Political and Cultural 
Critique, Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press; Wendy Brown (2004) ‘Human Rights and the 
Politics of Fatalism, South Atlantic Quarterly, 103: 2/3 Ellen Messer (1993) ‘Anthropology and Human 
Rights’, Annual Review of Anthropology, no. 22; Etienne Balibar (2004) "Is a Philosophy Of. Human 
Rights Possible," in South Atlantic Quaterly 2/3, Spring 20; Jacques Ranciere (2004) "Who is the 
Subject of Human Rights," in South Atlantic Quaterly 2/3, Spring ; Slavoj Zizek, ‘Against Human 
Rights’; Kate Schick (2006) ‘Beyond Rules: A Critique of the Liberal Human Rights Regime, 
International Relations, vol. 20, no.3; Richard Wilson (2006) ‘Afterword to “Anthropology and Human 
Rights in a New Key”: the Social Life of Human Rights’, American Anthropologist, vol. 108, no. 1; 
Annelise Riles (2006) ‘Anthropology, Human Rights and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage’, 
American Anthropologist, vol. 108, no. 1; John Hagan & Ron Levi (2007) ‘Justiciability as Field 
Effect: When Sociology Meets Human Rights’, Sociological Forum, Vol. 22, no. 3;3;Rajagopal 
Balakrishnan (2003) International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World 
Resistance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
26 The stylistic invocation of ‘tragedy’ as genre in the narrative structure of postcolonial criticism has 
been discussed with considerable nuance and insight by David Scott in his reflection on CLR James’ 
classic account of the Haitian Revolution. Cf Scott,D  (2004) Conscripts of Modernity: the Tragedy of 
Colonial Enlightenment, Durham: Duke University Press.  
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center of apartheid the colonial legacy of citizenship, an identity mediated by Law: 
one could be a rights bearing individual or one could be a subject living under 
customary law. Understanding apartheid in this way makes the ‘native question’ a 
central focus of understanding the violence of apartheid and what it meant. Apartheid 
has also, I would suggest within a certain dominant counter-hegemonic discourse to 
state power, come to be seen as a disputatious contention over the right and access to 
‘Human Rights.’  
 
An account of the critique of apartheid that emerges, framed within a rights discourse, 
is crucial to an account of how the TRC came to interpret its mandate in the way that 
it did. This account requires a discussion of the valence and investment in law, and of 
the rise the figure of the ‘human rights lawyer’, as the mediating figure between the 
world of the (racialized) citizen and the (ethnicized) subject. It is to this discussion 
that I now turn. 
 
Apartheid and the Majesty of Law 
 
Delivering first Ernie Wentzel Memorial Lecture in 198727, the senior South African 
advocate, Sydney Kentridge Q.C, dwelt at length in the opening of his talk on the 
ethics and ideological beliefs that the late Ernie Wentzel had come to stand for. 
Wentzel, he noted, ‘held strong beliefs about the law and about the society in which 
                                                
27 Kentridge, S (1987) ‘Law and Lawyers in a Changing Society’, The First Ernie Wentzel Memorial 
Lecture, Johannesburg: Center for Applied Legal Studies. Sidney Kentridge became a senior counsel in 
1965 in South Africa, and was a defence lawyer in some of the most significant political trials, 
including the Treason Trial (1958-1961) and later represented the family of the late Black Conscious 
leader, Steven Bantu Biko, at the inquest into his death in police custody in 1977. Thereafter Kentridge 
practiced law as member of the English Bar, and was appointed Queens Counsel in 1984.He served as 
a Judge in Botswana and an acting Justice in the Constitutional Court of postapartheid South Africa. 
This biographical information taken from website of the Presidency of the Republic of South Africa on 
the occasion of a national order of merit to Kentridge for his role as an anti-apartheid lawyer: 
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/orders_list.asp?show=395, accessed on 01/05/2010.  
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he practiced law…He detested racism, white or black, and he detested Fascism, 
whether of the left or the right. Above all’, noted Kentridge, ‘he believed in individual 
rights and individual choices’.  Holding these beliefs, recalled Kentridge, would mean 
that it was ‘inevitable’ that Wentzel would become an ‘opponent’ of the government, 
and ‘inevitable too, that in his profession he should be a forceful defender of the 
victims of government policies’ (1987: 11).  This inevitable conflict and oppositional 
stance would lead to a three month spell of detention without trial for the Advocate 
who opposed the laws of the government, during the 1960 State of Emergency.  
 
In this next section I explore the relationship between law and apartheid as a 
relationship between a certain conception of law and a certain conception of politics 
as it emerges in and through the autobiography of human rights law and lawyers in 
South Africa. I am taking this autobiography to describe both a legal disposition as 
well as a subjectivity that unfolds in a certain kind of praxis.  I am treating law as a 
discourse here, with its own modes of evidentiary practices, epistemological rules and 
ontologies which produces its own subject and objects, and which are to be thought in 
concrete time and space (Bourdieu 1987). I am therefore interested here in tracing the 
idiomatic features of human rights law in the context of apartheid South Africa, 
through its autobiographical narrative from the standpoint of its ‘advocates’, in the 
double meaning of that phrase. 
 
There are three aspects of this narrative that I wish to elaborate on and underscore. 
The first is to consider how those lawyers who held a view critical of the legal-
philosophical injunctions of ‘legal positivism’ would relate to the law of apartheid as 
law, and the ethical-political consequences over whether to participate in this legal 
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framework or not.  I believe that it is in a tradition of what has been called ‘courtroom 
activism’ that we can grasp the investment and disposition of lawyers like Nicholson 
and Bizos, and the methods and strategies that they deployed in the inquests amnesty 
hearing later on, of the Cradock Four. The second is to consider the normative 
understanding of ‘law’ that emerges here, in term of what was at stake in the 
upholding of one legal philosophical tradition of interpretation over another. Lastly, I 
wish to bring into relief the form of the political critique of apartheid that emerges 
from the legal critique, so to speak. In other words, to ask, how does a hegemonic 
conception of the ‘wrong’ of apartheid come into being?  It is this critique, which I 
argue produces a certain form of political subject, and a certain mediation of pain and 
suffering as juridically determined by human rights law, producing a ‘legal victim’ 
(while the State, in contrast, produces a political enemy). A victim who resides in but 
outside the law, who is subject to law, but not entitled to law’s rights, and is therefore 
a victim of law’s incompleteness. 
 
Law’s Heritages: what does and should Law do? 
 
In this recounting of the life of Ernie Wentzel, a life held up as exemplary for its 
principled, unwavering and courageous defense of the law, Kentridge, who viewed 
himself no doubt as sympathetic and following in the vein of Wentzel’ example of 
what law should do and be, was upholding a certain normative conception of what it 
meant to be a lawyer. This was a question of deep deliberation amongst a minority of 
lawyers and judges in South Africa, articulated as: what would their ‘role’ be in such 
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a context?28 As we saw, Wentzel was lauded for not being an ‘ideological figure’, he 
eschewed the political, whether of the right or the left. His vision of the law is neither 
of place nor time, neither partisan nor parochial, but is presented as universal, 
underpinned by the dictum of neither fear nor favour, committed only to itself and the 
imperatives imminent to this. Of course Wentzel, and Kentridge, were drawing on a 
particular sensibility here that is central to our understanding of the modern state, that 
derives from an understanding of law as, in its Kantian formulation, ‘the highest form 
of reason’.  It is also an understanding of law as a civilizational marker that embodies 
within it rights that derive from a distinct but dialogical relationship between ‘natural 
rights’, and ‘positive law’, upon which social contract theory as the foundational 
‘myth’ of the modern state rests. This is most starkly exemplified for example in key 
texts of Enlightenment thinkers like Thomas Hobbes’ in Leviathan [1651] (1986), and 
John Locke’s Two Treatise of Government [1689] (1993) as rationales for the 
emergence of the modern regime of sovereign law.29  It is the writings of the latter in 
particular, that have come to be seen as canonical to the foundations of liberalism. 
                                                
28 Cf  Steytler, N.C (1987) ‘Criminal Justice and the Apartheid State’, in Rycroft, A.J, et al. Race and 
the Law in South Africa, Cape Town: Juta and Co; Adam, H (1988) ‘Engineering Compliance: The 
Management of Dissent in South Africa’, in Hund, J. ed. Law and Justice in South Africa, 
Johannesburg & Cape Town: Institute for Public. Interest Law and Research; Friederichs, D.O (1990) 
‘Law in South Africa and the Legitimacy Crisis’, International Journal of Comparative and Applied 
Criminal Justice, vol. 14, no.2; Wacks, R (1984) ‘Judges and Injustice’, South African Law Journal, 
no. 101 
29 Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, as well as Jean Jacques Rousseau are taken to be amongst the most 
important Enlightenment theorists of a form of government based on the idea of natural rights, drawing 
on the earlier writings of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694).   Noting 
a distinction between different national conceptions of the natural rights concept, Waswo (1996), in his 
account of the American genealogy of the concept, as distinct from the British, argues that the early 
Puritans accepted that it was ‘natural’ that  ‘men’ would seek liberty, but they also saw that it contained 
a threat. Writing in 1630, John Winthrop was to make a distinction between two forms of liberty. The 
first he described as natural and the second as ‘civic’ or ‘federal’:  ‘The First is common to man with 
beast and other creatures..the exercise of this liberty makes men grow more and more evil and in time 
to be worse than brute beasts: omnes sumus licentia detoriores. The other kind of liberty I call civil or 
federal; it may also be moral, in reference to the covenant between God and man, in the moral 
law…This liberty is the proper end and object of authority and cannot subsist without it’. (Waswo, R 
(1996) ‘The formation of Natural Law to Justify Colonialism 1539-1689, New Literary History, vol. 
27, no. 4, pp743-749. See also Hussain, N (2003) The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and 





This account of law and the modern state takes the autobiography of an evolutionary 
narrative at its face value for now, and brackets, to the extent that it is possible, the 
entanglements and complicated relationship between liberalism, colonialism and 
empire. What is crucial though is that the tension between the universal claims of 
liberalism and its particular, and now well documented, categorical exclusions, are 
central to the anxiety that motivates the human rights lawyers, particularly in the 
South African iteration of modernity.  In a different context, Uday Singh Mehta 
(1999) has argued for a distinction between a notion of empire and colony that is 
worth bearing in mind. On the one hand we may refer to a history of imperial rule, 
which describes a practice and rationality that exterminates aboriginal populations30; 
at the same time, as Mehta argues, there is also a liberal notion of empire which is 
predicated on various assumptions of ‘tutelage’ and kinship. It is this notion of 
colonialism that seeks views the native population as the target of interventions to re-
arrange cultures, and identities towards an image of progress and civilization. It is this 
latter teleological sensibility that I am concerned with here in relation to a view of 
law, more particularly in the attendant legal subject-citizen that arises from the 
political community founded on these social evolutionist liberal principles. In it 
resides a triumphalist and self-vindicating legal narrative that absorbs its paradoxes, 
contestations and violence over time. But as Mehta notes, the work of criticism is to 
render visible and think through the implications of these paradoxes and tensions: 
“The facts of political exclusion- of slaves, of women, and of those without sufficient 
property to exercise either suffrage or real political power- over the past three and a 
                                                
30 An example of this invocation of Empire can be found in Sven Lindqvuist’s (1992) Exterminate the 
Brutes, One Man’s Odyssey into the Heart of Darkness and the Origins of European Genocide, New 
York: the New Press 
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half centuries must be allowed to embarrass the universalistic claims of liberalism” 
(Mehta, 1999: 76).31  
 
It is something of this embarrassment that is evident in the discussion below – the 
embarrassment of lawyers committed to a notion of law as an aspect of the 
civilizational project – which itself assumes and seeks to cultivate a certain kind of 
political subject. However Afrikaner nationalist and its notions of the permanence of 
difference denied the possibility of this very project and subject. For Hobbes, as we 
know, the state of nature is one in which ‘men’ find themselves if not in war, then in 
the permanent disposition towards war, where the condition of ‘man’ is said to be 
‘solitary, nasty, and brutish’. This violence lacks a legal-moral character since it is 
without a normative boundary for the subject to be within or to transgress. It is only 
with the arrival of an exterior and common law that such a character can be given to 
both the disposition and more particularly, the action, which now has a line over 
which to traverse, with consequences: ‘till they know not a law that forbids them: 
which till Lawes be made they cannot know; nor can any Law be made, till they have 
agreed upon the Person that shall make it’ (1986: 187). 
 
The redeeming feature of human beings, in this schematic metaphysics of the shift 
from the ‘state of nature’ to political society, is the endowment of ‘reason’. Through 
the capacity to reason, two imminent ideas are revealed:  the disposition towards a 
                                                
31 The paradoxes between universal claims have been articulated in various forms. In the moment of 
imperialism, which exterminates the colonial subject, there are the famous debates on the right to 
imperium and dominum (Grovogui, 1996, pp 17-25). For the latter paradoxes, see also Grovogui, S 
(1996) Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law; 
Mommsen, W. J & De Moor, J. A. eds. (1992) European Expansion and Law: The Encounter of 
European and Indigenous Law in 19th and 20th Century Africa and Asia, Oxford: Berg; Ann Stoler, 
"Making Empire Respectable: the Politics of Race and Sexual Morality in 20th c. Colonial Cultures," 
American Ethnologist (16:4): 634-660; Ann Stoler, "Rethinking Colonial Catgories: European 




condition of ‘liberty’ is considered a natural right; secondly, the exercise of that 
liberty, understood in its negative sense as the ‘absence of external impediments’ 
undermines,  through the insecurity that arises out of the equal right to wage private 
war, the first right (1986: 189). In other words, it negates the freedom to be free. This 
Right of Nature, Jus Naturale brings into being therefore a general state of insecurity, 
based on the exercise of private reason, leading to the condition of ‘man as nasty, 
short and brutish’. And it is from the private reason of liberty that law as obligation 
emerges. Law is therefore at odds with Natural rights, argued Hobbes, ‘like obligation 
is at odds with Liberty’. The distinction between Jus  (Right) and Law (Obligation) is 
the basis of a form of sociality through which the ‘individual’ can protect and enjoy 
the rights that are put into question in the absence of a ‘common law’32: As Hobbes 
describes it: 
 
 ‘That a man be willing when are so too, as farre forth, as for Peace, and defence 
himselfe he shall think it necessary to lay down his right to all things, and be 
contented with as much liberty against other men, as he would allow only against 
himself’. (Hobbes, 1986: 188-190).  In this reworking of the Biblical injunction 
‘doing unto others’, it is the self that is placed at the center of the ‘motivation’ for the 
transfer of absolute rights to the sovereign. Reasonable men would thus see that they 
                                                
32 The Enlightenment formulation of a natural law tradition, out of which this conception of justice 
arises, draws on a number of historical precursors. In the genealogy of the concept in the West, it is to 
Aristotle that we most often turn, although there is some dispute about this. Cf. Charles H. McIlwain 
(1932)  The Growth of Political Thought in the West: From the Greeks to the End of the Middle Ages, 
New York, pp. 114-15 Particularly, it is to Aristotle’s distinction between distributive and corrective 
justice, the latter arising from a pre-given sense of right, which lends itself to a historically 
transcendent conception of law and right in the Nichomachean Ethics and Politics and Rhetoric. Cf Leo 
Strauss’s (1987) Natural Right and History, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Plato’s conception 
of natural law entered the mainstream of Western legal thought through the Aristotelian commentary 
on the Republic by the Andalusian Muslim polymath Ibn Rushd (Averroes), as well as through the 
writings of Thomas Aquinas. Cf. Corbin Henry (1993) History of Islamic Philosophy, Translated by 




had to give up some of their rights to everything and to protect themselves in order to 
live in Peace, not War. However, because men are governed by the ‘Passions’, they 
would revert to their natural ways if they saw advantage in a situation. Hence the need 
to not only agree by word, but also to agree by action to transfer their natural rights to 
an Authority, for: ‘Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and no strength to 
secure man at all’  (Hobbes, 1986:  pp192, 201-202).   This ‘covenant’, in the form of 
the ‘social contract’, is therefore to be protected by the threat of force, and mediates 
the relationship between the Authority, ‘the commonwealth’ or state, and the ‘citizen’ 
as the embodiment of rights and obligation, and allows for the distinction to be made  
between that which is legal and that which is illegal: ‘…whatever I lawfully 
Covenant, I cannot lawfully break’ Hobbes was to note.  (1986: 198). The making of 
a covenant, the agreement to be governed in actions by a common Law therefore 
creates ‘obligations’, and creates ‘injustice’ as Sin Jure (1986: 191):  
“And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of 
JUSTICE. For where no Covenant has preceded, there hath no Right been 
transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently no 
action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, the to break it is 
Unjust: And the definition of INJUSTICE , is no other than the not 
Performance of the Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just’ 
(Hobbes, 1986: 202).   
 
Justice and injustice are therefore premised on the upholding of the laws of the 
covenant. More so, for Hobbes, as I have noted above, the basis of these laws of the 
covenant, if they are to not be mere ‘words’, must have behind them the capacity of 
force: “Therefore, before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there must be 
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some coercive Power, to compel men equally to the performance of their Covenants, 
by the terror [sic] of some punishment, greater benefit they expect by the breach of 
their covenant.” (Hobbes, 1986: 202).  The very naming of justice itself is therefore, 
in this genealogy, premised on the existence of the creation of security through the 
ordering of violence, not as arbitrary, private and random, but as public, regularized 
and knowable, through law, and therefore, administered as the upholding of rights or 
the righting of wrongs, under the newly inaugurated name of “justice”.  
 
Later, Locke, in the Two Treatises of Government [1689] (1993), was to take the 
social contract theory as the basis of government, further. Drawing on a more 
optimistic view of the state of nature, where violence was present in potential rather 
than manifestation, and in disagreement with Hobbes’s (and Robert Filmer’s) 
centralized common-wealth despot of the Leviathan, Locke argued that accepting a 
centralized all powerful sovereign  ‘is to think that men are so foolish that they care to 
avoid what mischiefs may be done them by polecats or foxes, but are content, nay 
think it safety, to be devoured by lions’ (1993: 53).  As an alternative, Locke 
proposed a separation of powers within the commonwealth, with the Legislative and 
Executive functions bound by the rules upheld by the Judiciary. What Locke shared 
with Hobbes was the belief that the common-wealth, or government, was created not 
to protect its own interests, but through an imminent revelation of reasoned access to 
knowledge, which would allow for the exercise of pre-political natural rights, in his 
case, the right to life, to liberty and to property through a common law.  These 
rights—to life, liberty and property, are God-given rights, and are knowable and 
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discernable to those with the capacity for reflection and reason33. Again, like Hobbes, 
it is reason—and therefore the assumption of the possession of the capacity to reason-
- that reveals the existence of natural rights, not dependent on time and space, but 
‘writ in the hearts of all mankind’ (1993: 86)34. As he was to argue, drawing on 
Christianity, ‘God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given him 
reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience (1993: 127). 
There is an important caveat of course to note here: not all  possess the capacity to 
reason. He qualified the statement, by remarking that whilst God had indeed given the 
‘world to men in common’, this should not be taken to mean he meant for it to remain 
in common or uncultivated: ‘He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational, (and 
labour was to be his title to it) (1993: 131).  
 
The conception of an independent judiciary, it is argued, arises from this conception 
of law, which creates a distinction between law and the realm of politics. Natural law, 
in its secularized version, makes claim to a set of rights against which the realm of the 
political give form, are judged by, and have to conform to. These are constituted as 
‘fundamental’ rights, which judicial interpretation exercises sovereignty over. Whilst 
evident in Greece and the uncodified rules of the Roman Republic, in its modern form 
                                                
33 In the genealogy of natural law, the Enlightenment interpretation is distinguished from the Medieval 
and Christian conception of jus gentium by the status of natural law in relation to obligation and 
compliance, which derives from a general acceptance, rather than a rule or force. This is taken up in 
modern law as “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” (see for example the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38), from the Latin principle of ius cogena erga 
omnes, transl. “law that is compelling in relation to everyone”, or “higher law” or “fundamental human 
rights” cf. Hart, H.L.A (1994) The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press] but from 
‘positive’ law. Aquinas argued that whilst the positive legal system ‘derived from natural law’, these 
only carry legal force as part of a posited system: ex sola lege humana vigorem habent: ST I-II, q.95.a3 
cf. John Finnis (1980) Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press; Lon Fuller (1969) 
The Morality of Law, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.  
34 According to Carlyle this finds its way into Christian doctrine on natural law through Cicero, cf. A.J. 
Carlyle (1927) A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, vol. 1, p. 83. 
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Locke and more particularly, the French philosopher Montesquieu, provide the 
intellectual authority for the idea of a separation of powers.35   
 
Returning to Adv. Sidney Kentridge’s inaugural address, he was lamenting the 
decline of this  ‘independent’ role of the law in South Africa, and the erosion of what 
was seen to be an exemplary legacy of judicial independence in South Africa. In this 
lament Kentridge is bemoaning a shift in the social and political work that law does 
and could do. The coming to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948 marked this shift.  
Prior to that, he describes in celebratory terms how the Appellate Division, then 
presided over by a series of judges known for judicial independence, had challenged 
the constitutionality of government segregation policies, such as the removal of 
‘coloured’ voters from the common roll in the Western Cape province, and the 
segregation of railway carriages and waiting rooms.  He described too how the 
Supreme Court, had a ‘high international reputation’, and that this reputation was 
based in the fact that the courts provided ‘a real protection to the individual against 
executive excess’ (1987: 12).  
 
Kentridge contrasted this role with the ‘general decline’ of what he describes as a 
historically exemplary role of the judiciary. In explaining this decline, he put the 
cause squarely with the election of the National Party: ‘the first cause was the 
legislative policy of the government that came to power in 1948.36 It showed scant 
                                                
35 Cf. Montesquieu, C [1777] (1989) Spirit of the Laws. Eds. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, 
and Harold Samuel Stone. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press;  Althusser, L (1972) Politics and History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx, 
UK: New Left Books; G. Balandier (1970) Political Anthropology, Random House,  p 3; Shklar,J 
(1989). Montesquieu, Oxford and New York:  Oxford University Press. 
36 The study of the ‘decline of the rule of law’ in South Africa was at that time a matter of domestic and 
international contention, first appearing on the agenda of the UN General Assembly in 1952. cf. 
International Commission of Jurists (1960) South Africa and the Rule of Law, Geneva; Brookes, E.H 
and Macaulay, J.B (1958) Civil Liberty in South Africa, Oxford University Press; Beinart, B (1962) 
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regard for the courts…. The change in the courts was also attributable to the spirit of 
the times. Looking back, one can see that by the early sixties, there was a general 
spirit of submission to the authority. The government was all powerful. Resistance 
seemed hopeless’ (1987: 12). Kentridge noted how the cases that increasingly came 
before the court dealt during that period dealt with so-called ‘victimless crimes’, 
arising from the implementation of apartheid’s discriminatory legislation, which 
focused on race:  
In the period that I am talking about, and right through to the 1970’s, 
there are numerous cases in the Law Reports about race; and the reported 
cases are of course only a fraction of those that were being heard. These 
were the cases under the Immorality Act, the Race Classification Act and 
the Group Areas Act…. Judges and more frequently, magistrates heard 
evidence about the racial antecedents of the accused persons or litigants 
before them, their history and their associations. The courts studies and 
recorded their physical appearance. One would find on the part of the 
judges and the magistrates concerned no discernable distaste for these 
processes, still less any conception that the laws they were applying were 
as abhorrent as the laws of slavery (1987: 13).  
 
Kentridge’s focused his subsequent comments on the increasingly pernicious effects 
of racialized segregation, and the willingness of the majority of judicial appointees to 
accept the political nature of the appointments, as well as the legislation they were 
implementing.  Taken as an example of a sentiment, Kentridge’s speech also 
describes a certain legal sensibility, and an argument within South African 
                                                                                                                                      
‘The Rule of Law’, Acta Juridica, no. 99; Mathews, A.S (1971) Law, Order and Liberty in South 
Africa, Johannesburg: Juta; Schreiner, O.D (1967) The Contribution of English Law to South African 
Law, and the rule of Law in South Africa, Stevens Press.  
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jurisprudence that emerged in opposition to the all encompassing legislative 
framework of the apartheid state from 1948 onwards, and from which the emergence 
of the recourse to human rights law in South Africa drew its vigor37.  
 
In 1972 the Legal Commission of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid 
Society (Spro-Cas), released a report, titled ‘Law, Justice and Society’38.  The report 
comprised a series of individually authored papers, described by the Commission’s 
Secretary, John Dugard, as an attempt to ‘create an awareness on the part of the legal 
profession and the lay public of the incompatibility of apartheid’s legal order with the 
ethical principles upon which Western legal systems are based’ (Randall, 1972: 2).  
John Dugard has become one the most eminent South African scholars and advocates 
of human rights, with a growing international prominence39. Spro-Cas itself was a 
project that had its origins however not only in the legal fraternity, and was funded by 
the South African Council of Churches and the Christian Institute of South Africa.  
 
The Spro-Cas Legal Commission’s report converges two universalizing ethical 
domains: a Christian ethic, premised on the normative question of whether apartheid 
was consistent with being a Christian, and a secular legal ethic, premised on whether 
                                                
37 It was also a debate presented as a case of the particularity of Afrikaner nationalism’s understanding 
of law as moral communal values, contrasted with the more universalist and ‘progressive’ orientation 
of liberal English-speaking white South African’s and the legal tradition they sought to protect. Cf 
Lewin, J  (1963) Politics and Law in South Africa, London: Merlin Press 
38 Randall, P ed. (1972) Law, Justice and Society: Report of the Legal Commission of the Study Project 
on Christianity in Apartheid Society, Johannesburg: Spro-Cas Publication no. 9 
39 Besides his copious writing on apartheid and human rights law, Dugard has served as an ad hoc 
Judge on the International Court of Justice and as a Special Rapporteur for both the former United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights and the International Law Commission. More recently he has 
been, in the latter capacity, investigating human rights violations, as well as the colonial and apartheid 
features of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories of the West Bank, and Gaza in particular. 
For his views on the apartheid features of Israeli occupation, a transcript of a lecture is accessible at 




apartheid was consistent with the progressivist ideals of Western law40. The opening 
paragraph of the report gives a genealogy of South African common law, as 
derivative of a ‘blend of principles’. These derive from Roman-Dutch law, as well as 
principles of English common law. But it also notes that this law is ‘not merely a 
product of the legal genius of Rome and the Netherlands and the experience of 
English law: it is also the product of Judaeo-Christian philosophy, the legal 
manifestation of Western Christian civilization. The South African common law 
reflects the ethical values of Western society in its detailed body of laws and customs, 
promoting, through the instrument of the law, respect for the individual—his life, 
liberty, family and basic freedoms—and equality before the law.’(Randall, 1972: 3).   
 
In this narrative of the location of the historical and cultural filiality of law, we are 
beginning to see the image of a certain conception of the role of law, its genealogy 
and its legal subject. In other words, it is a narrative of where the law that we value 
comes from, how it evolves, and where it places those who remain faithful to it, both 
ethically, but also within a geo-spatial imaginary.  Its unstated premise is that this is a 
version of law that is in Africa but not of Africa.  This is described as the  ‘heritage’ 
that had to be defended (Randall, 1978: 3). At its normative core is a rights bearing 
individual, a familiar figure embodied in liberalism’s political subject. The Legal 
Commission report is concerned principally therefore with how the policies of the 
government’s legislation and its practices impacted on the universal enjoyment of 
these ‘Judeo-Christian’ values by individual citizens. Do all citizens enjoy their 
individual rights, are they free and equal, and do they have unfettered access to the 
                                                
40 Whilst some might suggest an incompatibility between this secular and religious convergence, Alain 




law? This narrative of law embeds itself firmly therefore in a ‘Western’ genealogy 
and at the same time ascribes to this particularity a universal purchase.  
 
Apartheid and Humanity 
 
There was of course a context within which this South African interpretation of law 
was unfolding, which situated the local legal context within an international order of 
legal norms and values from the ‘ethical principles’ that Dugard alluded to, would 
derive from. If the Judeo-Christian legacy spoke to one part of its historical 
foundations, it was in the modern language of international human rights law where 
its manifestation as a secular concern was articulated.  International law during the 
time of the killing of the Cradock Four drew its force from a cachet of instruments 
that derived from customary international law, treaties and covenants, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.41 These treaties and covenants also included, 
amongst others, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), as well as 
regional treaties like the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and 
the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1950)42. Whilst it is commonly observed that the modern human rights 
legal regime is a post World War II phenomena, human rights law is premised on a 
                                                
41 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), adopted 10 December 1948, General Assembly Res. 
217, UN Doc. A/810.  
42 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature on 19 December 1966, 
and entered into force on 23 March 1976, General Assembly Res. 2200A, UN. DOC A/6136; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, open for signature on 19 December 
1966 and signed into force on 3 January 1976, General Assembly Res. 2200A, UN Doc A/6136; 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted 2 May 1948 by the Ninth Conference 
of the American States, Bogota, Colombia, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Handbook 
of Existing Rules Pertaining to Human Rights, O.A.S Doc.OEA/ Ser.L/V/II.50.doc 6; European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed 4 November 1950, 
entered into force 3 September 1953, 213, U.N.T.S 222. 
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notion of natural law and natural rights with a longer genealogy, including the 
American Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man (1789). From the vantage point of international law and custom the 
debate about the legal status of apartheid in relation to international law hinged on its 
practice of discrimination, particularly as it pertained to the question of race. In its 
‘Study of Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in South Africa’, the UN Special 
Rapporteur referred in turn to the 1953 UN ‘Report on the Racial Situation in South 
Africa’43, which highlighted that the laws of South Africa violated the fundamental 
rights contained in international charters, particularly as they pertained to 
discriminatory practices.  
The list of specific rights violated where indeed extensive: 
The rule of non-discrimination; the right to take part in Government, 
freedom of peaceable assembly and association, freedom of opinion and 
expression, the right to nationality, the right to seek and enjoy another 
country’s asylum from persecution, freedom of religion, the right to marry 
and protection of family life, one’s country and return, the right to 
privacy, the right to personal freedom and security, freedom from slavery 
and servitude, freedom from inhumane and degrading punishment, the 
right to a fair trial, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to 
rest and leisure, the right to social security, the right to education, the 
right to participation in cultural life, access to public facilities and 
accommodations, the right to a just order.44 
 
                                                
43 Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights Commission (1967), ‘Study of Apartheid and 




It was on this basis that the organs of the United Nations declared, first in 1965, and 
in subsequent declarations, that apartheid was a ‘crime against humanity’.45 
Significantly, there were four key pillars of apartheid that, taken together, constituted 
its crime against humanity46: firstly, it denied the majority of citizens the right to self-
determination, secondly, it denied the majority the right to political participation, 
thirdly it sought to practice ‘denationalization’47 through the homelands system, and 
fourthly, it put the policies of apartheid into practice through the use of force 
internally and to neighbouring states.48  
 
The international seminar hosted by the United Nations Special Committee Against 
Apartheid, with the co-operation of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, 
which issued the Declaration of the Seminar on the Legal Status of the Apartheid 
Regime and Other Legal Aspects of the Struggle Against Apartheid, devoted a 
considerable part of its report to the question of ‘denationalization’ and the status of 
the Bantustan system. It observed that the “Colonial nature of the South African 
regime…arises form the institution and operation of the apartheid system.’ It was a 
                                                
45 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adopted 30 
November 1973 and entered into force 18 July 1976, General Assembly Res. 3068, UN Doc. A/9030; 
‘Apartheid’ (1974) The International Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 23, no.2; Rubin, N (1974) Law, 
Race and Color in South Africa, Journal of Opinion, vol. 4, no.3. In its own report, the US Department 
of State later concurred that “[t]he practice of apartheid remains the basis for the organization of South 
African society. Apartheid institutionalizes political and economic control by the white minority. 
Discriminatory laws and practices are woven throughout the fabric of South African society” US Dept. 
of State (1983) Country Report on Human Rights Practices. 
46 There is a overlap between elements of these four pillars and the four principles of the Glen Grey 
Act, as described by Lord Lugard: ‘work, segregation in the reserves, individual property in land, and 
local self-government’ Lugard, F. D (1965) The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, London: 
Frank Cass and Co. p327.  
47 ‘Denationalizaton’ was considered contrary to jus cogens and self-determination because  
“[d]enationalization on racial, ethnic and other related grounds is particularly notorious because of its 
close association with Nazi and fascist atrocities”, McDougal, M, Lasswell, H, Chen, L (1980) Human 
Rights and World Public Order, New Haven: Yale University, pp 906-907; Butcher, T.G (1986) ‘Legal 
Consequences for States of the Illegality of Apartheid’, Human Rights Quarterly, vol.8, no. 3.  
48 United Nations Centre Against Apartheid (1984) Declaration of the Seminar on the Legal Status of 
the Apartheid Regime and Other Legal Aspects of the Struggle Against Apartheid, seminar held in 
Lagos, Nigeria, 13-16 August, UN Doc. A/39/423-S/16709. 
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regime that based its rule ‘upon a policy of dispossession and the perpetuation of alien 
and colonial-type domination’, and that the “alleged tribal units are not ‘social entities 
possessing clear identity and their characteristics. They reflect rather the white view 
of African traditional culture rather than the reality.”  It was also a regime, the Lagos 
Declaration noted, that “negates the legal personality of the great majority of its 
people on the ground that they are of indigenous origin, which deprives them of 
elementary rights and leaves them without citizenship….”49 
 
There is an important divergence that comes into existence, which I wish to note at 
this point. The UN declaration on apartheid as a crime against humanity highlighted 
four aspects: denationalization, political participation, self-determination and lastly, 
force. Reinforcing this view of the crime that apartheid constituted, the Declaration of 
the Seminar on the Legal Status of the Apartheid Regime and Other Legal Aspects of 
the Struggle Against Apartheid emphasized the colonial nature of apartheid. It 
highlighted the centrality of the Bantustan system of homelands as a feature of the 
wrong of apartheid, through its discursive and materially forced and enforced 
convergence of cultural and political identities, in order to create a multiplicity of 
discrete self-governing entities. It argued that this dimension of apartheid denied the 
majority the right to citizenship and therefore the sovereign right to self-
representation within a system of universal franchise.  In other words, it emphasized 
sovereignty and its denial as the key foundational injustice.  Force itself was 
considered as the consequence of the latter, as the result of the colonial policies were 
to be implemented. In contrast to this view, the South African human rights-derived 
critique of apartheid evolves to take a different view on the wrong of apartheid. In its 




view takes ‘racial discrimination’ rather than self-determination and the right to 
sovereignty are the key feature. It comes to focus on force—its victims and its 
perpetrators—as the most visible wrong of apartheid. 
 
In his authoritative account of the relationship between ‘Human Rights and the South 
African Legal Order’ (1978) a widely upheld text in the field,50 John Dugard 
systematically elaborated the key arguments made in the Spro-Cas Commission 
Report with a view to assessing the practices of the legal regime of apartheid when 
evaluated against the values of human rights law.51                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Dugard’s book is divided into five sections, with a focus on the following rights, 
taken as universal: the Freedom of Person, Freedom of Speech, Association and 
Assembly. Two other key chapters considered the Political Trial, and the Judiciary 
and Human Rights. As Dugard describes, it, the study “examines against the yardstick 
of the American Bill of Rights and modern human rights conventions those features 
of the South African legal order which have aroused domestic and international 
opposition (Dugard, 1978: xi-xii).” These features are evaluated as they affect the 
fundamental criteria of ‘individual liberty’, and in each of the sections noted above, 
Dugard meticulously documents how the everyday life of black South Africans shows 
evidence of not being able to individually enjoy the fundamental rights that are 
                                                
50 The canonical importance of this book’s impact for human rights oriented lawyers in South Africa 
was noted by the University of Cape Town Professor of Law, Christina Murray. Its most salutary 
feature, she argued, was  that it separated legal assessment from the realm of the political: “John 
Dugard’s landmark book…does not formally claim to be a history book but for many students it 
provided the first encounter with the history of law in its apartheid setting. It also triggered major 
studies on the record of the South African judiciary—which was much lauded for its independence 
from the apartheid government’ Murray, C (2003) ‘The Political and Social History of South African 
Law’, The Journal of African History, vol. 44. No. 1, pp165-166.  
51 Dugard had already by then published, amongst others,  (1971) ‘The Judicial Process, Positivism and 
Civil Liberty’, South African Law Journal, no. 88;  (1972)‘The Legal Framework of Apartheid’, in 
South African Dialogue: Contrasts in South African Thinking on Basic Race Issues, Johannesburg: 
McGraw Hill;  (1972) ‘Judges, Academics and Unjust Laws: The Van Niekerk Contempt Case’, South 
African Law Journal, no. 89 
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supposed to flow from individual liberty, like the right to free movement, or the right 
to free speech, or the right to free association. The legal matrix of apartheid impacted 
on life at every level of the public and the private, evidenced in the number of 
prosecutions that derive from racially derived offenses, and from the prosecution and 
persecution of organizations that question the legitimacy of apartheid’s policies.  
 
In both the Spro-Cas Commission on Law, as well as in Dugard’s writing, the 
fundamental problem with apartheid was that it denied a group of people their full 
individual rights and liberties, and inflicted ‘pain and suffering’ on the basis of ‘race’.  
It was this discrimination that undermined the value of law as a heritage of Western 
civilization. In his concluding plea for a new approach to law, Dugard emphasized 
two key elements that needed reform: discriminatory legislation needed to be revised, 
and a Bill of Rights needed to be introduced. These were necessary to rehabilitate the 
legitimacy of law in the eyes of those denied its freedoms and protections:  
It is therefore small wonder that blacks do not share the admiration of the 
white South African for the majesty of South African law, the mysteries 
of the Roman-Dutch tradition, and the impartiality of the South African 
judiciary and administration…. If faith is to be restored in the South 
African legal system while there is yet time, sweeping changes will need 
to be made…. A new Constitution with a Bill of Rights to provide legal 
safeguards for individual liberty, anti-discrimination laws to educate an 
unenlightened and prejudiced people, and a concerned and courageous 
legal profession committed to the enforcement of human rights, are the 




Writing as he was in the wake of a period of intense state repression, throughout the 
1960s,52 and in the immediate aftermath of the June 16 student uprisings of 1976, 
which had been violently repressed, Dugard was challenging his colleagues in the 
legal fraternity to reflect on their practices and the implications of accepting the status 
quo. Although he had, in the discourse of law, indicated in the foreword of the book 
that the intention was to ‘describe and not to judge’, he concluded with a judgment: 
‘This passive, neutral attitude on the part of the lawyers as undoubtedly helped the 
Government’ (Dugard, 1978: 391). The question we may want to ask, is what was this 
complacence helping the government to do? It is clear that Dugard is worried that the 
complicity of judges, magistrates and prosecutors in carrying out apartheid’s law was 
helping the government to implement its policy, but its effect was to undermine the 
long term legitimacy amongst Africans. He was in effect calling attention to the 
condition of jeopardy that existed in the country, not only as it affected the victims of 
apartheid repression but, with more foreboding, as it threatened the ‘majesty’ of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition of jurisprudence on, I would add, the Southern-most tip of 
the African continent. 
 
For legal scholars and practitioners like Dugard, Wentzel and Kentridge, the 
formulation of the South African legal system was seen as iteration of the most 
salutary aspects of the ‘Western tradition’. The disposition of the legal fraternity in 
particular has been shaped by the legal positivist tradition that drew on Roman-Dutch, 
and the dominant 19th Century English legal arguments derived from John Austin 
(1832; 1895) and Jeremy Bentham53. In seeking an explanation as to why and how 
                                                
52 By this time the security legislation of the apartheid state was already firmly coming into being.  
53 Cf  van Niekerk, B  (1973) “The Warning Voice from Heidelberg—the Life and Thought of Gustav 
Radbruch”, South African Law Journal, no. 234; Sir John Wessels (1908) History of the Roman-Dutch 
Law, African Book Company: Grahamstown; Miller, D. C (1973) “South African Judges as Natural 
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most judges seemingly supported the discriminatory practices of the apartheid state, 
Dugard turned his criticism to the effects of this legal positivist tradition: “The 
positivist legal tradition of Austin and Dicey was exported to the Cape in the 
nineteenth century, along with institutions of British justice, and secured a firm 
foothold in South Africa” (Dugard1978: 373).54   
 
Legal positivism not only makes a clear distinction between the legislative function 
and the judicial function, but also views the latter as the statutory manifestation of 
policy made by the legislature. This notion is also described as the ‘command theory 
of law’. It describes law as distinct from the realm of morality and values: “Rigid 
adherence to the distinction between law as it is and law as it ought to be leads to a 
rejection of legal values—as opposed to legal rules—which results in the neglect of 
considerations of human dignity, freedom of speech, freedom of movement and 
assembly… (Dugard 1978: 374).”55 Legal positivist thought of the Austinian or 
Benthamite variety sees law as strictly within the realm of rules made by humans, to 
be implemented by the commanding presence of the sovereign, and to be habitually 
obeyed by its subjects. Law is therefore separated from its moral or ethical 
                                                                                                                                      
Lawyers—a Roman-Dutch Basis?”, South African Law Journal, no. 86; Hahlo, H. R and Kahn, E 
(1960) South Africa: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, Cape Town: Juta and Co. 
 
54 Also see Hart, (1983) ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, in Essays in Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
55 In the attempt to give some voice to collective and institutional complicity, the TRC invited the legal 
fraternity to make submissions. Of the few officials of the apartheid state that came forward, almost all 
objected to the nature of the enquiry on the very grounds of legal positivism, an argument the 
Commission, in its findings, rejected:      “ Much was made, particularly by some judges who made 
submissions, of their relative impotence in the face of the exercise of legislative power by a sovereign 
Parliament…it is not enough for South African lawyers to parade sovereignty of parliament as if that 
alone explained (and excused) their conduct” (TRC, Vol. 4, p105). In his submission to the Hearing, 
the former Attorney-General of the Transvaal, between 1983-1985, Klaus von Lieres und Wilkau, S. C, 
noted with indignation that: “Mr. Chairman, I am here today because I believe it needs to be said we 
owe a debt of gratitude to the many fine prosecutors, past and present, who discharged their 
prosecutorial task with integrity and courage and professionalism. I believe that they have been 
seriously maligned by unfounded generalized propaganda…We took our decisions to prosecute on 
facts and not on the basis of ideological convictions..” (un Wilkau, quoted in Dyzenhaus,(1988) Truth, 
Reconciliation and the Apartheid Legal Order, p120)  
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implications, and only shows fidelity to the law as written. As Austin put it: “The 
existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or be not is 
one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a 
different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike 
it, or though it vary from the text, by which we regulate our approbation and 
disapprobation” (1832 Lecture V: 157). 
 
The critics of legal positivism were well aware that that the policies of apartheid were 
legislated: “The apartheid order is a legal order. Fashioned by politicians, it has been 
applied by lawyers.” (Dugard 1978:393).  Whilst Kentridge was bemoaning the 
decline of an independent judiciary as an event that accompanied the victory of the 
Afrikaner National Party in 1948, the dominant school of legal philosophy in the 
country prior to that had already accepted that the judiciary considered law as it was, 
rather than in the normative register of what it ought to be.  The dominance of legal-
positivism in South Africa can be traced to the influence of a tradition of British legal 
thought which drew on Austin and Bentham. It was brought to the Cape from 19th 
century England after it annexed the Cape in 1806, and soon displaced, as a legal 
philosophy, the Roman-Dutch natural law that had been dominant. By 1908 Sir John 
Wessels (1862-1936), later Chief Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court between 1932-1936, could declare, in his study of the history of the Roman-
Dutch law tradition in South African that “(t)he whole theory of the Law of Nature is 
now so thoroughly exploded that is difficult for the modern student to imagine how 
the jurists of the former years ever came to attach such importance to the 
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abstraction—Natural Law.”56 The positivist approach to law dominated legal 
education at the time, and advocates at the Cape were obliged to also be members of 
the United Kingdom Bar, or were to be Doctors of Law at either Oxford, Cambridge 
or Dublin57.  
 
 For Dugard, and others who held a different view of the role of law, those who 
carried out the law had a duty to not only carry out statute, but also to find ways in 
which to exercise an interpretative role, based on the commitment to the pre-political 
rights of the autonomous individual, and the rights of the citizen that had to be 
conflated in this case. The debate amongst lawyers who found themselves in objection 
to the racially discriminatory practices of the state, has been posited as one that hinges 
on whether their was an effective role to be played by engaging with apartheid’s law, 
to treating it as legitimate, or whether to engage with the law was to make one 
complicit in it, and to render that which was seen as illegitimate, legitimate.58 The 
position of the former group, from which a generation of ‘anti-aparthied lawyers’ 
emerged, was to ‘engage’. Stephen Ellmann has described it as the ‘strategy of 
courtroom resistance’.59 Also known as ‘anti-apartheid lawyering’, an assessment of 
                                                
56 Wessels,J (1908) History of the Roman-Dutch Law, Grahamstown: African Book Company, pp291-
293; One is reminded here of Bentham’s dismissal of  “natural rights” variously as “simple nonsense: 
natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts.” Bentham, J [1843] 
(2010) ‘Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Declarations of Rights Issued During the 
French Revolution’ in  The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 2, Online Library of Liberty 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1921&It
emid=27 accessed 10/06/2010 
57 Although in 1858 local qualifications were made provision for. An important account remains Hahlo, 
H.R and Kahn, E (1960) South Africa: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, Cape Town: Juta 
and Co.  
58 Cf. Steyter, N.C (1987), “Criminal Justice and the Apartheid State”, in Rycroft, L.J, et al, eds. Race 
and the Law in South Africa, Cape Town: Juta; Wacks R (1987) “Judges and Injustice”, South African 
Law Journal, no. 101; Ellmann, S (1992) In a Time of Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa’s State 
of Emergency, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
59 This was a debate that was confronted by the independent black trade union movement that emerged 
after 1973, known as the ‘recognition debate’. When the Wiehahn Commission of 1979 recommended 
the recognition of the legal status and right of African workers to unionise, the unions had to consider 
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this practice has been taken up by a number of legal scholars, most notably Steven 
Ellman (1995) David Dyzenhaus (1997), Richard Abel (1995) and Michael Lobban 
(1996).   
 
As Ellman argues, adopting a strategy of ‘courtroom resistance’ meant that one had to 
except the legitimacy of apartheid’s laws in order to challenge their pernicious effects. 
The strategy was to “press the categories of South Africa legal argument to their 
limits but still remain within those categories” (Ellman 1995: 408).  
 
Ellman notes that the apartheid state was aware that its claim to law entrenched it 
within a “community of Western nations”, and that this provided a “testament to their 
own civilization, in contrast to the barbarism they attributed to those whom they 
ruled; and as a gift to the subjects of apartheid, a gift which whites could reap with 
gratitude and respect” (Ellman, 1995: 408).  Ellman’s concern was very much the 
concern of Dugard and others: would working within the rules of the apartheid system 
legitimate apartheid, but furthermore, would working within the rules of the system, 
deligitimate the salutary claims of law in the eyes of most black South Africans?   
 
The alternative prospect would have been for white lawyers who opposed apartheid to 
refuse to participate in the legal system at all. Ellman concludes his own study by 
arguing that participation was to have beneficial effects. He does so by making a 
distinction between the legitimating effect of participation on the apartheid system as 
a whole, and the law itself as something distinctly different. The benefits of the 
possibility of the latter for him, outweigh the dilemmas presented by the former: “the 
                                                                                                                                      




possibility that anti-apartheid lawyering might have encouraged South Africans to see 
virtue in the ideals of fearless advocacy, independent judging, and the rule of law 
offered promise that these same ideals would be honored in post-apartheid South 
Africa” (Ellman 1995: 409). 
 
In his study of secularism, the anthropologist Talal Asad (2003: 141-44) discusses a 
speech made by Malcolm X, advocating a shift away from ‘civil rights’ to human 
rights in order to better advance the cause of African Americans against racism and 
suffering in the United States. It is a speech worth quoting at length: 
We need to expand the civil rights struggle to a higher level- to the level 
of human rights. Whenever you are in a civil rights struggle, whether you 
know it or not, you are confining yourself to the jurisdiction of Uncle 
Sam. No one from the outside can speak on your behalf as long your 
struggle is a civil rights struggle. Civil rights comes from within the 
domestic affairs of this country…You may wonder why all the atrocities 
that have been committed in Africa and in Hungary and in Latin America 
are brought before the UN, and the Negro problem is never brought to the 
UN…. They keep you wrapped up in civil rights. And you spend so much 
time barking up the civil rights tree and you don’t even know there is a 
human rights tree on the same floor…Civil rights means you are asking 
Uncle Sam to treat you right. Human rights are your God-given rights. 
Human rights are the rights that are recognized by all nations of this earth. 
 
For Malcolm X, the route of civil rights constrained political possibilities, bound 
within the United States as a nation-state. As Asad notes, “he (Malcolm X) diagnoses 
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a profound crises of justice in race-based America and claims that it cannot be 
resolved by a purely domestic maneuver—that is, by a state’s formal extension of full 
citizenship to African Americans” (2003).  In the case of African-Americans, the 
strategic decision to be made, for Malcolm X, was the question of how, as a group 
denied representation and participation, they could best articulate the demand for 
political representation as an excluded minority within a larger nation-state, where the 
Anglo-Saxon majority had access to these rights. In the South African case, the 
recourse to human rights, rather than civil rights, as Malcolm X argued for, was the 
terrain on which political demands were presaged within the country. What is worth 
considering also however is the difference. Apartheid’s four ‘wrongs’ as identified by 
the UN— denationalization, lack of political participation, lack of self-determination, 
and force— involved utilizing a colonial technology of rule, as Mahmood Mamdani 
(1996) has argued, which bifurcated citizenship and subjection, creating a world of 
racialized citizens and ethnicized subjects who would reside in homelands.60   
 
This created a realm of citizens with access to the liberal democratic rights, and the 
legal heritage, which I have described above. And it created the category of ‘subject 
races’ with truncated rights but full obligations; alongside these were the subject 
ethnicities—the so-called African population. In its desire to implement three of the 
four pillars of apartheid as a crime against humanity, a large scale re-ordering of 
                                                
60 It was of course Hannah Arendt who when discussing the fate European refugees, noted the paradox 
of ‘human rights’- that they were rights that did not require membership of a political community in 
order to be granted, but they that did require membership of a political community to be ‘enjoyed’: 
they were therefore considered to be universally applicable but could only find expression through the 
particularity of a sovereign sphere to which one was considered a part of, or eligible to be a member of. 
Hannah Arendt (1968) ‘The perplexities of the Rights of Man’, in The Origins of Totalitarianism, pp. 
290-301. For the French philosopher Jacques Ranciere, this paradox should not be considered as 
disabling, but rather as the space where we might think ‘the political’ in a way that is not 
overdetermined by the conceptual political architecture of sovereignty and law: “The very difference 
between man and citizen is not a sign or a disjunction proving that the rights are either void or 
tautological. It is the opening of an interval for political subjectivization” (2006: 6). 
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bodies and identities, of space and place, of cultural boundaries and political identities 
had to be implemented.  For the apartheid state, and Afrikaner nationalist thought, 
humanity was only a multiplicity of particulars, which had to exist in various 
hierarchies, whereas for liberalism in South Africa, there was only a universal, which 
should be applicable to all. Of course, South African liberalism’s singular universal 
was itself based on a conception of a hierarchy, and grounded in its own 
particularity—the Judeo-Christian tradition, and contained within it a liberal 
paternalism.61 
 
The electoral victory of the Nationalist Party in 1948 brought to a colonial and 
segregationist history a refinement of the idea of what Partha Chatterjee has called 
‘the rule of colonial difference’- the permanence and radical otherness of the native 
which required a different path to self-improvement and development, via the 
structures of tradition and custom. In delivering the Rhodes Lectures at Oxford 
University in 1929,62 fresh from a term as the Prime Minister of South Africa, Jan 
Smuts was to articulate this argument for permanent segregation to the assembled 
audience:  
Nothing could be worse for Africa than the application of a policy, the 
object or tendency of which would be to destroy the basis of this African 
type, to de-Africanise the African and turn him into either a beast of the 
field or into a pseudo-European. And yet we have tried both alternatives 
in our dealings with the Africans…. If Africa has to be redeemed, if 
Africa has to make her own contribution to the world, if Africa is to take 
                                                
61 The complications of political practice and philosophical abstraction are at the center of what Partha 
Chatterjee has called liberalism’s ‘conundrum’: “To begin with, liberal political theory in its strict 
sense cannot recognize the validity of any collective rights…”. Chatterjee, P (1999) ‘Secularism and 
Toleration’, in The Partha Chatterjee Omnibus (1999) New Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 249.  
62 Smuts, J. C (1930) Africa and Some World Problems, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
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her rightful place among the continents, we shall have to proceed on 
different lines and evolve a policy which will not force her institutions 
into an alien European mould, but which will preserve her unity in her 
own past. That should be the new policy….63  
 
The idea of a ‘white South Africa’, surrounded by  ‘homelands’ for the various 
‘tribes’, would require a violence of immense scale- the forced removals and 
relocations, the control and regulation of movement, the policing of boundaries; all of 
which, if the regime was to be a bastion of ‘Western civilization’, would be done 
through law. A series of laws were placed on the statute books, which had a three fold 
aim: to creation a nationally applied and imposed singular order of law which legally 
classified the population by race and ethnicity; to create the legal framework for two 
modes of political authority, one for natives and one for race groups; and to create the 
legal framework for the ethically and racially ordered provision of social life and 
social welfare- education, marriage, domicile, and health. It also had the aim of 
creating the imagination of possibilities that were racially and ethnically defined in 
relation to the cultivation of the self and labour: where one could live and work and 
the kind of labour that was allowed.  The violence required to realize these aims 
would be made legal through the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), the 
                                                
63 Smuts, J. C (1930) pp. 76-78. Smuts went on to laud the introduction of this bifurcated rule in South 
Africa by Cecil John Rhodes through the Glen Grey Act: “Rhodes’ African policy embodied two main 
ideas: white settlement to supply the steel framework, and the stimulus for an enduring civilization, and 
the indigenous native populations to express the specifically African character of the natives in their 
future development and civilization.” (Smuts, 1930: 78). The metaphor drawing on the metallurgical 
rigidity of steel to describe the architectural framework of European modernity in its encounter with 
Africa striking illuminates the impermeability between the bifurcated zones that Smuts, and Rhodes 
had in mind when speaking about ‘the European’ and ‘the African’. In the narrative around Smuts he is 
upheld by liberalism in South Africa because he changed his views on segregation, and supported the 
recommendations of the Fagan Commission in 1948, which recommended abandoning as impractical 
the continuation of racial segregation in urban areas and the control, or influx of Africans. This position 
was opposed by the Nationalist Party who defeated Smuts’s United Party narrowly in the poll that year. 
What is often not recalled in the lament of loss, and the celebration of Smuts as an anti-segregationist 
running on a liberal platform, was that the Fagan Commission recommended desegregation, but not 
political representation or universal franchise for Africans.  
  
88 
Population Registration Act (1950), the Group Areas Act (1950), Bantu Authorities 
Act (1951), the Bantu Education Act (1953), and at the end of that decade, the 
Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act (1959), a crowning piece of legislation.    
 
At the interstices of this bifurcated zones of belonging and exclusion, where those 
who sort to make the case for the universal, from various foundational claims- 
religious, moral, ideological, political, ethical and legal. It was for this latter group in 
particular, that a recourse to human rights would appeal, since it could make visible, 
and bring into question the developmental claims of the Nationalist Party-led 
government after 1948 by demonstrating the systematic and widespread nature of the 
violations the implementation of these policies had on the individual as a subject of 
suffering, in other words, as a victim. The tension here for human rights lawyers is 
that modern legal rights rest on the metaphysically derived notion of a set of rights 
which are immanent and pre-political. These are translated in thought, through 
concepts and mythologies (and secularized) as the foundations of modern positive 
law. There is the law that is (sacred, divine, God-given) and there is the law that 
emerges from the labour of thought as the product of reason, the law that is not 
‘natural’ but human—positive law. When human rights lawyers endeavour to critique 
the legality of the apartheid state and its laws, how would they pit one form of 
positive law against another? How do they find a universal foundation for positivism, 
which is not national? In other words, how does one universalize liberalisms’ political 
ontology? Dugard introduced this as ‘moral’ question, or a form of law that can take 
into account ‘values’—this is what he was getting at with the idea of protecting a 
‘heritage’, not on metaphysical grounds, but as the cultural value of an inheritance to 




In another assessment, the South African legal scholar and activist Dennis Davis, a 
current judge in the Cape High Court, remembers this past along very similar lines 
(Davis and Le Roux 2009).  In a volume of essays on the role of law under apartheid 
and in postapartheid South Africa, Davis and co-author Michelle Le Roux look at four 
key, and for a legal tradition he includes himself in, salutary moments, between 1950 
through to 1991, where ‘courtroom activism’ or ‘lawfare’, challenged apartheid 
policy. The first was in the response to the removal of ‘Coloured’ voters from the 
Cape voters role in the 1950s, the second was the prominent Treason Trial of 1955 
where the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC), and the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) were charged under criminal law for incitement; the third 
moment was to follow with the role of lawyers in relation to the question of residence 
and relocations as the so-called Influx Control laws were implemented, which 
included the Pass Laws, forced removals and denationalization; fourthly, argue Davis 
and Le Roux, was the role of human rights lawyers in the challenging of state 
atrocities and incarcerations without trial under the various States of Emergency, but 
particularly through the 1980’s (Davis and Le Roux 1989: 10-13).  
 
 For Davis and Le Roux, law is about ‘rights’, and they argue that the link between 
the presence of a Bill of Rights, the human rights orientation of the Constitution of 
postapartheid South Africa, and the focus on human rights at the TRC, have 
something to do with what they describe metaphorically as a ‘bridge’: 
The bridge would assist in the journey which society undertook to travel 
away from arbitrary and brutal excercises of power to decisions, which 
could be subjected to debate, deliberation, public examination and above 
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all, justification. The constutional bridge was to be created by bridge-
builders who were fluent in the old legal traditions. The dominant 
conception of the common law and that of a universal body of truth 
inherited from the days of the Dutch occupation of the Cape…. All these 
legal rules and conduct from the traditions of which we speak. But it now 
becomes mixed with the new constitutional text and the interpretative 
moves of the courts in giving meaning to the new text. In this way, fresh 
legal material is manufactured which in turn, is employed in the 
construction of the legal bridge (2009: 7-8).  
For Davis and Le Roux, as for Dugard, there is a contestation in law, but also an 
underlying continuity within the contestation, within a universal teleology- the bridge 
along which we move, linking the past with the present and the future. Law is here 
once more constituted as a universal (Western) ‘tradition’ and an ‘inheritance’. In 
their chapter in the Spro-Cas Report on ‘Difficulties facing Black South Africans in 
exercising their Legal Rights’, Lane and Williamson argued from the premise that  
‘[i]t is a fundamental juristic proposition that a right has no meaning unless there is a 
remedy for its invasion…It is suggested that before it can be said that a person has 
effective remedies for enforcing his legal rights, whether against a fellow citizen or 
against authority’. In order for this enforcement of a legal right to come to fruition, 
they argued,  ‘he must enjoy: 
1. Sufficient freedom of movement to enable him to seek assistance in the proper 
quarters and reach persons who have it in their power to assist him. 
2. Unfettered access to professional and other advisers who are best able to act 




3. Ready access to the courts.’ (Randall, 192, p46). 
Against these requirements, they gave an account of the numerous obstacles that 
faced an average urban black South African:  the Pass Laws, Influx Controls, Group 
Areas restrictions, amongst a myriad of other Apartheid laws, to be able to get access 
to an urban center where most often legal representation was based. In addition, black 
lawyers and professional services were few and far between64, and legal aid an 
unrewarding vocation. This was just to describe the challenges of getting access to a 
lawyer. And then, as they describe it,  “Once he reaches the courts, the problems of 
the black are not over”, as the litigant faces the challenge of unsympathetic 
magistrates and clerks, and language and translation complications, dependent on the 
availability of court interpreters. They concluded that, “it is manifest that the rights 
which are accorded them in law are in many instances not enforced or readily 
enforceable. Compared with their fellow white citizens, there are at a grave 
disadvantage” (Randall 1972: 447-49).65   
 
It was in this context that the rise to hegemony in the mediation of pain and suffering 
of human rights law and the figure of the human rights lawyer must be located. In its 
institutional forms, a related mediating institution between the (white) lawyer-- the 
‘bridge builder’-- and the (black) subject of apartheid is the ‘Advice Office’ or the 
Advice Bureau. An illuminating example of this is the formation and history of the 
non-governmental organization, the Black Sash, and the issues that it took up66. The 
                                                
64 The first black owned law partnership was opened by Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo—the two 
key leaders of the African National Congress in the postwar period, in Johannesburg in 1952. 
65 From this realization the ‘Legal Advice Office’ was born. Funded by donor organizations, NGO’s 
and universities, the Advice Office was staffed by lawyers, volunteers and community workers, who 
sought to be the bridge between Africans  in urban centers, and the legal rights they had access to, but 
could not access.  




Black Sash, according to its own narrative, was formed by group of white suburban 
women over afternoon tea in 1955. They shared a concern for the fate of 
‘constitutionalism’ in the country.67  Reflecting on its formation, and five years of 
Nationalist Party rule, June Sinclair, the organizations President in 1960, remarked: 
When the Black Sash was originally formed in 1955 to protest against the 
debauching of our Constitution by the Senate Act—and I say debauching 
deliberately because the assertion of the legality arising from the 
manipulation of an unfortunate loophole in the Constitution does violence 
to our intelligence—we little thought that in so short a time we would be 
called on to defend the fundamental human rights and dignities which 
been the prerogative of civilized peoples since the middle ages.68 
She went on to note that, “the Black Sash is fully conversant, through the work in its 
Advice offices, with the implication of the laws which affect the urban African. The 
Native Urban Areas Act of 1945 is now surpassed by the horrors of the Bantu Laws 
Amendment Act. These laws have converted the African from a human being into a 
statistic, juggled with and pushed hither and thither by officials who are bound to 
carry out the letter of the law”.69 
 
The disquiet with what was occurring in the country stemmed from a very similar 
worry that I have traced in the legal thinking of figures like Sydney Kentridge.70 The 
                                                
67 Black Sash (1995) Golden Jubilee report, The Black Sash of South Africa C. Michelman Oxford 
University Press, London.  
68 Black Sash (1964a) ‘South Africa in Crisis, Opening Address by National President of Black Sash, 
Jean Sinclair’, Pietermaritzburg 20 October 1964 B1.10/28, p2.  
69 Black Sash (1964a) ‘South Africa in Crisis, Opening Address by National President of Black Sash, 
Jean Sinclair’, Pietermaritzburg 20 October 1964 B1.10/28, p4.  
70  At the organization’s 1979 Congress a report was given on the Human Rights in Law conference 
held at the University of Cape Town in January of that year. The minute noted that Sydney Kentridge 
provided a summary of the discussion at the congress, and it was resolved by the meeting, on his 
recommendation, that a Bill of Rights should be promoted and propagated as the basis of a future 
government with immediate effect, and not ‘left to being some last ditch stand by whites’. This last 
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concern was about the fate of Africans as prospective citizens; at the same time, this 
concern also stemmed from the worry that a certain kind of civilizational filiation to 
the achievements of the West— which I am using to refer to as an accretion or 
placeholder of markers achieved through the evolution of its laws, viewed as a 
tradition and a heritage—was being thrown into question by apartheid rule. In Jean 
Sinclair’s words,  
Seven hundred and fifty years ago the Magna Carta laid down the basis 
on which Western civilized standards of justice have been founded…In 
sixteen years, with the help of a mass of statutory legislation this 
Government has plunged South Africa back into the social anarchy of the 
middle ages. They have abandoned centuries of political progress, have 
manipulated Christian doctrine to suit their own philosophies and have 
subverted the common law in the interests of sectional dogma.71 
 
The Black Sash volunteers decided that besides the advocacy work and campaigning 
they would do against apartheid in the white community, they would also mediate and 
advise Africans on their rights under the legislation. This was to be done through 
provision of free paralegal advice by volunteers on matters related to working 
conditions, pensions, right to residency and so on; later they would focus on 
conditions of repression, and detention without trial as the overt repression of the state 
became more pronounced with the States of Emergency. The method of operation was 
to open a case-file for each person attended to, and to provide legal advice and 
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71 Black Sash (1964a) ‘South Africa in Crisis, Opening Address by National President of Black Sash, 




assistance where possible to assist in finding legal justice for a wrong that those who 
came in to the Advice Office felt they were being subjected to.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Two years after the formation of the organisation in 1955, and in conjunction with the 
liberal-oriented South African Institute of Race Relations, they formed the first of 
their Advice Office’s in the ‘coloured’ neighbourhood of Athlone on the Cape Flats. 
Subsequently Advice Offices were set up on the major urban centers around the 
country where the Black Sash had branches. In its report for 1973, the Athlone office 
reported that it had been in operation at that point for sixteen years, and in that year 
alone it had added another ‘one thousand index cards’ to its files. Each index card 
represented a case. The report recalled that the rationale for the establishment of 
paralegal assistance was that  “each every African needs to understand his or her 
position vis a vis the provisions of Section 10 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Act No. 25. 
of 1945.”  Whilst the Advice Office was established by white volunteers who would 
use their knowledge of the law and skills to press the case of Africans, the report 
writers noted that there was often also a reversal of roles—that Africans often had a 
well developed sense of the law and their rights, more so than the average white 
citizen: “Africans are generally better informed than their would-be helpers. ‘They’ 
know a good deal about the law and its two faces, back and white.”72  
 
In its report a common challenge facing many Africans in the Western Cape was the 
right to residence without a work permit, or issues domestic issues like pensions, or to 
do with residency of a husband and wife together. African men, as migrant labour, 
were not permitted to bring families to reside with them in urban centers Families 
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were of course expected to reside in the ‘homelands’ or Tribal Authorities.  There was 
a caveat in the Western Cape which came into existence in 1972 which allowed a wife 
to live in the same location has her husband if she had a job, but there was a cruel 
conditionality attached- the children from the marriage could not live with their 
parents, they would have to live in the ethnicized Tribal Authority. The work of the 
Advice Office reported that in each of the over hundred and twenty cases pertaining 
to this provision that they had looked at, it was the “husbands awareness of his 
residential rights that prompted the inquiry”.73 The Advice Office concluded that “the 
ordinary understanding of the ordinary citizens know that the law is forcing them to 
live extra-ordinary lives. People do not need to be told that family life is a normal 
human prerogative, that husbands, wives and children belong together, nor that a man 
who has worked until his body is almost worn out should not be cast back upon rural 
relatives without recompense”.74 
 
In its report for the same year, the Johannesburg branches of the Advice Office 
reported that 4505 people visited the office. They came for assistance with the right to 
residency and assistance for procuring Residential Permits, a necessary requirement 
under Section 10 (1) of the Urban Areas Act.75 This process was adjudicated by a 
Bantu Affairs Commissioner would need evidence that the applicant had secured 
employment in order to enjoy residency rights, and many of the cases involved loss of 
employment, or the applicant being self-employed or unemployed and seeking to 
remain in an urban area to search for another job. This, together with housing, 
                                                
73 Black Sash (1973) Athlone Advice Office Annual Report to National Conference on 16 October 
1973, B1.19/ 29. 
74 Black Sash (1973) Athlone Advice Office Annual Report to National Conference on 16 October 
1973, B1.19/ 29. 
75 Black Sash (1973) Johannesburg Advice Office Annnual Report at National Conference on 15 
October 1973, B1.19/29. 
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remained a staple of the reports through the 1960’s and the early 1970’s. The report 
broke down its cases along the following lines that year: 
 
 
Source: Johannesburg Advice Office Annnual Report at National Conference on 15 
October 1973, B1.19/29 
 
Whilst assisting those arrested for various offenses stemming from segregationist and 
apartheid policies was a routine part of the work of the Advice Offices and the Black 
Sash, the repression of the state, as it confronted resistance from black South Africans 
in organized forms, via the rising independent trade union movement and popular 
community organizations, was to present the organization with a challenge. The year 
after the 1976 uprisings, which initiated with the Soweto schools revolt but quickly 
spread throughout the country, the Black Sash met in Johannesburg for the annual 
conference of 1977.76  Whilst the organization had done advocacy work amongst 
white South Africans arguing for legal and policy reform, it had worked with black 
                                                
76 See Baruch Hirson’s Year of Fire, Year of Ash.  
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South Africans within the law to press their cases within the juridical framework as it 
existed. The debate following the repression of June 1976, and following the 
formation of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) successor, the Security Branch, and 
the beginnings of deaths of activists in detention, created a dilemma for some 
members of the Sash77: what stance should the Black Sash take in relation to the law, 
if apartheid was morally repugnant to their sensibilities of what the foundations of a 
legal order should be, but was itself legal? 
 
The matter was raised by ‘Ms Franklin’ of the Natal Coast region: “The Sash” she 
lamented,  “was founded to uphold the constitution but the irony is that there is very 
little to uphold…We can ask ourselves whether it is morally permissible for a small 
group to impose its brand of morality by Law.”  She observed with consternation that 
“the security arm of the law has enormous powers and abuse of such power is seen in 
deaths of detainees, arbitrary arrests, etc. Our action has taken form of stands and 
handouts and has always been legal procedure but we must look and see how we can 
expose and oppose the activities of the Security Branch”. Pressing the case further, 
Ms. Franklin bluntly raised a serious dilemma which brought into question the stance 
the Black Sash had taken in relation to compliance and the law: “ Laws which uphold 
apartheid do not demand our obedience or respect”.78 In her summation of the 
discussion that followed, the organization’s President, Sheena Duncan, quickly 
brought the provocative questioning of the legitimacy of the law from the delegate of 
                                                
77 The first death was that of Solwandle Looksmart Ngudle on 3 September 1963, the last under 
apartheid the apartheid era  was that of Alfred Mabake Makaleng on 26 August 1988. During the 25 
years of detention without trial, there have been 67 deaths in detention, an average of almost three each 
year. Only during 1970 and 1972 to 1975 were no deaths recorded, whilst peaks occurred in 1969 (7 
deaths), 1976 (13), 1977 (13) and 1986 (4). These figures are cited at 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/online%20books/crime-
humanity/detention%20weapon.htm accessed 25/08/10. 




the Natal coastal region back into the legal fold: “Ms. Duncan”, the minute records,  
“pointed out that we may not discuss civil disobedience as Black Sash policy…We 
should be aware of the possibilities in testing the limits of the tolerance of the 
law…We must make sure that the application of the law is no wider than would be 
ruled by the Courts…and we should use due process of law to establish the peaceful 
and non-violent possibilities.”79  
 
The matter was resolved in favour of Sheena Duncan’s view, but the issues that the 
organization would itself focus on increasingly was to shift more and more to the 
making visible, and the recording, of repression and suppression that arose from the 
violence of apartheid’s policies. By 1985 the Advice Office files still record that the 
attention to cases involving ‘documentation’ constituted the bulk of consultations in 
the large urban centers of the Western Cape and Johannesburg. These were 
consultations to do with the information necessary for the verification of requirements 
of urban residency under Influx Control laws. The Advice Offices were also consulted 
about disability and old-age pensions, housing and ‘domestic matters’. There was 
however also the issue of the effects of policing and repression that had become 
increasingly acute. In 1985 the Black Sash set up Crises Centers in conjunction with a 
number of NGOs’. It was in the Eastern Cape town of Port Elizabeth—under whose 
jurisdiction the town of Cradock where Mathew Goniwe was a resident— that the 
Crisis Center had to deal with such a large volume of cases that it felt compelled to 
hire full time staff, employing a director, and two assistants, as well as the regular 
compliment of at least three volunteers who ran the office each day from June 1985 
                                                





onwards.80  Between June to September of 1985 the files show that there were 172 
interviews with people who were victims of police action in one way or another- 
through detentions, assaults or deaths: “One man expressed the dilemma in which 
every township resident shared, notes Glenda Webster in her overview of the period, 
that ‘if you see the soldiers or the police you stand still, they beat you. If you run, they 
shoot.’”  
 
By 1986 the Black Sash had also set up a group of volunteers who constituted a Court 
Monitoring Group. As the South African government placed greater restrictions on 
the extent to which the media could report on the actions of the South African Police 
and the South African Defence Force, the Sash felt that a direct monitoring of the 
cases that came before the courts would allow both an exercise of pressure through 
surveillance, as well as constitute a form of record keeping and knowledge, and 
contribute to the cataloguing of injustices.81 The 1987 report noted that, “it is 
appalling to note the number of individuals who allege brutal violence on arrest, in 
Casspirs [an amoured vehicle used by the SAP and SADF], and in police cells—
including incidents of torture. The assaults ranged from kicking and beating—with 
quirts, fists or rifles- to teargassing and close range-shooting” (In a few cases doctor’s 
certificates, photographs, and slides were offered in evidence).82 
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The relationship between the white female Black Sash volunteers, the almost all white 
lawyers, and the black South African’s for whom they were the hope or possibility of 
legal justice mediated, is something that the court monitors themselves reflected on: 
We have established very cordial relationships with attorneys and 
advocates involved in these cases, and have learned to admire their 
dedication in often trying circumstances. They in turn, have encouraged 
us. For us, as monitors, the court experience is disturbing and depressing. 
But it can be inspiring too…This is one of the few avenues available to us 
for contact across the colour divide—a place for possible bridge building. 
It has been made clear, again and again, that it has mattered to them to 
know that there are those who care and are concerned for them.83 
 
The situation was to become more dire as the conditions in the country changed. In 
her Presidential Address of 1986, Sheena Duncan, reflected on a year with a somber 
opening: 
The past year has been a year of mourning. We last met in Port Elizabeth 
in March 1985. Mathew Goniwe was there. Di Bishop presented a report 
about the visit she and Brian had made to Namibia. Molly Blackburn was 
there. Mathew is dead. Brian is dead. Molly is dead. We have wept for 
them as we weep for the hundreds of South Africans who have died since 
September 1984. The Institute of Race Relations estimates that 1158 
                                                





people were killed during those months. At least 4000 thousand people 
have been injured in the past 17 months.84 
 
Just under ten years before, at the Congress of 1977, Sheena Duncan had firmly 
reminded delegates that the Black Sash would not discuss civil disobedience and that 
its policy was to utilize legal channels in order to alleviate the pain and suffering of 
apartheid’s laws on the lives of black South Africans. Now, nine years later, the tone 
of her address had shifted dramatically: “There has been no change towards 
dismantling apartheid. Apartheid is the deliberately planned, coldly evil system 
designed for the subjection and the exclusion of the poor and the black majority in 
order to further the interests and preserve the power of the wealth and white minority. 
There has been no reform of apartheid”. Departing from the position she had held 
before, Duncan sort solace in a legal hope no longer: 
I believe that there is one small hope left in South Africa at the present 
time and that lies in those political movements and black communities 
who have withdrawn and are withdrawing their co-operation from the 
apartheid state. The withdrawal of co-operation entails civil disobedience. 
Civil Disobedience is not to be taken lightly but only in deep respect for 
the idea of law…Civil disobedience must not be entered into when the 
law can offer redress. It is a last resort. In South Africa the law does not 
offer redress for the many gross violations of civil liberties and human 
rights which are part of the laws of this country.85 
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It was quite a shift, but this did not mean that the Black Sash would no longer seek 
recourse through the courts. Legal work would continue, and there was an 
intensification of the production of records, and evidence of state repression, and the 
dissemination of news, together with a greater identification and support for the work 
of black community organizations like United Democratic Front, which had come 
into existence in 1983, and of which Mathew Goniwe had been the key organizer in 
up until the time of his death in July 1985.  
 
Conclusion 
The Modes of Legal Accounting and Suffering  
At the Black Sash’s 1964 Congress two resolutions was passed to both recruit more 
volunteers to the advice offices, but also to register in its publicity campaigns that the 
cases of Africans dealing with the effects of the migrant labour system affected 
millions and were part of the normal reality of day to day life. The first resolution 
passed noted that “in order that all members of the Black Sash should be better 
equipped to make the South African public aware of the devastating consequences of 
the Influx Control and Migratory Labour systems, every member of the Black sash 
should undertake to spend a morning in the Advice Offices and to bring at least one of 
her friends with her…” 
 
The second recommendation, proposed by Mrs. Robb of the Western Cape and 
seconded by a Mrs. Cluver, was carried as follows: 
That whenever Press or similar publicity is obtained for the Advice Office 
cases an attempt should always be made to have appended at the end :- 
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THIS IS NO ‘HARD LUCK’ EXCEPTION TO THE RULE. This case is 
typical of hundreds in the Advice Office files and of the South African 
situation. It is merely one more illustration of the fact that for millions of 
our compatriots, there is nowhere where they may live or work as a 
RIGHT in the land of their birth.86  
In the first part of her speech of 1960, June Sinclair had focused on the harshest 
aspects of apartheid- the effect of apartheids policies on the movement of Africans 
through the Pass Laws: 
Thousands of Africans are ‘endorsed out’ of urban areas back to the tribal 
areas every month. Thousands of families are broken up and thousands of 
children are deprived of paternal care and discipline. Thousands are 
homeless, rootless and many are even stateless…Thousands of employers 
spend thousands of hours in pass offices in an endeavour to have their 
labour registered. Thousands of Africans spend thousands of hours 
standing in queues waiting for permits to seek work. Thousands of 
Africans travel thousands of miles to their homes in the country to await 
permission to travel back to town to take up the employment offered to 
them.87 
 
She recalled in her address, spoken with eloquence and passion, that apartheid’s 
victims were to be enumerated and measured in their thousands. The sense of the 
scale of the impact of the injustice of apartheid was vast. Towards the end of the talk 
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that year she provided a summary ‘in a nutshell’ of the situation in the country in 
1964. But the number of victims in this accounting is quite different in scale to the 
numbers invoked earlier on in the report, the shift now from thousands to much 
smaller figures: for example, the number of people banned (404), the number listed as 
Communists (435) , the number of people placed under twenty-four hour house arrest 
(13) , the number of people placed  under ‘night arrest’ (24) , the number of people 
detained under the 90 day detention law (900), the number of political trials 
concluded (137), the number of people charged with receiving military training 
outside the country (126), the number charged with sabotage (260). And so on—the 
list goes on for two pages of her speech.88 
 
This was a mode of accounting that was to continue over the years, and it was more 
pronounced by the late 1980’s when even the organization’s President came to 
despair about the utility of remaining obedient to the law. It is also a mode of 
accounting for the pain and suffering induced by apartheid that circulated more 
widely in the anti-apartheid movement both outside and inside the country. Pamphlets 
issued by various organizations, including the United Democratic Front, would 
routinely commence with a ‘State of the Nation’ section, where a list corresponding to 
the style and categories used above, would be listed, and the numbers of people 
affected enumerated. As the State of Emergency came into being in 1985, the 
additional significant category would be an accounting of people ‘detained without 
trial’ under the infamous “Section 29” of the Emergency Regulations, which allowed 
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for renewable periods of 90 and 180 days of detention without access to legal 
representation or criminal charges, at the discretion of the Minister of Police.  
 
I recall, when attending my first lecture at the University of the Western Cape as an 
undergraduate student of Political Studies, receiving a course syllabus, which I still 
have in my possession, which comprised of a reading list for the semester, to which 
was appended a ‘State of the Nation’ account, a list of Advice Offices in the greater 
Cape Town area, a section on ‘Knowing your rights under the Emergency 
Regulations’, and a note on how to respond in the event of being tear--gassed. This 
reflected the particular lecturer’s ethical-political stance, and a generally more activist 
stance that had been taken by that particular university, and not necessarily a more 
widespread academic practice at the time, but it was something entirely not out of the 
ordinary to do in the course of anti-apartheid mobilization.  
 
In its more general sense, it is a mode of accounting which I suggest shifts between 
the abstract idea of apartheid’s thousands, if not millions of victims of pass laws and 
forced relocations, and discrimination—closer to the four wrongs identified with 
apartheid as a crime against humanity—and on the other hand, a narrower empirical 
sense of apartheid at the points where it concretely violates and fails to uphold the 
civilizational claims of universal law, as framed within a human rights discourse. 
From the vantage point of the latter, certain modes of evidentiary practices are put 
into play. These require very specific individualized wrongs to be witnessed, to be 




If the TRC came to define apartheid quite incredulously as producing only 22,000 
victims, then it is because the TRC’s way of talking about the injustice of apartheid 
was the continuation, I hope to have shown, of a critique of apartheid forged through 
a human rights discourse. Characteristic of this discourse were certain ways 
documenting the violence of apartheid. Consequently, Black Sash and other 
organizations mobilized certain forms of knowledge in order to make claims within 
the civil realm of apartheids bifurcated political structure. In this realm, ‘racial 
discrimination’ became the dominant marker of what apartheid was about. Race was 
seen in this rationality as the grounds upon which individuals were denied the 
universal by their place in the epidemiological taxonomy, and which condemned them 
to their particularity. They were thus excluded from liberalisms’ universal 
capaciousness. To correct this exclusion the modern political subject could make civil 
claims through law. More precisely, claims could be made through the mediating 
figures of law – those considered citizens with rights, on behalf of those considered 
non-legal, or precariously legal persons subjects lacking in rights. Over time, the one 
dimension of apartheid’s bifurcated structure and the implications of its modes of 
power, repressions, injustices and possibilities that were put in play by the realm of 
the Traditional Authorities, customary law—the ‘decentralized despotisms’ as 
Mahmood Mamdani calls them— became the absent present of the figure of 
apartheid’s victim, and of apartheid as a mode of power and subjection itself. 
 
This mode of critique establishes then an idiom, and a style of evidentiary practice 
that requires not only a corporeal subject of suffering, but also a empirically verifiable 
corporeal agent of pain, a perpetrator, which a skillful lawyer could bring into the 
same orbit with the victim by linking the two in order to demonstrate culpability. It is 
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this genealogy of speaking about pain and suffering that comes to hegemony through 
its capacity to speak, as racial citizens, in a language and in a way that frames the 
wrong of apartheid—as racial discrimination—and which finds a global traction in 














































The juridical life after death of the Cradock Four 
 
 
Some explanations of a crime are not explanations: they're part of the crime. 
~Olavo de Cavarlho 
 
 
As I noted in Chapter One, two important questions were raised in the aftermath of 
the deaths of the Cradock Four: what happened, and who did it? The first question 
seeks to fill in the opacity of the event with narrative detail, it is a forensic question 
that seeks texture and detail: the why, the when, the where and the how.  The second 
is a question about who was involved, a question of responsibility and blame and a 
question of culpability. Between the first and second questions are a number of 
mediating discourses.  I have tried to show in the previous chapter that one discourse 
was the juridical framing of the wrong of this violence as a human rights violation. 
The wrong of apartheid exists, in this way of talking about it, as the unauthorized 
violation of bodily integrity. What happened could be ‘understood’, but it is a kind of 
understanding that instrumentalizes knowing in order to prove the commission of a  
‘criminal act’ within the law. Knowledge of who did it, and the acknowledgement of 
who did it, would in a Kantian conception of legal imperative, require a prosecution.  
 
 I would like to make a distinction between different discourses of knowledge that are 
being invoked here – the knowledge of scholarship and criticism, that seeks an 
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understanding of particular events, processes and phenomena, and which may or may 
not be mobilized for specific ethical-political ends, and for either hegemonic or 
counter-hegemonic intentions, on the one hand. And  ‘legal knowledge’ which, in 
legal formalism, views the juridical field as autonomous from the social field, and 
treats knowledge as ‘motive’, where motive is ‘a sort of causal power, a moving force 
which impels the agent toward his or her actions.’89  During the inquest hearings, as 
well as the TRC Amnesty hearings, knowledge of ‘what had happened’ was 
produced. This knowledge was produced in a legal space, which we might describe as 
a ‘habitus’, drawing on the use Pierre Bourdieu has made of this concept, to refer to  
‘a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions.’ 90 Knowledge that is produced 
within the habitus of law, when explaining the actions of ‘the perpetrator’, we might 
say tends to be transformed into the status of exculpation, where ‘to exculpate’ is to 
absolve the individual of culpability. 
 
Law as discourse practiced within a certain habitus is invested with certain rules, 
produces certain kinds of knowledges, and puts into play certain kinds of dispositions 
and behavioural practices, established within what Bourdieu would call ‘structuring 
structures’91.  Such knowledge directed towards ‘understanding’ what happened was 
                                                
89 Kaufman (2003: 330). Whilst there is a debate in criminal jurisprudence about the issue, the 
orthodox and dominant position is for motive and crime to be distinct with the former not being seen as 
an ‘excuse’ for the latter, other than in certain specified instances, such as ‘insanity’ for example. Cf 
Eugene Milhizer (2004) ‘Justification and Excuse: What they were, what they are, and what they ought 
to be’, St. Johns Law Review, Summer; Bennett, J (1998) The Act itself, Oxford: Clarendon Press; 
Horder, J (2000) ‘On the Irrelevance of motive in Criminal Law’, in Horder, J. ed. Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence, New York: Oxford University Press. 
90 ‘Habitus’, which was used to describe the inscription of power and domination through somatic 
politics was earlier developed by Mauss in a famous essay on ‘Techniques of the Body’, and was 
invoked by Bourdieu to be able to theorize domination and hegemony outside a structure/ agency 
binary. Bourdieu (1977: 83); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992:105). 
91 Bourdieu, Logic of Practice: ‘The law is a social field – set of objective and historical relations 
between positions of social actors who struggle for power or capital – in which participants struggle 
over the appropriation of the symbolic power that is implicit in legal texts. Thus, the law becomes a 
form par excellence of symbolic power – and of symbolic violence – given the possibilities possessed 
by its practitioners to create institutions and with them historical and political realities through a simple 
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brought forth, summoned, both by oral testimony as well as by the documents that 
were presented as ‘evidence’. Knowledge of what happened has therefore become 
simultaneously inscribed in legal discourse as a mode of gathering and relaying 
evidence. It has become knowledge that could implicate or absolve, as it did in the 
TRC hearings, where it took on the aura of ‘truth’. 
 
In the aftermath of apartheid, there are two substantive texts that have focused on the 
killings of the Cradock Four. Both are written by lawyers. Christopher Nicholson, 
then an advocate has since become a senior judge in post-apartheid South Africa, and 
George Bizos is a longstanding senior lawyer of immense social standing as a ‘human 
rights lawyer’, derived from his record of defending high profile anti-apartheid 
activists, including Nelson Mandela in the 1950’s.92 Both Nicholson and Bizos were 
involved with the inquest hearings that took place to investigate the deaths of Goniwe 
and his three comrades.  
 
Nicholson produced a full length book, titled ‘Permanent Removal: who killed the 
Cradock Four?’ (2004), while Bizos devotes a substantive chapter to the Cradock 
Four in the monograph he has authored, titled ‘No One to Blame? In Pursuit of 
Justice in South Africa’ (1998).  Bizos, Nicholson and a number of other lawyers who 
assisted them became directly involved in the case of the Cradock Four primarily 
through the statutory requirement in South African law for inquests into unnatural 
deaths.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
exercise of naming.’ Cf Villegas (2004: 62). As Villegas argues, “The law is, then, the exception 
whereas habitus is the rule” (Villegas 2004: 65).  
92 Bizos (2007) 
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It might be useful, as I suggest here, to think about the implications for how we 
understand the Cradock Four’s killings, primarily mediated as they have been thus 
far, through the institutions, discourses and practices of law.  What is at stake for 
these two lawyers, what prompted them to dwell on these killings, and to invest their 
time and energy in the production of texts of a popular nature that would circulate 
outside of the domain of law and lawyers? Both book titles are phrased to pose 
questions that hint at the stakes involved for the authors: the question on the one hand 
of responsibility (‘who’) and the question of accountability on the other (‘blame’). 
These are two central questions of legal culpability when prosecuting a crime.93 Yet 
in this case the two lawyers felt compelled to seek an alternative route, outside of the 
law, in order to address their questions about the preferred form of accountability that 
remained after the legal inquests as well as the quasi-judicial process involved in the 
Truth and Reconciliation’s Amnesty. The questions therefore are more than legal 
questions. Or rather the questions seem to presuppose that their answers are 
responding to questions posed within the domain of law, but which remained to be 
answered outside of the domain of law. In my discussion of these texts I wish to 
foreground the meaning of ‘justice’ as it comes to be understood in juridical discourse 
at work here, in particular as it gets highlighted in Bizos’s formulation of his 
motivations: ‘the pursuit of justice in South Africa’.  
 
Bizos’s book, written a few years before Nicholson’s, focuses on a selection of cases 
involving deaths at the hands of the Security apparatuses of the State. Death due to 
unnatural causes in apartheid South Africa required an inquest to establish, via a 
medical autopsy performed by a state authorized medical practitioner, what the cause 
                                                
93 Sistare (1987) ‘Agent Motives and the Criminal Law’, Social Theory and Practice, 13 (30) 
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of death was. This could in turn, on the recommendation of the medical practitioners, 
establish the need for a criminal investigation to ascertain legal responsibility for a 
criminal act. The decision to prosecute an offender would be taken by the Minister of 
Justice, and not by an ‘independent’ legal authority, as is the case in certain 
constitutional democracies with separations of power. In other words, it was an 
explicitly political prerogative. In the South African case, this could mean a greater 
tendency toward proceeding with a prosecution for explicit political outcomes, or 
alternatively, not proceeding with a prosecution to prevent certain political outcomes, 
and their possible consequences. 
 
The attempt by the killers of the Cradock Four to conceal both their own identities as 
well as that of their victims might not only have had the aim of denying the anti-
apartheid movement a political opportunity to mobilize followers and memorialize 
martyrs, it also had a legal-political aim. The South African Inquest Act  (1959) 
stipulates that  
If the body of a person who has allegedly died from other than natural 
causes is available, it shall be examined by the district surgeon or another 
other medical practitioner, who may, if he deems it necessary for the 
purpose of ascertaining with greater certainty the cause of death, make or 
cause to be made an examination of any internal organ or any part or any 
of the contents of the body, or of any other substance or thing.94 
The identification of the bodies of the Cradock Four, as bodies of ‘known persons’ 
would require, by statutory decree, that there be closer bio-medical and legal scrutiny, 
                                                
94 Sect 3 (2) Inquest Act 58 of the Republic of South Africa, 1959. 
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with the potential for an investigation, a scenario the killers would have wanted to 
avoid. Section 5 (2) of the Inquest Act noted that  
‘[i]f on the information submitted to him [the Public Prosecutor] in terms 
of subsection (1) it appears to the magistrate that a death has occurred ad 
that such death was not due to natural causes he shall, subject to the 
directions of the Minister, take such steps as may be necessary to ensure 
that an inquest as to the circumstances and cause of death is held by a 
judicial officer….95  
The Cradock Four subsequently became the object of two official inquests, which I 
will hereafter refer to by the names of the presiding Magistrate of each:  E. Zietsman 
(1989) and Neville De Beer (1994) respectively referred to as the Zietsman and De 
Beer Commissions.96  
 
As a ‘human rights lawyer’, George Bizos’ case-load spans an illustrious career of 
more than four decades defending those adversely affected by Apartheid’s laws. The 
cases discussed in his writings are referred to in South Africa as ‘high profile cases’: 
among them the first political detainees who had died while formally in detention, 
like Looksmart Ngudle and Ahmed Timol in the 1960s’, the death in detention of the  
Black Consciousness movement leader Steve Biko,  the death in detention of the  
trade unionist Neil Aggett in the 1970’s, and the inquests into the Cradock Four in the 
1980’s.  In the foreword to No One to Blame Sidney Kentridge, who’s prominence 
amongst a group of lawyers I have referred to in the previous chapter, notes that  
                                                
95 Sect 5(2) Inquest Act 58 of the Republic of South Africa, 1959. 
96 Goniwe and others 1994(3) SA 877 (SECLD). I have read through the transcript of the inquests in 
the archive of the Cory Library, Rhodes University. For the purposes of my discussion here, focusing 
on the legal narrative from the vantage point of lawyers, I have relied mostly on the accounts as 
mediated through Bizos and Nicholson’s recollection of the proceedings.  
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(Bizos’s) book is about a continuing search for truth – the truth about the 
deaths of the sixty or more people who died in the hands of the Security 
Police during the years of apartheid in South Africa. It is also about the 
repeated failure of the judicial officers to recognize that truth even when it 
was staring them in the face (Kentrdige in Bizos 1998: vii).   
Bizos himself explains that  
Colleagues and friends who had heard me relate my disappointment with 
the exoneration of torturers by inquest magistrates have for years 
suggested that I should try and get it out of my system through writing. I 
have resisted the temptation partly because our profession has a 
conservative attitude towards publicity…Nadine Gordimer, and other 
writers, David and Marie Philip, colleagues…encouraged me. They won 
the day (Bizos 1998: viiii).  
Bizos had written the book after the TRC applications and the hearings for amnesty 
had taken place, but also prior to Judge Ronnie Pillay announced the decision of 
Amnesty Committee in December 1999, reinforcing the demands for and of ‘Truth’. 
Bizos concludes the book with a projection: “The search for truth will continue. Why, 
how and by whose hand so many died in detention is not yet fully known. We owe it 
to their memory to keep the dockets on their deaths open in the hope that those who 
know will not take their secrets to the grave” (1998: 239). 
 
The De Beer Inquest 
And the question of individual guilt or innocence, the act of meting out justice, to both 
the defendant and the victim, are the only things at stake in a criminal court. 




The first inquest that investigated the deaths of the Cradock Four took place in 
February 1989, some three years after the deaths had occurred. An NGO, the Legal 
Resources Center, first engaged Arthur Chaskalson, who would go on to become the 
first President of post-apartheid South Africa’s Constitutional Court, on behalf of the 
families. In turn, Chaskalson deputed his friend Bizos to run the case (Bizos 1998: 
166). It was at this inquest that a ‘factual’ outline of the ‘known’ was established 
around the event of the killing: of who the victims were, where they were coming 
from, where they were going, and what the immediate context was. From the medical 
examiners report it was clear that death was by unnatural causes, and quite deliberate 
harm was done to the bodies. For Chaskalson and the legal team, the car registration 
number plate that had been found partially burnt out at the scene served as a key piece 
of evidence. The registration plate belonged to the car, but had been removed, and 
replaced with another set of registration plates, which belonged to another car that had 
since been put out of commission or ‘scrapped’. It was this piece of evidence that 
allowed Chaskalson to convince Magistrate De Beer that there was more to the 
killings than a random robbery accompanied by murders. It suggested that a high 
degree of planning was involved, and that there was a deliberate attempt to destroy 
the identities of the bodies, as well as evidence which might link the car to the owner, 
in this case the white Honda Ballade that was registered to Matthew Goniwe.  
 
Chaskalson and his team lacked any physical or direct evidence to implicate a specific 
group or set of individuals, particularly anyone associated directly with the State. 
Their hope was that they could leave the Magistrate with a strongly argued conjecture 
about who had been involved that bordered on innuendo, a strategy which they hoped 
would lead the Judge to only one logical answer: that members of the agencies of the 
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State were involved in the killings. In Bizos’ words, the judge asked, “Now then, 
what does the evidence then tell us about who might be the killers?’ he asked. Bizos 
recounts his response in his book:  
We know them to be a group sufficiently strong and well organized to 
stop the car, to overpower, to stop the car without doing it any damage, 
sufficiently strong and well organized to overpower the four deceased 
people and sufficiently strong and well organized with petrol, guns and 
weapons and with transport to move the bodies about and take them to 
different places…. It was a group of people sufficiently skilled to 
formulate a plan and to leave a false trial…. Now there must be a group of 
persons who were willing to drive around with dead bodies in the dark of 
night, to conceal and disfigure the bodies, to engage in this macabre and 
dangerous undertaking, to conceal the identity of their victims, and if it 
were, as I suggested it must be, a politically motivated murder, why 
would this be done? Why should people disappear? Who would want 
people not to be traced? It could be that there would be no inquest. It 
could be that there would be no funeral. It could be that there were no 
martyrs…. (Bizos 1998: 169-70).  
 
This was the extent of the intimation that Chaskalson and Bizos could make: the 
circumstances surrounding the deaths, and the identities of the victims would suggest 
that the killings had a ‘political motive’, and that although there was a conflict 
underway between activists of the United Democratic Front and the Azanian Peoples 
Organisation (AZAPO), there was an insufficient presence of AZAPO in Cradock to 
given credence to this theory. The only other political beneficiary, with sufficient 
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means and motive would have to be governmental agencies. Magistrate de Beer did 
not however need to spend much time pondering the evidence, and was quick to 
return a judgment on the matter. He declared crisply that the “only finding I can make 
in this regard, which is also a finding to which all parties have agreed, is that their 
deaths were brought about by a person or persons or group of persons unknown” (De 
Beers Inquest cited in Bizos 1998: 171). As Bizos lamented about this judgement at 
the time: “Once more, no one was to blame.” 
 
The question of who had killed the Cradock Four was to remain unanswered in legal 
terms until it again became a subject of national attention in the country in 1992 when 
a piece of evidence surfaced that seemed to link, quite incontrovertibly, the state to 
the bodies of the Cradock Four. A number of important developments took place 
between the conclusion of the De Beer inquest and the year1992. These events started 
to reveal the presence of institutions popularly known as Death Squads within the 
security apparatus of the South African government. These ‘Death Squads’, as I have 
noted in Chapter One, were set up to operate in secret and carried out ‘extra-judicial 
killings’, illegal even under the suspended civil law provisions enabled by the State of 
Emergency. They attracted a considerable amount of attention, and had the potential 
for scandal, precisely because of their lack of legal sanction not only within the legal 
framework of the apartheid state but also under the State of Emergency provisions, 
which had suspended much of the legal code protecting expressive and associative 






The Zietsman Inquest 
 
Secrets began to unravel in earnest in October 1989. A former security policeman, 
Butana Alfred Nofomela, contemplating his scheduled execution the following day— 
the 20th October, calculated that he might be able to stave off the gallows by offering 
information on killings carried out by a unit of the South African Police that he was a 
part of. Nofomela was to be executed for the criminal murder of a farmer, and feeling 
abandoned by his superiors who had always assured him of his impunity, decided to 
make his revelations. When he made a last minute effort to secure his freedom 
through his superiors, an envoy was sent to tell that unfortunately he would have to 
“take the pain” (Laurence 1990: 7). He made his disclosure in an affidavit to a lawyer 
of the non-governmental organization, Lawyers for Human Rights. In the meanwhile, 
Nofomela’s commander, Coetzee, in the special unit “C1”, now known in popular 
discourse by the name of the farm where it was headquartered, Vlakplaas,  [‘Flat 
Farm’], had been making similar revelations to a journalist of the dissident Afrikaner 
newspaper, Die Vrye Weekblad [The Free Weekly Magazine]. 
 
The national and international scandal provoked by the public nature of the 
revelations forced the Minister of Justice to set up a committee of two – comprising a 
provincial Attorney General and an army general—to investigate the allegations. 
Their report was handed to then President FW De Klerk, who released it only a year 
later. The McNally report, named after the attorney-general who authored it, 
concluded that neither Nofomela not Coetzee’s allegations were credible.  De Klerk 
accepted this finding and continued to resist calls from certain quarters for a judicial 
commission of inquiry. He would later accede, with the establishment of a 
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commission under Judge Louis Harms that was appointed to investigate allegations of 
irregularities within the South African Police and Defence Force with regards to 
political violence.97 Harms’ mandate was confined to investigating only cases within 
the borders of South Africa and prevented from issuing subpoenas that could compel 
potential witnesses to give evidence. Whilst the Harms Commission findings have 
been described as a ‘farce’ by Bizos and others, Judge Harms had found that a unit 
known by the Orwellian name of the ‘Civil Co-operation Bureau’ had ‘been involved 
in death squad activities’ but, he concluded on the basis of his evidence that he 
“exonerated the police and the defense force from any wrong doing” (cited in Bizos 
1998: 173).  
 
                                                
97 Harms, L.T.C (1990) ‘Commission of Inquiry into Certain Alleged Murders’, RP 109-90(A); RP 
109-90 (E); S297/151 (A); S290/152(E); murders.  
De Klerk recalled the chronology of his actions in his submission to the TRC on behalf of the National 
Party:  
On 9 July 1990 the Government announced the final termination of the National Security 
Management System, and also drastically scaled down the role of the State Security 
Council. The management of covert operations was further reviewed after receipt of the 
report of the Harms Commission.  I appointed a committee under chairmanship of Prof E 
Khan to advise on the desirability of all secret projects and to recommend on the phasing 
out, where possible, of such projects. Part of its brief was to advise me of the adequacy 
of existing control measures. I appointed a standing commission (The Goldstone 
Commission) to investigate incidents of public violence in November 1992 I appointed 
General Pierre Steyn to investigate allegations made to the Goldstone Commission with 
regard to activities of the Directorate of Covert Collection of Military Intelligence. These 
steps - and particularly the reports of the Goldstone Commission - were instrumental in 
uncovering many of the abuses that have now come before the Courts and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. However, the Goldstone Commission consistently found 
that abuses had been committed by all sides in the conflict. I therefore submit that 
extensive steps, in keeping with what could reasonably be required under prevailing 
circumstances, were taken to prevent abuses and the gross violation of human rights. The 
inability since 1994 of the new Government to bring political violence in KwaZulu-Natal 
to an end serves as a good case study of the limitations on any Government to effectively 






The second inquest into the hearings of the Cradock Four came after the publication 
of a document that surfaced in 1992 in the anti-apartheid newspaper, The New 
Nation98.  This document has subsequently become known as ‘the signal’ (‘die sein’), 
referring to a category of internal communication, namely a note that would be 
encrypted and circulated between different branches of the state bureaucracy and 
contained information considered and marked by various degrees of confidentiality, 
as either ‘Secret’ or ‘Top Secret’, various degrees of urgency, and various degrees of 
circulation. This particular signal had been sent by a Col. Lourens du Plessis, 
secretary of the Eastern Province Joint Management Center (JMC).  It was sent on 
behalf of General Joffel van der Westhuizen who was chairman of the JMC, and was 
addressed to General Janse van Rensburg, who was chairman of the strategy branch 
of the Secretariat of the State Security Council. The signal was given to the media by 
the homeland leader of the Transkei, General Bantu Holomisa, who in turn had 
apparently received it from du Plessis.99 An innocuous appearing, typically 
bureaucratically formatted page, with a ‘Top Secret’ [Uiters Geheim] stamp 
prominent on the top of the  black and white-marked rows and columns, it was further 
marked as ‘Priority’ [Prioriteit], and the handwriting in Afrikaans refers to a 
conversation between Van Rensburg and Van Der Westhuizen,  dated 7th June 1985, 
and then indicates 
2. Names as follows [Name as volg]: Matthew Goniwe 
                                                              Mbulelo Goniwe 
                                                              Fort Calata 
                                                
98 ‘Death Signal’ (1992) New Nation, 8-14 May 




3. It is proposed that the abovementioned persons be permanently 
removed from society as a matter of urgency [Dit word voorgestel dat bg. 
persone permanent uit die samelewiing, as saak van dringeneid, verwyder 
word] 
 
4. Widespread reaction locally, as well as nationally should be expected 
given the importance of these persons, particularly the first named, for the 
enemy.... [Wye reaksie kan plaaslik sowel as nasional verwag word agv 
belangrikheid van hierdie persone, veral eersgenaamde, vir die 
vyand….]100 
 
The Zietsman inquest, which started on 28 February 1993, forms the bulk of Bizos’ 
own writings on the Cradock Four. That time around, he was the lead advocate 
representing the families. Furthermore, the inquest became a source of considerable 
information about the security logic of the apartheid state. The Zietsman inquest 
especially reveals contours of two contending rationalities in the state: the political 
and the legal. We see the attempt here by Bizos to bring these two contending 
rationalities to a head in order to tip the scale in favour of a legal imperative.  
 
By the early 1990’s classified state intelligence documents had begun leaking out of 
the South African state’s security agencies. The Police and the Defence Force could 
no longer effectively stonewall inquiries into their actions through silence or through 
plausible denials. A small amount of textual and oral artifacts in the form of 
documents, reports and affidavits, which constituted legally accepted evidence, were 
                                                
100 Cory Library, Rhodes University, Transcript of the Zietsman Inquest (1994) p84 
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forcing an opening up and providing insights into the shadowy rationalities and 
practices of state security. A growing lack of will and capacity to enforce a coherent 
and collective denial was especially evident when three separate legal teams appeared 
at the Zietsman Inquest to represent each of the state agencies who felt they had 
something to answer for: the South African Defence Force, the South African Police 
and the Department of National Intelligence. In the course of the inquest it became 
apparent that there was considerable intra-departmental animosity between the 
Defence Force and the South African Police, over competing mandates as well as 
competition over recognition for ‘rewards’ or avoidance of responsibility.  
 
Like Chaskalson before him in the De Beer hearing, Bizos wanted to demonstrate the 
destructive presence of the state on the bodies of the Cradock Four. That is to say, he 
wanted to show that the South African government had killed the Cradock Four 
through personnel and agencies that were in its employ, and that this was done outside 
of the authorized forms of juridical execution administered through the death penalty. 
For Bizos the challenge appeared easier, given that they101 had in their possession a 
document which seemed to be a clear instruction to ‘permanently remove from 
society’ three of the Cradock Four, what Bizos was to call the ‘smoking gun’ (1998: 
174). If Bizos could show that the state had a reason to kill Goniwe and the others, 
and if he could generate a consensus that the signal was indeed ‘the smoking gun’, an 
instruction to kill, then the grey area of the actual persons who did the killing would 
become less of an obstacle to proving that the South African government was 
responsible for the deaths.  
  
                                                
101 Whilst I refer to Bizos in the singular, I am aware that he points out at all times that he was assisted 
by a team of lawyers: Clive Plaskett, Nicollette Moodie and Mohamed Navsa. 
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To that extent, the Zietsman inquest was to shed light on how Matthew Goniwe was 
viewed by the state. I have in mind something like James Scott’s phraseology, of 
‘seeing like a state’ (1998) but I am not referring to a developmental optic here. 
Rather I am referring to the optic of the legal-state, the state that looks at the 
population also from the vantage point of  ‘law and order’. The inquest was therefore 
also useful because it gave a picture of a rather reclusive and much speculated upon 
aspect of the South African parliamentary democracy of the 1980s. In as much as this 
was a racialized and ethnicized State, it claimed for itself the mantle, like the state of 
Israel does in the Middle East, of being the only democracy in the Southern African 
region. What emerged in the Zietsman inquest was the degree to which being at ‘war’ 
was the driving rationality that had become centralized within the structures of 
governance, particularly after the former Defence Minister, P.W Botha, had become 
Prime Minister in 1978.102 This rationality had created an institutional framework for 
waging a ‘war against terror’, and it was therefore simultaneously at war at home and 
abroad, whilst maintaining the features and rituals of a parliamentary democracy for 
white South Africa. The actual governance of the country was therefore less decided 
by the structures of parliament, and more and more determined, after 1983, by a 
centralized system which ran from the State President, to the State Security Council 
(SSC) and downwards via a National Security Management System (NSMS) which 
coordinated local and provincial governance through Joint Management Centers 
(JMC’s). At each of these institutional levels, military, policing and ‘biopolitical’ 
                                                
102 Much of the critical literature describes it as the ‘militarization’ of the state (cf Cock, Posel, 
Swilling). I describe it as a rationality of war, because I think that this more accurately describes how 
and why the state became structured as it did, for the waging of a war against multiple enemies. It was 
a war that was waged internally and externally, becoming the mandate of both policing and the 
military. Militarization seems to suggest that the military captured the state institutionally, from the 
civilians, which I think is an inaccurate description. Secondly, the condition and declaration of ‘war’ 
has different legal-political consequences, as I intend to show in Chapter Four. 
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functions were represented and integrated. It was a war very much understood in Cold 
War terms, with terrorists as local iterations of a global communist threat.  
The implications of understanding the late apartheid years in South Africa, as a 
condition of civil and Cold wars, the relationship to the Cold War, and African 
nationalist claims for sovereignty, is a question I take up in a later chapter. For now, 
what I would like retain for the purposes of this discussion, without delving into too 
much depth about the operationalization of this ‘war on terror’, is that Bizos’ legal 
team emphasized this argument considerably and, to some extent, even pressed it 
upon the SADF and SAP legal teams at the inquest provoking responses from them. 
His opening sentence in the chapter on the Cradock Four in his book ‘No One to 
Blame’ notes that, “In the 1980s Matthew Goniwe was the apartheid regime’s enemy 
number one in the Eastern Cape” (1998: 163).  Later he notes that,  
It became clear during the second inquest that Goniwe had been such a 
problem for the security forces that they had considered him ‘the enemy’. 
Van Rensburg testified that ‘The enemies in the counter-revolutionary 
war were all revolutionaries who were focused on overthrowing the state 
in an unconstitutional manner’ (Bizos 1998: 182).  
With these words Bizos clarified how resistance to apartheid came to be viewed not 
as a political opposition but as actions of an enemy – an enemy who was also a 
military enemy and an enemy in war.  Whereas one may dialogue with a political 
opposition, military enemies are mortal enemies, to be destroyed. In a war, as Hannah 





To go back to the Zietsman inquest that became particularly focused on ‘the signal.’ 
Firstly, was the signal ‘authentic’, and secondly, what did it mean?  The authenticity 
of the document itself was quickly verified through a number of witnesses who 
testified to that effect, particularly Jacobus Pretorius, a cryptographer for the South 
African Defence Force who was responsible for relaying and deciphering encoded 
signal messages. He testified that he was in charge of the encryption of all signals 
from the Eastern Cape Command of the SADF. The normal procedure required the 
cryptographer to destroy (shred or incinerate) the original signal that was the source 
of the encrypted signal usually after period of three months after it was produced. 
Pretorious conceded that he could not know how many copies the author of the signal 
might have made since he only required and handled the original. He testified that he 
recalled this particular signal as one that he had handled and had relayed because he 
had himself filled in certain parts of the form –parts such as the ‘Handling 
Instructions’ while also making a note of the kind of cryptographic system he would 
have used.  He also verified that the handwriting style of the instructions as that of the 
author, Col. Lourens du Plessis, and recalled that ‘this report was written on 1985-06-
07 at 14.30 and was handed over by me for encrypting. I encrypted it on the same 
day.’103 In his affidavit the author of the signal, Col. Lourens du Plessis confirmed 
that Brigadier van der Westhuizen gave him an instruction to send the signal from the 
Eastern Cape JMC to General van Rensburg of the Secretariat of the State Security 
Council in Pretoria. 104 Brigadier van der Westhuizen himself was less forthcoming in 
his own affidavit, and declared a moment of amnesia: ‘I don’t remember the sign, if it 
                                                
103 In his words, “This report was composed on 1985-06-07 at 14.30 and was handed to me on the same 
day for transmission. I sent the sign on the same day.’ [Hierdie berig was op 1985-06-07 om 14.30 
opgestel en was dieselfde dag aan my oorhandig vir versending. Ek het dieselfde dag ook die berig 
versend’. Affidavit of Pretorius, 1992. J.H,  Zietsman Inquest, Cory Library, p74. 
104 ‘Sworn Statement: Lourens du Plessis’, Transcript of the Zietsman Inquest, 1993, Vol. 21, p102 
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existed at all in the first place.’ [Ek kan die sien, as dit wel ooit bestaan het, glad nie 
onthou nie’].105  
 
Van der Westhuizen noted that while his memory failed him concerning the particular 
signal, his memory of Mathew Goniwe was more vivid: 
From about the middle of 1984 the unrest situation in the Eastern 
Province became so bad that anarchy reigned in certain parts of it. At that 
point the Eastern Province was the flashpoint of the revolutionary 
onslaught against the State. The names Matthew Goniwe and Fort Calata, 
which appear in the signal, are names that I can still remember. I 
remember that Matthew Goniwe was a schoolteacher in Cradock. I 
remember also that his name received attention because there was a plan 
to erect alternative structures in black areas, known as the “G” Plan.  In 
the expression, the “G” refers to Goniwe. In other areas this plan was 
known as the “M” plan, which referred to Mandela. Goniwe played a very 
prominent role in the aforementioned revolutionary onslaught. He was 
one of the leaders of the UDF, and to the best of my knowledge, Cradock 
was the first area where alternative structures were implemented. 
Furthermore he was one of the leaders of the militant youth movements of 
the Eastern Cape region, and because of that he received the prominent 
attention of the media, the security police, and the Dept. of Education and 
Training.    
[Vanaf ongeveer die middle 1984 het die onrussituasie in die Oostelike 
Provinsie sodanig versleg dat anargie in gedeeltes daarvan geheers het. 
                                                
105 ‘Sworn Statement: Christoffel Pierre van der Westhuizen’, Transcript of the  Zietsman Inquest, 
1993, vol 22, p108 
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Op daardie stadium was die Oosterlike Provinsie die brandpunt van die 
rewolusionere aanslag teen die Staatsbestel..Die name “Matthew 
Goniwe” en “Fort Calata” wat in die sein genoem word, kan ek nog 
onthou. Ek onthou dat Matthew Goniwe (“Goniwe”) ‘n onderwyser op 
Cradock was. Ek onthou ook dat say naam erkenning gekry het omdat 
daar in die Oostelike Provinsie na die plan vir die daarstelling van die 
alternatiewe structure in swart woongebiede verwys is as die “G-Plan”. 
Die “G” in the uitdrukking “G-Plan” het verwys na Goniwe. In ander 
gebiede het die gonoemde plan as die “M-Plan” bekend gestaan, in welke 
geval die “M” na “Mandela” verwys het. Goniwe het ‘n baie prominente 
rol in the voormelde rewolusionere aanslag in die Oostelike Provinsie 
gespeel. Hy was een van die leiers van die United Democratic Front 
(“UDF”), en na die best van my wete was Cradock die eerste plek in the 
RSA waar voormelde alternatiewe structure geimplimenteer is. Verder 
was Goniwe die leier van die militante jeugsbewegings in die Oos-Kaap 
streek, en het ook as gevolg daarvan in die media sowel as by die 
Veiligheidspolisie en by die Deppartment van Onderwys en Opleiding 
prominensie geniet (ibid. 106-7). 
 
The meaning of the signal was less straightforward. The phrase seemed to be far more 
semiotically ambiguous than Bizos would have liked, as different witnesses testified 
that ‘permanently removed’ could refer to a range of options available to the state, 
including jail or detention. An Afrikaans-language expert was brought in. This writer 
of speeches for one of the army generals involved has since spoken about how she 
wrote a twenty-four page long report at the request of a SADF general she worked 
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for. In her testimony during the inquest she went on to argue that ‘permanently 
removed from society’ did not mean ‘killing’.106 As for Col. Lourens du Plessis: he 
noted that whilst he authored the signal “I am quite sure that Brigadier van der 
Westhuizen never gave me the impression that he was proposing that any person was 
to be killed. If he had indeed done this, I would definitely have remembered.” [Ek is 
egter baie seker daarvan dat Brigadier van der Westhuizen nooit teenoor my te kenne 
gegee het dat sy voorstel behels date enige persone doodgemaak moes word nie. 
Indien hy dit wel gedoen het, sou ek did baie beslis onthou het.]107  
 
The receiver of the signal, as named on the document was General van Rensburg. In 
his account he described the critical security situation in the Eastern Cape, and the 
central role of Goniwe in this. Nevertheless he denied that one of the options his 
colleagues and he considered involved killing Goniwe or other activists. He had 
however requested suggestions about what to do about Goniwe. In his words,  
During this conversation a possible alternative was identified, namely that 
Mr. Goniwe as well as his militant lieutenants, be held indefinitely in 
terms of the security legislation, specifically Article 28 of the Internal 
Security Act (Act74 of 1982) until the explosive political situation had 
calmed down. An alternative was also the possible transfer of Mr. Goniwe 
to another city in the Republic to achieve the same goals. This would 
make it possible to hold the leader of the unrest situation for long periods 
of time. For all practical purposes, this would achieve the same results. 
For all intents and purposes this would permanently remove him from 
                                                
106 The author is now a writer of popular Afrikaans language ghost stories. http://www.litnet.co.za/cgi-
bin/giga.cgi?cmd=print_article&news_id=65200&cause_id=1270 
107 ‘Sworn Statement: Lourens du Plessis’, Transcript of the Zietsman Inquest, Vol. 21, 1993, p104 
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community. This signal, according to me, definitely does not order 
anyone to be murdered, as implied in the article in the New Nation. 
[Tydens hierdie gesprek was ‘n moontlike alternatief genoem, naamlike 
dat Mnr Goniwe asook sy ander militante luitenante, eerder ingevolge 
Veiligheidswetsgewing, een meer spesifiek Aartikel 28 van die Wet op 
Binnelandse Veiligheid (Wet 74 van 1982) vir ‘n onbepaalde tyd 
aangehou moes word ten einde die plofbare situasie te ontlont. As 
alternatief was ook moontlikheid genoem dat Mnr Goniwe eerder 
verplaas kon word na ‘n ander sentrum in die RSA, ten einde moontlik 
dieselfde gevolge te bereik…Dit sou die moontlikheid maak om van die 
leierfigure van die onrus vir lang tydperke aan te hou. Hulle sou dus vir 
alle praktiese doeleindes uit die gemeenskap verwyder word...Die sein 
bevel volgens my baie beslis nie aan dat enige persone vermoor moes 
word, soos wat nou klaarblyklik geimpliseer word in die New Nation 
nie.]108 
 
The signal had come from the South African Defence Force, not the South African 
Police. Bizos decided to focus on how the SADF viewed Goniwe and what the 
implications of this were. What the semantic debate revealed was that Matthew 
Goniwe was the object of the gaze of at least three state institutions, both at a 
provincial level, as well as nationally. His employer, the Dept. of Education  (DET), 
the SADF, and the Security Police branch of the South African Police, had all placed 
him under surveillance, and each could assert a different potential implication of the 
phrase. Each suggested meaning reflected the particular concerns of the agencies and 
                                                
108 ‘Sworn Statement: Johannes Frederik Janse van Rensburg’, Transcript of the Zietsman Inquest, 
1993, vol 23, pp 112, 113, 116 
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their personnel at the time.  Matthew Goniwe, as I will discuss later, had come to be 
seen as central to the anti-apartheid organizational activity of the United Democratic 
Front in the Eastern Cape. He was also a schoolteacher, and a school principal. He 
was therefore a challenge for the Dept. of Education, given that schools had become 
important sites of resistance at local and national levels to state policies. There had 
been a resurgence of political activities from 1976 onwards; these activities further 
intensified in the 1980’s. The inquest heard about a debate that had ensued between 
the Dept. of Education, the SADF and the SAP about ‘the Goniwe problem’.  An ad-
hoc committee was established to propose a resolution of the problem that would 
satisfy all three institutions. Chaired by Brig. Geldenhuys, the ‘Geldenhuys 
commission’ was set up on June 6, and had its first meeting the following day.  That 
day, June 7, was also, incidentally, the very day that the signal calling for the 
‘permanent removal’ of Goniwe and two others was authored.  
 
The Geldenhuys Commission noted that the sticking point was a disagreement 
between the Dept. of Education and the Eastern Cape branch of the Security Police 
over the Goniwe’s future as a teacher and principal.  Eventually a consensus was 
reached and the Commission recommended a ‘conditional re-instatement’ that 
amounted to a ‘restriction’ of permitted activities (Bizos 1998: 198). This report was 
delivered as a memorandum by the Commissioner of Police, Gen. Johann Coetzee to 
the Minister of Law and Order on the 25th June 1985. Two days later however, on the 
27th June 1985, seemingly at odds with the recommendations to the Minister of Law 




Bizos and his team faced conflicting narratives about what was to be done about the 
‘Goniwe problem’- a signal calling for his permanent removal from society on the one 
hand, and a memorandum calling for his conditional re-instatement as a school 
principal or restriction on the other. The difference between these two 
recommendations were stark—a difference between life and death, and between 
illegal and legal punishment. The latter was of particular interest to human rights 
lawyers, since it meant the distinction between a legal act and a crime. Bizos was 
convinced that the Security Police had agreed to the Geldenhuys Commission 
recommendation’s as a ruse, because they had a parallel plan under way: “They 
(Geldenhuys Commission recommendations) seem to be void of substance, as if 
written for form’s sake by people who knew a solution was already at hand, as if they 
were trying to build an alibi into their own documents” (Bizos 1998: 188).  
 
At this point during the trial, Bizos recalls that the attorney representing the SADF, 
Anton Mostert, invited him to his home and shared an important insight in 
confidence: he had evidence that it was the South African Police and not the SADF, 
his client, which had in fact carried out Goniwe’s murder. It was Mostert’s intention 
to introduce evidence into the hearing that would steer the judge towards the SAP, 
and therefore way from his client, the SADF (Bizos 1998: 197). Any remaining 
semblance of a coherent front between the SAP and the SADF as integrated units of 
the formidable and hitherto omnipotent security apparatus of the state had now come 
undone.  
 
As he had said he would do, Mostert shifted focus from the SADF to the SAP by 
sharing his information with the Judge that at “this stage the indications are…that the 
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police, and particularly the Security Police, should be investigated and examined to 
determine the existence of any complicity in the murder of Goniwe and the others 
whose murders are the subject of the inquest (Bizos 1998: 197).” Mostert’s allegation 
was based on evidence he had acquired in the course of an investigation into what had 
become know as the Motherwell bombing.109 Three black security policemen were 
blown up by a bomb planted in their car in 1989, near the Eastern Cape town of 
Motherwell. At the time the police declared that ANC ‘terrorists’ were responsible, 
and the ANC military wing, from its position in exile, had in fact taken responsibility 
for the killings. It turned out, according to Mostert, that the three were killed on the 
orders of a Security Police captain by the name of Gideon Niewoudt, to allay fears 
that they were going to reveal their role, and the role of the Security Police, in the 
killing of the Cradock Four four years earlier.   
Mostert requested that the Judge call three members of the Eastern Cape branch of the 
Security Police: Niewoudt, Col. Eric Winter and Col. Harold Snyman, to testify.  
 
Eric Winter had joined the Cradock branch of the Security Police in March 1985, 
transferred from the then South West Africa, where he had been a member of the 
infamous Koevoet police unit since 1980. A number of other members of Koevoet 
were transferred to Cradock during the same period (Bizos 1998: 200). Bizos was 
intent on highlighting the idea that Goniwe was considered an ‘enemy’, and he 
pursued this notion in his cross-examination of Winter as well. Fred Koni, a former 
member of the Cradock Security Police between 1978-1989, informed Bizos and his 
team that he had received instructions from Winter to heighten Goniwe’s surveillance 
in June 1985. Goniwe’s movements were already being monitored and his phone calls 
                                                




intercepted. Koni himself had monitored the phone calls, and reported the proposed 
visit to Port Elizabeth on 27th June to Winter, who then ‘made a phone call and left 
the office with two colleagues.’ As Bizos noted, “Koni did not see him until the next 
day. On that day, the 28th June 1985 he looked anxious and ordered Koni and his 
colleague Msoki to keep listening to Goniwe’s telephone and not to take breaks 
together” (1998: 201).  
 
On the witness stand Winter was not obliging. Bizos noted that ‘Winter continued to 
try to distance himself from the murders, denying much knowledge of the UDF’. And 
in an interesting twist, it was now the lawyers for the SADF that were cross-
examining the members of the Security Police in a hostile manner, trying to implicate 
the latter. During his questioning of Col. Winter, Adv. Mostert representing the 
SADF, questioned the amnesia of the Security Police, noting that Winter had 
answered that he ‘didn’t remember’ 135 times, 19 times said he ‘had no knowledge’, 
and answered evasively 83 times. Bizos was pleased however that that Winter did 
acknowledge that he considered Goniwe “ an enemy of the state because his activities 
were aimed at making the country ungovernable” (Bizos 1998: 203).  
 
The next witness was Col. Snyman, who as noted in the previous chapter, had applied 
for amnesty for his involvement in the killings. This time it was the counsel for the 
person who had leaked the signal to the press, Col. Lourens du Plessis of the SADF, 
who was cross-examining the SAP Colonel about whether he consider Goniwe an 
enemy. The cross-examination went as follows: 
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“ ‘You have also accepted, if I understand your evidence correctly, that 
Mr Goniwe was busy fuelling the revolutionary climate in the country 
through his activities, correct? 
‘Correct, M’Lord.’ 
‘So you consider Mr Goniwe to be an enemy, correct?’ 
‘M’Lord, yes, in such a case, possibly.’ 
‘Not possibly. You considered Mr. Goniwe to be an enemy.’ 
‘I said in my testimony yesterday that he was considered to be of security 
interest due to his activities.’ 
‘Yes. I want to put it to you that your evidence of yesterday can’t be 
correct in light of what you have just testified.’ 
‘But you were  talking about MK [Mkhonto we Size] members now.’ 
‘But you agreed with me and said that people who fuel the revolutionary 
climate make it easier for MK members to do their job, not so?’ 
‘Correct, M’Lord.’ 
‘So you accept that you saw Mr. Goniwe as an enemy.’ 
‘There was no information that he housed MK members.’ 
‘No, but there was information that he fuelled the revolutionary climate.’ 
‘He was definitely of security interest’. 
‘He as an enemy, Colonel’. 
‘He was of security interest, M’Lord.’ 
‘Why are you scared to say you saw him as an enemy?’ 
No answer 




‘Well, he acted against the state, that is clear.’ 
‘Why are you scared to say you saw Mr Goniwe as the enemy?’ 
‘I considered him to be of security interest and that is why we monitored 
him.’ 
‘Colonel you considered him to be the enemy. Why are you so scared, as 
you sit there in the witness box, to say so?’ 
No answer 
‘Do you have an answer Colonel?’ 
‘He was a danger to the state, a threat.’ 
‘Colonel, do you have an answer to my question? Why are you so scared 
to say you considered Matthew Goniwe to be an enemy?’ 
‘He was considered to be dangerous to the state.’ 
‘Why are you scared- listen to my question- why are you scared to say 
that you saw Mr. Goniwe as an enemy?’ 
‘We considered him to be of security interest and dangerous to the state.’ 
‘Colonel, what are you trying to hide? You don’t want to use the word 
enemy?’ 
‘I am not hiding anything M’Lord’. 
‘Now why don’t you say honestly that you considered Mr Goniwe to be 
an enemy?’ 
No answer.” 
The judge then intervened: 
 ‘Did you see him as an enemy?’ 
‘I saw him as a danger to the state M’Lord.’ 
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‘That is not what  asked. My question is, did you consider him to be an 
enemy of the state- yes or no?’ 
‘One could describe it like that, M’Lord.’ 
‘What is your answer?’ 
‘Yes.’ 
 
What does it mean to be an Enemy? It is quite clear that Harold Snyman had some 
sense of the implications of inhabiting that identity, of being an ‘enemy of the state’. 
It was only in his silence, and in the repeated recording in the transcript of this silence 
as a form of answer, as  ‘No Answer’ that he could find refuge, until ultimately 
compelled to a different form of answer, a spoken one produced by the order of the 
Magistrate. He would neither want to answer whether he considered Goniwe an 
enemy nor answer why he would not answer, or what in the words of his interlocutors 
‘scared’ him about it.  Both the lawyers for the state institutions as well as Bizos’ 
team had accepted and given an account of a situation of war in which Goniwe had 
become a ‘legitimate’ target in a war on terror and communism. Yet both sides now 
faced the various implications of this argument. Human rights lawyers had been 
enticing the witnesses, through legal argument and cross-examination, to acquiesce to 
and confirm their theses; and the SADF and SAP lawyers had, through similar 
techniques of legal argument, trying to make sure their respective clients did not so 
acquiesce and confirm Bizos and his team’s assertion that Goniwe was a target in a  
war on terror and communism. The SADF and the SAP personnel could convincingly 
argue that they believed themselves to be at war; however the parliamentary-
constitutional identity of apartheid South Africa implied that killing an individual 
without a formal judicial trial and sentencing process sanctioning the act made the 
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killing ‘illegal’ and therefore criminal. Legal imposition of the death penalty would 
have been the alternative, but that is not what happened here.  
 
The Zietsman inquest ran from March 1993 to September 1993, producing a record of 
three and a half thousand pages. The inquest resumed for final arguments in February 
1994 and the Judge delivered his finding on 28 May 1994. As Zietsman set out his 
finding he restated that his task was to follow the requirements of the Inquest Act, and 
to ascertain whether ‘the death was brought about by any act or omission prima facie 
involving or amounting to an offence on the part of any person.’ He went on to note 
that in line with the findings of the first inquest, the murders showed a high level of 
planning, and then declared that “the South African security forces, which included 
the police, the Security Police and the army, had the necessary ability and resources” 
necessary for such a level of planning. Discussing the SAP involvement, he noted that 
the evidence “raises a suspicion that Col. Snyman and Col. Winter knew that Matthew 
Goniwe and the others were to be murdered and that they could have taken part in the 
planning of the murders.” There was not however, Judge Zietsman argued, sufficient 
evidence to suggest a prima facie case. Regarding the signal sent by the SADF to the 
Secretariat of the State Security Council, he argued that the evidence  suggested that 
the signal was intended to convey that Goniwe and the two others named in it, were to 
be killed. However, he noted that  
The problem is that we do not know what happened to the signal after it 
had been received by Maj. Gen. van Rensburg…. Evidence to link the 
signal to the murders is lacking and the set-up of the National Security 
Management System does not in itself justify the assumption and 
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inferences that I have been urged to make... I am not able, on the evidence 
placed before me, to identify the murderer or murderers.110 
 
Reflecting on the outcome of the inquest, Bizos noted that  
[o]urs was a partial victory in that for the first time in South African legal 
history it had been found that the security forces were not above murder 
and that they were in fact responsible for the murder of Matthew Goniwe, 
Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkonto and Sicelo Mhlauli. But we were 
disappointed, if not surprised, that the judge had not gone beyond the 
strict letter of the law. No prosecutions would follow. No one would be 
held accountable. In the eyes of the law, no one was to blame (Bizos 
1998: 240).  
There are two points here I wish to underscore. Firstly, as Bizos notes, the Zietsman 
inquest found, for the first time in South African legal history, that the security 
apparatuses of the state were collectively responsible for murder. At the same time, 
the finding of collective responsibility remained, for him an inadequate finding. 
Which brings me to my second observation: the ‘eyes of the law’, as Bizos puts it, 
need to see individuals rather than collectivities as ‘responsible’. If there were to be 
accountability for the fate of the Cradock Four, there would have to be individual 
perpetrators. The inquest considered the deaths of four individuals within the ambit of 
South African jurisprudence, and within the ambit of Criminal Law, it sought criminal 
liability that required a particular form of perpetrator.  
 
                                                
110 Transcript of the Zietsman Inquest, Cory Library; Bizos (1998: 218-219).  
  
139 
Lets turn now to Christoper Nicholson’s Permanent Removal (2004), written after the 
Amnesty Committee of the TRC had made a decision on the applications of the seven 
security policeman who had admitted a role in the killings of Cradock Four (which 
Bizos had also opposed on behalf of the families of the Cradock Four). By the time 
Nicholson had written his book, some of the questions that Bizos’s posed, the 
questions of motive, of means and of responsibility, had been answered. But it was 
the question of individual responsibility that was also at stake in Nicholson’s book; 
this time however the question of who should be held accountable was divided 
between those who carried out the deed, or those who authorized the deed. Given that 
the identities of those who carried out the deed where now known, Nicholson wanted 
a form of justice that held those who authorized the deed accountable.  Nicholson sets 
out his reasons for writing the book and broader motives in the opening preface: 
When twenty innocent men, women and children were gunned down by 
police on the 21st  of March 1985 in Kwanobuhle, outside Uitenhage in 
the Eastern Cape, I was part of a team of lawyers who represented the 
families of these victims at the ensuing inquest held in Port Elizabeth. 
During the inquest I spent a lot of time with Molly Blackburn, of Black 
Sash, who was of immeasurable help—not only to the lawyers, but also to 
the families, whose lives had been devastated by the killings. It was in the 
first week of April 1985 that I met Matthew Goniwe and Fort Calata at 
Molly’s house. In the short time that we spoke I was impressed by their 
immense integrity and courage. I was shaken and deeply saddened by the 
murders of Goniwe, Calata and their comrades Sparrow Mkonto and 
Sicelo Mhlauli, in June 1985, and was keen to find out who was 
responsible. The possibility of every fact being laid bare in the killing of 
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the Cradock Four was the spur that led to the writing of this book (2004: 
xv).  
The activists’ characters had left a deep impression on Nicholson as a lawyer.  In 
Nicholson’s view, the TRC hearings had brought to light sufficient evidence that 
showed how those in the highest office of executive authority in the Apartheid State 
had to have known of Goniwe’s impending murder, authorized the actions, and were 
therefore responsible.   
 
Nicholson’s analysis is based on the information brought to light during the Amnesty 
hearing and in the exchanges and questioning of the Amnesty Committee. The 
amnesty process was set out in the Act that legislated the TRC into existence.111 The 
Goniwe case was amongst one the prominent cases that featured in the more than 7, 
000 applications for amnesty received by the Amnesty Committee, and as I have 
indicated before, it was the first case to be heard.112  Amnesty could be granted to 
individuals who had committed acts considered ‘gross violations of human rights’ 
between 1960-1994. This was contingent on two requirements: that there be a ‘full 
disclosure of all relevant facts’, and secondly, that the act or acts be ‘associated with a 
political objective’. 113  Defining what a political crime, and what a political objective 
was, proved a challenge for the Committee.114 The Committee resolved its dilemma in 
practice by privileging a factor that it directly derived from the enabling legislation:   
                                                
111 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation, Act 34 of 1995 
112 South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Summary of Amnesty Decisions, available at 
http://wwww.truth.org.za/amntrans/index.htm 
113 20 (1) Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation, Act 34 of 1995 
114 cf Raylene Keightley (1993), ‘Political Offences and Indemnity in South Africa, South African 
Journal of Human Rights, no.9, pp 334-339; Ronald Slye (2000) ‘Justice and Amnesty’, in Villa-
Vicencio and Verwoed, W. eds, Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on Truth and 
Reconciliation in South Africa; Anurima Bhargava (2002) Defining Political Crimes: A Case Study of 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission’, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 102, No. 5 
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Whether an act, omission or offence was committed in the execution of an 
order of, or on behalf of, or with the approval of, the organization, 
institution, liberation movement or body of which the person who 
committed the act was a member, an agent or a supporter.115   
By asking for the applicant to provide evidence of ‘orders’, and evidence which could 
demonstrate that acts were carried out ‘on behalf of’, or with ‘approval of’ another 
agent, the Committee was focusing on the explicit authorization of an act, and the 
capacity of the applicant to prove this and, in effect, negating any implicit conception 
of the authorization to act internal to the agent as person or institution.  
 
As recalled above, toward the end of the second inquest, two conflicting narratives 
had emerged regarding the ‘fate’ of Matthew Goniwe. Was he to be reinstated in his 
position, with conditions, or was he to be ‘permanently removed from society’? These 
two narratives led the lawyers acting on behalf of the families to the view that in order 
to have a fuller understanding of what had happened to the Cradock Four, these two 
opposing narratives would have to be reconciled by the amnesty applicants. The 
testimony of Lieutenant Jaap van Jaarsveld, who worked in the State Security 
Council, as a secretary, was in Nicholson’s view, to shed much needed light on the 
matter, and put “the pieces of the puzzle” together (Nicholson 2004: 191-2).  
 
Van Jaarsveld testified that sometime in the middle of 1984 he had received an order 
from Craig Williamson, then the Head of the South African Police’s Security 
Intelligence Unit, who was based in Pretoria. Williamson had asked Van Jaarsveld to 
“investigate whether it would be possible to take out Matthew Goniwe.”  During his 
                                                
115 20 (3) Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation, Act 34 of 1995 
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cross-examination Bizos requested clarity on that phrase. Van Jaarsveld was 
unambiguous in his understanding:  “It meant to kill him.” He described a 
reconnaissance trip he had made to Cradock to meet with members of the Security 
Branch in Cradock and to visit Goniwe’s house:  
Later that morning we went to Cradock. One of the members of the 
security branch, Sakkie van Zyl, accompanied us. He had come from 
Koevoet and I assumed he was a captain… A meeting was held at his 
offices where he showed their VIP room, that is, where all the tapping 
devices where monitored…. After that we went to Goniwe’s home in 
Henry Fouche’s motor vehicle. The road to the house was very bad, but 
the house itself looked very different to those in the environment. As I 
remember it, it was painted white. Mrs. Goniwe was at home when we 
arrived. We greeted her and walked through the house…. Fouche pointed 
to a double adaptor for the radio and told me that there was a tapping 
device inside it. After a while we left the house and went back to the 
Cradock Security Branch. From there we went back to Port Elizabeth 
(Nicholson 2004: 193). 
 
On his return to Pretoria Van Jaarsveld contacted Craig Williamson and, as he said,   
…recommended that Goniwe could not be taken out at his house because 
there were too many people in the vicinity and it would make the process 
problematic…. I recommended that he [Goniwe] be followed and taken 
out alongside the road somewhere (Nicholson 2004: 194).  
At this point in the text Nicholson records that,  
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When the families of the Cradock Four heard Van Jaarsveld’s words they 
whispered excitedly to one another… “taken out alongside the road 
somewhere”- this was the source of the plan to kill their husbands and 
fathers…The pieces of the puzzle where finally starting to fit (Nicholson 
2004: 194). 116  
Another piece of the puzzle then appeared, apparently anonymously. As Nicholson 
tells it, during the hearings of the Amnesty committee, on a May morning in 1999, 
Bizos found a number of documents on his desk, and among the documents were 
minutes of a few State Security Council meetings.  To digress slightly, when I began 
my research a few years ago on the construction of the enemy and state security in 
South Africa in the final years of apartheid, I visited the national archives in Pretoria 
where the minutes of the State Security Council are stored. I was told that the minutes 
between 1985-1990 had not been declassified, and that I would have to apply for the 
declassification of the documents through the Freedom of Information Act (PAIA). I 
duly filled in a form but received no further correspondence regarding my application. 
My follow-ups were also not successful. Shortly afterwards I decided to focus on a 
specific case with an archive that was ‘publicly’ available – the Cradock Four inquest 
and amnesty hearing transcripts- and I decided I did not require further access to these 
documents and did not pursue the matter further. No doubt, there are political and 
legal concerns for controlling access to these documents117.  In any event, as it turns 
                                                
116 The ways in which the families appear in the texts, both of Bizos and Nicholson, as motivation for 
the lawyers, is something I am noting at this point, and need to come back to, to reflect on further.  
117 See Kate Allan.ed (2009) Paper Wars: Access to Information in South Africa, Johannesburg: Wits 
University Press; The filmmaker David Forbes, seeking to make a documentary on the Cradock Four, 
encountered the same challenges. Forbes persisted, and in partnership with the South African History 
Archive, took the matter to court with success after a couple of years.  David Forbe’s documentary, 
“The Cradock Four’, had its inaugural screening in South Africa, in August 2010. Forbes persisted, 
because as he noted, in his talk, and in email correspondence, getting access to the documents is a 
Constitutional right, and he is motivated by the desire to have questions answered that for him related 
to questions of culpability of individuals in the State that were involved. His questions and motivations 
are therefore quite similar to those of the lawyer’s narrative I am describing above. My decision not to 
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out, George Bizos was supplied with copies of minutes of a few meetings relevant to 
the Goniwe case, which he made public at the Amnesty hearings and which now form 
part of the ‘public’ transcript. 
 
One of these SSC meeting minutes revealed that two days before Van Jaarsveld had 
been given an instruction to ‘take out’ Goniwe, a SSC meeting had taken place in the 
cabinet room of the Hendrik Verwoed Building in Cape Town. It was chaired by the 
then State President, P.W Botha, and in attendance were the Ministers of Transport, 
Finance, Constitutional Development, Internal Affairs- represented by the future State 
President F.W de Klerk, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, the Minister of 
Defence, Magnus Malan, the Minister of Law and Order, Louis Le Grange, and the 
Minister of Education and Training, Barend de Plessis, the Commissioner of Police 
and the Director-General of National Intelligence, and and a few other deputy 
ministers. Bizos drew attention to item 4 on the agenda, ‘Unrest in Black Schools’, 
and read from the minute:  
After an overview by General Groenewald, Minister du Plessis, at that 
time the Minister of Education and Training, raised the following points, 
point f. being ‘In Cradock there are two ex-teachers who are acting as 




There appeared no dissent and the minutes did not record that anyone spoke out 
against the proposal…. The minutes were marked “Top Secret” and a limited number 
of copies (52) were printed (Nicholson 2004: 198). 
                                                                                                                                      
take the matter further stems from the different nature of my concerns that are less about individual 




The Mail and Guardian led that week with the headline ‘The Top Nats who ordered 
Goniwe’s Death’118, quoting from the SSC minutes, and declaring that  
The top secret minutes from the meeting, which started at 10 a.m. on 
March 19 1984, provide strong proof that the former president and other 
NP politicians master-minded the state-sponsored assassinations that have 
so far been blamed solely on the underlings of the security forces (ibid.).   
It also contained an account of Mungo Soggot’s telephonic interview with F.W de 
Klerk, by then residing in London, in which De Klerk recalled only that he 
remembered that Barend du Plessis had recommended ‘rerouting’ Goniwe and Calata 
to another school in another part of the country (ibid.). Later, Bizos released further 
minutes of SSC meetings.119 These included a SSC meeting on the April 29 1985 at 
the Presidential residence Tuynhuys in Cape Town, where senior ministers, including 
F.W de Klerk were presented with a report by a Colonel Erasmus attributed the 
political instability in the Eastern Cape to UDF affiliates, and the following resolution 
was taken: “Certain covert operations have been initiated at JMC [Joint Management 
Center] level to identify and neutralize upcoming UDF leaders at the earliest 
opportunity (ibid.).   
The Amnesty Committee heard the case of the seven policemen who had come 
forward and who admitted carrying out the action. The outcome need not occupy us 
here right now. For Nicholson, as I note above, sufficient information had come to 
light to connect the dots between the most senior political leaders of the country and 
the operatives who carried out the deed. Justice would also therefore be a question of 
who authorized the action.  It is with the view that a criminal trial extraneous and 
                                                
118  Soggot, M ‘Top Nats who ordered Goniwe’s death’ Mail and Guardian, 28 May-3 June 1999 
119 According to Nicholson, copies of these minutes where passed on to Bizos by John Daniel, a 
Professor of Political Science then working as a researcher for the TRC. Nicholson (2004: 210).  
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supplementary to the TRC might be a possibility under the then newly formed 
National Prosecuting Authority that Nicholson ended his book. He posed it as a 
question: “Will the families of Matthew Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkonto and 
Sicelo Mhlauli- as well as many others- ever know for certain who authorized the 
murders of their loved ones” (2004: 221)? He quotes the widow of Matthew Goniwe, 
Nyameka, speaking in April 2002: 
We need to be told what the next move is going to be, especially after the 
impression we got was that there was going to be a prosecution. We knew 
that the old regime would never prosecute, but we were led to believe our 
new government would bring justice to the victims of apartheid. They 
promised us and they must deliver on this one (cited in Nicholson 2004: 
229).  
During the two inquest hearings we heard from the documentary information, and 
from the oral testimonies, that the security personnel considered Matthew Goniwe an 
‘enemy’, and we heard why this was so, about the ‘flashpoint’ that the Eastern Cape 
province was seen to represent, the eye of a revolutionary storm. From the vantage 
point of the security personnel this was a condition of war.  My interest here is how 
this knowledge can be useful in order to ‘understand’, to make ‘thinkable’ practices 
considered by some to be beyond the pale of understanding, as only the product of 
pathological aberration, or the product of metaphysical ‘evil’. From another 
perspective, perhaps what we might call a scholarly vantage point or the imperative of 
criticism, this kind of knowledge helps us understand the realm of the ‘political’ both 
as it is constituted and as it constitutes the ‘legal’. Yet, it is a knowledge also 
mobilized within the legal habitus in order to be negated at the moment of its coming 
to being, a flash that appears on the surface only to be instantly erased, since it is 
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knowledge as ‘evidence’. In the exchange between the security policeman who seeks 
to recognize and deny that Goniwe was seen as the ‘enemy’ this tension is brought out 
most acutely. The ‘enemy’ straddles two discursive registers in that moment- the 
enemy in war and politics and the enemy in law.  
 
Bizos in the theater of the inquest, sort  to coax the political enemy out into the open. 
He sort to coax the enemy out into the open – to expose it in the glare of law in order 
to finally deliver justice. What cannot quite acknowledge are the ways in which the 
enemy exists not in the form of a corporeal person, but as a heuristic device 
embedded in an epistemology, as a way of understanding, of ordering the social, and 
as an ontology of being. For, he too partakes in the conventional narrative, in the 
autobiography of law and the modern state according to which what is novel about the 
modern state is indeed universal law. This law is, Bizos believes, the negation of 
violence. 120 As I have recalled in the previous chapter, in the autobiography of the 
modern state, philosophy’s contract theory, from Hobbes, to Locke and Rousseau, 
describes for us a certain genealogy and a relationship to law, a state which replaces a 
socialized right to violence with the socialized obligation to Law. This is vital to its 
civilizational claims: A state which banishes violence from the realm of the social and 
the political and quarantines it to the barracks, where it is the prerogative of only the 
state, as Max Weber (1964) was to remind us, to monopolize the right to unleash this 
violence, and even then, we are told, under specific rules which can make violence 
legitimate. If violence is passion, then law is the reason that can transform and 
transfer violence from the realm of passion to the realm of rationality; law’s violence 
                                                
120  Hobbes [1651] (1985), Locke [1689] (1993). This is a narrative I problematize in later chapters. 
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thus becomes legitimate. It is this rational violence that Charles Tilly (1990) would 
argue was constitutive of state formation in Europe. 
 
This vivid and gory recompense, of the right to shed blood if ‘by man his blood be 
shed’ is the right that social contract theorists will tell us, leads to a general insecurity 
which requires a Common Law to be administered through what would become the 
monopoly on violence that Weber describes. This justification of a common law, as a 
‘reasoned’ development that protects the right to liberty, to property and to life, has 
become a foundational text for the discourse of rights in modern liberal thought. Of 
course at the time, as Robert Williams has persuasively shown, this discourse figures 
the temporally coincidental subject of Western imperialism, ‘the native’, as either 
savage or property, and therefore as a subject  ‘with whom one can have no society’, 
since with the native as savage there is no possibility of reason or rights, and with the 
native as property there can be no talk of rights, since property itself does not possess 
rights; rather it is men who possess rights over property.121  
As it unfolds in the autobiographical narrative of the modern state, violence and law 
are positioned in the narrative of Western modernity’s progress, as antithetical. In the 
logic of this rationality, in the realm of the properly modern, violence and law should 
not be seen together.122 This is not to suggest that violence is done away with. 
“Covenants, without the sword,” Hobbes would declare, “are but words, and no 
strength to secure man at all” (Hobbes 223).  The question then becomes when could 
                                                
121 Williams (1990: 247-247). The political moment of this narrative of the modern state’s rationality is 
temporally co-existent and in a mutually constitutive and agonistic relationship to imperialism and 
colonial violence, especially after 1492, a point often elided in the salutary autobiographical version of 
the ‘modern states’ history.  See also Aime Cesaire’s Discourse on Colonialism; Walter Mignolo 
(2000); Mahmood Mamdani (2005: 4-8).  
122It is for this reason, we might say, that the executioners’ identity is often hidden during the 
administration of the death penalty. Even then, during the execution of a ‘legitimate’ violence in the 
name of the Law, the two cannot face each other unmediated by a veil, either symbolic or real. 
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the sword be wielded, and who could wield it? This would be the question inscribed 
into our current discourse on the legitimate display of sovereign power. 
 
 When Bizos in the legal domain of the inquest hearing, and as he brings violence to 
face law, it is violence which is expected to recoil as it senses itself in hostile 
territory.  It is the security police officer who seeks refuge in silence, in the strategic 
deployment of evasiveness, in the recourse to ‘No Comment’.  If the enemy in war 
and politics, following Clausewitz’s dictum, are filial123, the enemy in law is 
presented as an enemy of law. The human rights lawyer who thinks of human beings 
as ‘enemies’ within the law also turns the security policeman into an enemy of the 
law.  
 
The practice of bringing into view, into the space of the inquest, a view of the world, 
as a world of enemies, puts into play a set of strategies, of back and forth, of revealing 
and concealing. What the human rights lawyer seeks to bring into view is not 
therefore knowledge-as-understanding, but rather knowledge as knowledge of 
‘motive(s)’ underlying a crime. Motive is essential to that chain, which ties thought to 
action in a way that does not allow the one to escape from the other. It transforms 
understanding from that which is thinkable, as potential to that which is doable, or 
rather ‘has been done’- it is the juridical form of a postmortem. The killings have 
been done. We have evidence of this in the material form of mutilated bodies, verified 
by another order of knowledge: forensic science and the medical expertise contained 
in the coroners report. Bizos seeks to prove that the ‘motive’ is now clear: they – the 
four deceased – were the ‘enemy’.  
                                                






Knowing and doing, cognition and motion have been brought together in the 
criminalized act – killing as murder – with the criminalized agent/s. In other words, a 
victim and a perpetrator have been produced. At this point the victim is a victim of 
state violence and the perpetrator a perpetrator of murder. It is from within this frame, 
in the double sense of the word – ‘to be framed’ as an act of law, and to be framed as 
the boundary of what we see and what we do not see – that specific victims of state 
violence, like the Cradock Four, have been transformed post-apartheid, and come to 
stand in for the generalized  ‘victims of apartheid’, and the specific perpetrator of 
murder has come to stand in for the generalized perpetrators of apartheid.124 
  
By their own accounts, for both Bizos and Nicholson, the motive for writing 
monographs that deal with victims of state violence in South Africa, have to do with 
foregrounding what they perceive to be the demands of the widows, articulating their 
own familiarity with the inquests they were involved in accompanied by the feeling 
that ‘justice’ had not been done. Bizos speaks of law’s failure during the apartheid 
years and in Nicholson experienced TRC’s failure to prosecute in a post-apartheid 
South Africa. Bizos, during repeated inquest hearings, would argue that sufficient 
evidence was presented to judges to find the apartheid governments’ security police 
complicit and responsible for the Cradock Four murders. Yet this evidence was 
repeatedly overlooked in the findings of the presiding judges. His book is dedicated 
“To all for whom before and after their deaths justice was not only blind but also deaf 
and dumb”. In Nicholson’s case, it is a worry about the sacrifice of justice that he 
expresses when he asks  
                                                
124 As an example of this way of thinking about the incomplete question of justice in South Africa, see 
Terry Bell and Dumisa Ntsebeza’s (2003). Unfinished Business: South Africa, Apartheid and Truth. 
London: Verso.  
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Did the negotiations that led to the new South Africa include and 
agreement that the masterminds of the murder would be immune from 
prosecution? Have these men refused to confess their deeds and shame in 
the certain knowledge that they will not be punished for their crimes but 
are free to take their pensions and disappear from public life (Nicholson 
2004: 221)?  
 
For both Bizos and Nicholson then, the imperatives of law, and legal justice, have 
been trumped by politics, both during apartheid and after apartheid. The failure to 
prosecute those who carried out the deeds, and those who ordered them, marks a 
failure in the eyes of the lawyers, and the eyes of widows like Nyameka Goniwe, to 
do ‘justice’ to the ‘victims of apartheid’. Bizos had spent many years during the 
apartheid years working to bring to justice those who had been responsible for the 
deaths of political activists. For many who were part of the anti-apartheid movement 
the death of activists, from Biko, to the Pebco Three, to the Sharpeville Six, to Rick 
Turner signified certain questions. Questions of who did it. These were partly 
rhetorical questions, since as I said earlier, it was a question that many already had an 
answer to: it was the State. Yet it was a question requiring an answer: who where 
these anonymous individuals who seemed omnipresent and omnipotent, but who 
constituted ‘the State’, from the visible policeman in uniform, the security branch 
officer in civilian clothes, to the politicians, like P.W Botha or F.W de Klerk who 
denied any responsibility or role in the violence or the deaths and seemed to able to 






Like the previous chapter, in this one too I have discussed what I call the juridical life 
after death of the Cradock Four and our understanding of state violence. We have 
seen that ‘what we know’ about what happened to the Cradock Four, and ‘why it 
happened’ are thus far largely constituted by an archive produced in the space of a 
legal habitus. This legal habitus inflects that archive and our reading of it during a 
period of political transformation. Knowledge thus produced has been mobilized in 
order to provide ‘motive’ for the crime and implicate or acquit the subject(s) who 
apparently carried it out. Motive to commit a crime is therefore juxtaposed to 
exculpation – the freedom of the individual from culpability. But the policemen’s 
motives to kill the Cradock Four, as the human rights lawyers themselves discovered 
during their cross-examinations, were guided by the belief that these activists were the 
state’s enemy in a war.  However criminal law is not equipped to judge policemen as 
state agents acting against enemies in a war; it can merely account for individuals – as 
individual perpetrators acting against individual victims – not as a collective or 
bearing corporatized identities of ‘the security police’ versus ‘the UDF’, but as seven 
individuals conspiring to kill four individuals, disembodied from history, geography 
and social identity. Bizos and Nicholson were faced with that inability of law to see 
beyond the individual, its inability to see state histories and political identities at 
work, to judge and deliver justice accordingly. At the same time, their own training 
and trained instincts had led them to regard such a ‘blind’ justice that could rise above 
specific histories and politics as law’s virtue. Now, in their minds, if only the state 
could realize law’s virtue and rise above politics to indict state and political personnel 
themselves – a hope that both Bizos and Nicholson continued to hold onto as they 







The Partisan and the Political  
 
We know of no other means to imbue exhausted peoples, as strongly and surely as 
every great war does, with that raw energy of the battleground, that deep impersonal 
hatred, that murderous cold-bloodedness with a good conscience, that communal, 
organized ardor in destroying the enemy, that proud indifference to great losses, to 
one's own existence and to that of one's friends, that muted, earthquake like a 
convulsion of the soul….    
Frederick Nietzsche (1908: 8, 472).  
 
 
Here at last we have the perfect authentication of the idiot’s view of history as one 
damn’d thing after another: rising-information-decision-order.  
Ranajit Guha (1988: 57) 
 
 
Let us return then to the scene.  The bodies of four black men found burnt and stabbed 
in a veld on the coast of Port Elizabeth known was Bluewaters Bay. The town of 
Cradock, which the four men were returning to when they were intercepted on a bend 
in the road in the darkness of night, is named after Sir John Cradock. It was 
established as a stronghold to secure the eastern area of the Cape Province after the 
infamous Fourth Frontier War of 1812.125  Cradock had arrived in South Africa in 
September 1811, smarting from a period of controversial service in India. With swift 
resolve to succeed where his predecessor seemed to lack the will, and to rehabilitate 
his reputation perhaps, on Christmas day of 1811 he delegated Colonel John Graham 
to lead an amalgamated force of British troops. A number of settlers and the all-Khoi 
Cape Regiment reinforced the troops who went into the expanse of land along the 
                                                
125 The Frontier Wars were a series of nine wars fought over one hundred years between1779 to 1879, 
principally pitting the colonial settlers against Xhosa chieftaincies in what is now known as the Eastern 
Cape Province of South Africa.  
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Fish River known as the Zuurveld (a Dutch name which translates as  “the Sour 
Field”). The campaign was brutal like no other. The aim was to expel every Xhosa 
person from the Zuurveld. The army attacked Xhosa men and women, torched 
villages, corn and other crops as well as laid claim to thousands of head of Xhosa-
owned livestock. When the director of the London Missionary society travelled 
through the Zuurveld just a year later in 1813, he recorded in his notes that formerly 
the area “was strewed over with Kaffir villages, but now not a living soul is to be 
found. Universal stillness reigns” (Maclennan 1986: 125-6). The land had been 
cleared for settlement.  
 
“My intention is now, Graham confided to a colleague “to attack the savages in a way 
which I confidently hope will leave a lasting impression on their memories, and show 
them our vast superiority in all situations.” He had given his army “orders to stay 
there so long as a Kaffir remains alive, and to bring off all their cattle, which when 
they choose to quit our country shall be restored to them [emphasis added]” 
(Maclennan 1986: 112). Graham was to later reflect in a letter to Lord Liverpool that 
“ I am very happy to add that in the course of this service there has not been shed 
more Kaffir blood than would be necessary to impress on the minds of these savages a 
proper degree of terror and respect" (cited in Maclennan 1986: 112).  
 
Known as the Fourth Frontier War, it ended in 1812 when the colonial army drove 
Chief Ndlambe, along with a number of lesser Xhosa chiefs, and about 20,000  
subjects,  from the Zuurveld into the territory of his nephew, Chief Ngqika, to the east 
of the Fish River, and with whom he was to have a fractious relationship.126 As a 
                                                
126 An account of some of the tensions between the two can be found in a prose piece ‘Idabi lama linde 
(The Battle of Amalinde)’, by the  famed Xhosa praise poet,  and imbongi yesizwe jikilele (‘ poet of the 
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reward for John Graham’s violent success, Sir Cradock named a small garrison camp 
after the leader of the successful military campaign, now known as ‘Grahamstown’. 
Cradock also took the liberty of naming one of the new villages, which linked 
Grahamstown to a series of outposts who would guard against retaliatory Xhosa 
incursions, after himself.  Xhosa warriors, it is said, continued to wage war 
sporadically against the colonial settlers for another fifty years, but the 1812 victory 
had been a turning point: ‘the balance of power how shifted to the Whites’. 127 
 
 
Just over one hundred and fifty years later, we return in 1985 to the garrison town of 
Cradock to find violent armies roaming the landscape instilling ‘a proper degree of 
terror’. In a moment of both repetition and difference, they were still seeking to 
resolve the problem that the colonial state had delegated to the military forces led by 
Graham. The problem was an old one: of a minority seeking to maintain their rule 
over a majority.128 If the 1812 Fourth Frontier War is considered in the colonial 
archive’s ‘prose of counterinsurgency’ to be a turning point in the settler assertion of 
territorial dominance, we heard from policemen who applied for amnesty for killing 
the Cradock Four that even in 1985 the area was regarded as ‘strategic’ in the 
cartography of war – as a space to be conquered and defended.  
                                                                                                                                      
nation’),   S.E.K Mqkhayi. Cf Mqkhayi, S.E.K (2010) Abantu Besizwe: Historical and Biographical 
Writings 1902-1944, transl. Jeff Opland, Johannessburg: Wits University Press, p311 
127 Beck, R. B (2000) The History of South Africa, USA: Greenwood Publishers, p46. On the 
relationship between the Xhosa chiefs Ndlambe and Ngqika, and the narration of these events in 
relationship to an African nationalist historiography, see Premesh Lalu (2009) The Deaths of Hintsa, 
Post Apartheid South Africa and the Shape of Recurring Pasts, Cape Town: HSRC Press, pp 34-38 
128 There is an important distinction between the Fourth Frontier War of 1812 and the Total War of late 
apartheid. The former was a war, which sought to remove and expel and where necessary, exterminate 
the indigenous inhabitants – to push them out and beyond, to make way for a settlement of white 
Europeans. It had little interest in the minds of the indigenous or the desire to fundamentally refashion 
their ways of being, other than to instill ‘respect’ for domination through the use of terror and fear.   
Colonial administrative power did not seek to go where the London Missionary Society sought to go, 
that is, to across the lines of the frontier in order to reach into, and to conquer, to change, save or 
redeem the native soul through what Valentin Mudimbe has called ‘theologies of salvation’. Rather it 
sought to maintain the frontier as a line of controlled crossing, while slowly and convulsively, pushing 




Cradock had by now also taken on the spatial organization of the apartheid city.  It 
consisted of the formalized ‘white’ part of the town, and the black African township, 
founded in 1948, the year the Nationalist Party came to power. This area prescribed 
for black South Africans was named Lingelihle. In Xhosa, the word means “good 
beginning,” once again revealing the perverse ironies that characterized practices of 
naming areas delineated for black residents in apartheid South Africa. Close to it is a 
residential area designated for ‘coloureds,’ known was Michausdal, situated just 250 
kilometers outside of the main city of Port Elizabeth, 290 kilometers from East 
London, and about 230 kilometers from Bisho, the capital of the Ciskei Bantustan. 
Cradock, and its township, Lingelihle, was by this time not only a city that presented 
apartheid’s planners with the problem of the urban African, it was also now in the 
‘eye of the revolution.’129  According to security strategists, the very fate and future of 
South Africa as they envisaged it, would be decided in the battles fought there in the 
mid 1980’s.   
                                                
129 This was the phrase that emerged in the surveillance documents that considered Mathew Goniwe as 
the author of the ‘G-Plan’, as a reincarnation of the  
‘M-Plan’, (M for Mandela), which outlined a strategy of armed insurrection, and the basis of treason 
charges brought against the ANC leadership at the 1955 Treason Trial. The prosecution presented a 
document titled Operation Mayibuye, a five paged typed document outlining a plan for armed 
insurrection, combining small external forces and internal recruits: “Our target” declared the ambitious 
plan, “is that on arrival the external force should find at least 7 000 men in the four main areas ready to 
join the guerella (sic) army in the initial onslaught. These will be as follows:- a) Eastern Cape- 
Transkei  2 000; b) Natal- Zululand; c) North Western Transvaal 2 000; d) North Western Cape 1 000.”  
Operation Mayibuye, Part 1, A D 18441 / A/ Vol. 2, SAHA, p4. Goniwe was therefore considered to be 
conducting a political project of a similarly treasonous nature, even though, in contrast to Mandela’s 
case, there are no overt links between him and armed insurrection.  The township of Lingelihle remains 
not atypical, in biopolitical terms, of African urban townships in South Africa’s poorest province, the 
Eastern Cape. In a 2003 household ‘needs assessment’ survey conducted in the area, commissioned by 
the postapartheid Eastern Cape provincial government, Lingelihle had a population count of 14 346 
people. It had a female population of 54%.  Only 40% of residents had any high school training, and 
almost 20% had no schooling at all. 13.5% had potential income, of which 5.3% came from pensions 
and special medical grants. Even more dire, only 5.1% of residents had fulltime employment, and 31% 
identified themselves as unemployed. Potgieter, F.E, et al (2003) Report on Socio-Economic Needs 
Analysis in Lingelihle, Cradock, Port Elizabeth: Health and Development Research Institute University 
of Port Elizabeth 
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In his submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the ‘superspy’, 
and senior figure in South African intelligence, Major Craig Williamson,130 
explained to the commission that, 
The South African security forces gave very little cognizance to the 
political motivation of the South African liberation movements, beyond 
regarding them as part and parcel of the Soviet onslaught against the  
‘civilized/free/democratic Western world…. My security force colleagues 
and I did not see the liberation movements and their members as fellow 
citizens of our society. We regarded them as an alien enemy.131  
Williamson went on to speculate that because ‘the enemy’ was ‘alien’, it was easier 
for members of the security personnel of the state to bring their violence to bear on 
the bodies of those they established as priority ‘targets.’132 Counterinsurgency reads 
                                                
130 Williamson had secretly joined the intelligence services in 1971, and infiltrated the white anti-
apartheid student movement. He eventually went into ‘exile’, and co-ordinated the Inter-University 
Exchange Fund from Geneva in Switzerland, which supported African students who where studying in 
Europe, including the East Bloc, where many exiles went for training and schooling. From that position 
he secured high-level access to the leadership of the ANC in exile, as well as of the European anti-
apartheid movements. Wiliamson applied for amnesty, for amongst other actions, co-ordinating the 
assassination of exiled South African journalist and scholar Ruth First, who was also the wife of Joe 
Slovo, the General-Secretary of the Communist Party and head of the ANC’s military wing, Umkhonto 
We Size (“The Spear of the Nation”) At the time of her death in a parcel bomb explosion in 1982, First 
worked at the the Center for African Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University in Mozambique. 
Williamson’s celebration in intelligence circles as a ‘superspy’ was however preceded in the 1950’s by 
Gerard Ludi, ‘Agent Q-018’. Ludi is considered to be the first agent who had infiltrated ANC and 
Communist Party circles, and was instrumental in producing the evidence upon which the prosecution 
of the high-ranking Communist Party leader of Afrikaner descent, the attorney Bram Fischer, was 
based. Ludi later wrote an illuminating, if aggrandized account, of his cloak and dagger Cold War 
experience as an intelligence spy and member of the Communist Party, and observations from his trip 
as a delegate to the World Peace Congress in Moscow in 1960. Cf. Gerard Ludi (1969) Operation Q-
018, Pretoria:Nasionale Boek Handel; see also Vermaak, C (1966) Braam Fischer, The Man with Two 
Faces,  Johannesburg: A.P.B Publisher; for a sympathetic biography of Fischer, see Martin Meredith 
(2002) Fischer’s Choice: A life of Bram Fischer, Cape Town: Jonathan Ball 
131 Craig Williamson (1997) Aspects of the State Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Principles and 
Strategy: Republic of South Africa in the 1980’s. Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, 19 October, pp1-9; Department of Military Intelligence n.d Geheim: SAKP, Overte en 
Koverte Strukture 1062D/ 29, A 2991/ A6 SAHA Cullen, Wits University 
132 I. F Stone (1968) In Time of Torment, New York: Vintage, pp 173-174; That this view was not 
entirely without more complexity was revealed in the admission by John F. Kennedy to the Portuguese 
Prime Minister Franco Nogueira in 1962: “It is evident from what happened to the former French, 
Belgian and British territories in Africa that these pressures stemmed from the basic desires of the 
populations and were not due to any external agency.” Quoted in Shubin, V (2008) The Hot Cold War, 
The USSR in Africa, Natal: UKZN Press and London: Pluto Press, p4 
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events as signs of a foreign intervention rather than a locally articulated source of 
discontent, recalls I. F Stone, in his study of Pentagon intelligence reports on the 
South Vietnamese insurgency:   
One feels that these writers are like men watching a dance from outside 
through heavy plate glass windows. They see the motions but they can’t 
hear the music. They put mechanical gestures down on paper with 
pedantic fidelity. But what rarely comes through to them are the injured… 
the misery, the rankling slights, the hatred, the devotion, the inspiration, 
the desperation. So they do not really understand what leads men to…take 
to the bush and live gun in hand like a hunted animal; to challenge 
overwhelming military odds rather than acquiesce any longer in 
humiliation, injustice or poverty. 
Returning to Williamson’s testimony to the TRC, it becomes apparent that one part of 
his political rationality derives from a certain kind of pedagogy – from a science of 
war with its own experts and episteme; another part derives from a hermeneutics of 
the colonial subject as enemy, which mediates the sensory, affective and ontological 
dissonance that Stone was wondering about above.  The ways in which we articulate 
the relationship between these two parts is crucial to the ways in which we think 
about the political, and the killing of Mathew Goniwe and the Cradock Four133.  
                                                
133 An undated anti-communist pamphlet collected in a second book store in Cape Town outlines a 
theory of this dissonance through  novel reading of the concept of the dialectic, issued by the 
“Austrialian League of Rights”:   “According the Communist philosophy of dialectical materialism, 
anything which advances Communism is therefore true…Most of those who attempt to deal with 
Communism make the major mistake of overlooking that the fully-conditioned communist is a 
completely different type of human being. He thinks different to all other human beings. Rational 
discussion is impossible with an individual who not only believes that under certain circumstances 
murder is necessary, but that is ‘scientifically’ justified…. Western man faces something he has never 
before had to face in his struggle against those who challenged his civilization. The Communist is not 
going to be halted by appeals to reason. He, in fact, cannot be reached through the thought processes of 
Western man…. Those who want to defeat Communism must therefore face the truth, that 




In his study of violence, memory and the Truth Commission in South Africa, the 
anthropologist Allen Feldman problematized the question of how we remembered 
apartheid in the TRC, and how this authorized form of memorialization relates to the 
broader elements of a ‘social memory’. Feldman argues that the desire to know, a 
desire that the TRC would address through the ‘talking’ that it facilitated, arose from 
a number of structural features in the economy of knowledge under apartheid rule, 
particularly during the years of the State of Emergency in the 1980’s:  
Apartheid-era South Africa was characterized by structural forgetfulness 
and fragmentation of public recollection which was, and still is, an 
institutionally manipulated effect, emanating from (1) the secret 
knowledge systems of the state and from once-clandestine oppositional 
political organizations; (2) the apartheid culture of deniability that 
extended from the upper echelons of apartheid’s ruling organs- 
government, armed forces, police services and intelligence services—to 
the everyday class, racial and geographic insularity of most white South 
Africans; (3) the ghettoisation of social knowledge imposed on 
communities of colour by apartheids geographical sequestration, a race-
based inequitable education system, the cultural decimation of violently 
urbanized rural populations; and (4) media censorship and knowledge 
fragmentation…. (2002: 236).  
Mediating and nourishing this deficiency in not-knowing produced by this four-fold 
economy of knowledge, Feldman is concerned with how the violence of apartheid is 
narrated in the amnesty hearings of the TRC, to produce an ‘ideology of excuse.’ He 
                                                                                                                                      
defeated.” Eric D. Butler, n.d “Dialectics”: Communist Instrument for World Conquest”, The 
Australian League of Rights, pp2-3 
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is particularly concerned with the erasure of the social nature of systematic racism, 
which was normalized, but was attributed to the aberration of ‘bad apples,’ who were 
said to have committed the gross violations of human rights in an unauthorized and 
maverick manner.  For Feldman, the amnesty requirement, of having to prove a 
‘political motivation,’ allows for the instrumentatilization of violence; if one could 
show an ‘acceptable’ motive, then the act of violence was legitimized as political.  
 
He is however not convinced by this equivalence between political beliefs and 
violence posited in the TRC hearings and describes the ways in which they are indeed 
incommensurate. Feldman argues than an element of the narrative becomes oblique in 
the process of setting up such equivalences as this “perspective obscures any clear 
understanding of institutionalized racism.”  Feldman hones in on the testimony of one 
set of applicants, a group of policemen who applied for amnesty for the killing of 
three young UDF activists, also from the Cradock area. In particular he dwells on the 
matter-of-fact manner in which the policemen describe how they killed the activists, 
and then set their bodies alight, and had to wait through the night while the bodies 
smoldered to anonymous grey ash. While they waited, the policemen braaied 
(barbecued), on the river bank, and drank brandy. Through an extended, and 
somewhat gratuitous to my mind, discussion of the possible semiotic connections 
between the convivial act of braaing (a popular South African past time, and said to 
have originated with the frontier practices of white Afrikaner South Africans), 
Feldman argues the that there is a racialized violence within which the other forms of 
violence circulate; these other forms of violence exceed the instrumentalized violence 
that the political motive describes. This excess, for him, resides in a different register 
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of meaning: a ‘demonic economy’134 of racism that strips the black body of all ethical 
claims, since braaing, he argues, is ‘part of a political culture of white male 
dominance’.  
 
I don’t necessarily share Feldman’s view that Afrikaner males have a cultural cartel 
on the braai, since I think it is far more ambiguous in its contemporary circulation as 
a leisure activity amongst South Africans. But that minor observational infraction 
aside, his juxtaposition of the exceptional and the ordinary, and the registering of the 
one domain as the condition of possibility of the other, is a useful insight. It allows us 
to problematize the displacement of ‘responsibility’ from a socialized to an 
individualized and pathologized agent. My concern however is not at this point with 
these synchronic dualisms, but rather with the discursive ordering of authenticity 
Feldman seems to invoke, suggesting there is one register of discourse that is 
foundational and more pristine than another. 
 
In his reading of the amnesty applications, Feldman is uncomfortable with the ways in 
which the perpetrators explain their actions. In his words:  
Members of the former regimes security forces frequently cite anti-
communism as a justifiying motive for human rights abuses…. The 
imagined communist onslaught with its explicit anti-capitalist 
associations was the dream form through which the rupture in apartheid’s 
symbolic economy was imagined and projected onto black bodies by 
securocrats. It is now all the more curious—and downright offensive to 
                                                
134 As he describes his intention:  “I refer to the incorporation of everyday life practices, objects and 
associations into the extraordinary scenes of violence and terror and which conversely refracts the 
increasing penetration of a culture of terror into the quotidian”(2002: 244)  
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any human rights paradigm—that this fantasy served as the basis of 
indemnification in amnesty hearings (2002: 250).  
Since Feldman is suspicious of attempts to give the kind of violence described at the 
TRC hearings an instrumentality, or a rationality, he relocates it to a different 
discursive order: namely the realm of ‘fetish’, ‘mythography’, and fantasy, where 
‘structural nostalgia for their superior class and racial positions haunted the security 
personnel’s reenactments of braai violence. Feldman thus sees their violence as a 
form of historical desire, magic and fantasy that found expression in disfigurement 
and pain, and which rechanneled the violated and consumed black body as ‘a renewed 
productive fuel for state power’ (2002: 250.). It is at this point that I worry about the 
invocation of a Freudian conception of channeling and displacement in the 
suppression and expression of desire in relation to the kind of violence Feldman seeks 
to write about.  
 
As I have noted in Chapter One, there is a genre of writing on the violence of 
apartheid’s state agents that questions claims that the violence was carried out as part 
of an anti-communist effort being waged in South Africa. Feldman is similarly critical 
of the reference to anti-communism—seen as a fantasy that, according to him, 
displaces the racism directed  at the ‘black body’ on to a discourse invoked to  
‘justify’ it.  It seems however that in the displacement of one ‘explanation’, as 
‘fantasy’, Feldman inadvertently holds on to another as ‘real.’ This so-called real 
explanation attributes apartheid and its violence(s) to race and racism as categories of 
understanding in and of themselves, ignoring ways in which such racism is itself a 
product of the historical violence of colonialism. In a later chapter I have alluded to 
how a reading of apartheid’s violence through a political economy lens performed a 
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similar maneuver. Where it differed was in the ways in which it deemed ‘race’ as the 
fantastical justification for another form of the real – the economic and extractive 
imperative of capital and class.  The challenge it seems to me is not to find the 
originary, or to privilege a foundational claim to the real, but to locate these various 
invocations within historical time. These invocations of a ‘real’ and explanations so 
grounded may be seen as shifting and accumulative modes of comprehending, 
ordering and classifying the world that apartheid, as a shifting signifier, sought to 
bring into existence.  
 
I am also unsatisfied by the arguments that dismiss the narrative of anti-communism 
as ‘fantasy’ or ‘ideology’, or a postfacto rationalization.135 If anti-communism is a 
claim that conceals more truthful motivating forces such as ‘race’ and ‘class,’ then we 
might ask how is it that race and class come to be seen as foundational referents for 
violence? If Feldman, for example, believes that the recourse to the fantasy of anti-
communism is a projection that springs from a racial way of thinking about the world, 
which sees black bodies as available for violence and torture, is ‘blackness’ self-
explanatory as a target of violence or a condition of dehumanization? Or would we 
have to show the conditions under which blackness comes to occupy this category of 
non-being? In other words, ‘race’ cannot be assumed to be a free-floating signifier, 
but might rather have to be given a significatory meaning within certain regimes of 
truth.   
 
Historical studies of colonial violence, and racism, for example, have shown how, 
from within various discourses—sometimes biological and scientific, and sometimes 
                                                
135For a shared concern with this approach, in a study of memory and Malaysian narratives of the Cold 
War after the Cold War, see Kee Howe Yong (2007) ‘Divergent Interpretations of Communism and 
Currents of Duplicity in Post-Cold War Sarawak’, Critique of Anthropology, vol. 27, no. 63.  
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cultural and sometimes theological—the black body comes to be considered 
‘political’ as such, in time and space.  However, I would like to also suggest that the 
reduction of racism to the epidemiology of the black body is a move Feldman makes 
too hastily. I have argued in the previous chapter, following Mahmood Mamdani and 
we might add Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi, that the crucial distinction in this 
particular African context is not between black and white as transcendental 
abstractions of colour-coded racism. Instead we need to see black and white as 
translations of the divisions between settlers and natives that also underlie the 
differences between citizen and subject.136   
 
Seen from that vantage point of divisions between settlers and natives, and citizen and 
subjects, the question of racism poses a different set of questions. We have to pay 
attention to the ways in which native life in the colonial world was classified, re-
ordered and arranged.  The question of racism then gets tied to the question of the 
colonial subject as a subject in formation, as a figure at once historical and political.  
In this question, resides another – about the relationship between the apartheid subject 
generated in the colonial world and the modern state of the Cold War era. Rather than 
dismiss the discourse of anti-communism, I perceive it as a discourse that belongs to 
the modern rationalities of the political, to the colonial violence of the settler and the 
native, and to the world of late apartheid that demands attention as apartheid’s 
violence is memorialized.  
                                                
136  The kind of historicized discussion of ‘race’ I have in mind can be found in Arendt (1973) The 
Origins of Totalitarianism. In Society Must be Defended Foucault asks “What in fact is racism?”, and 
links it to a conception of biopolitics: “ It is primarily a way of introducing a break in the domain of 
life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die. “ (2003:255).   
“Racism” he continues,  “first develops with colonization, or in other words, with colonizing 
genocide.” (2003: 257); Rao and Pierce (2001: 162) make the point that the ‘colonial career of 
corporeal discipline was neither static nor untroubled. Racial difference proved elusive, contradictory 
and fragile’. Cf. Anupama Rao and Steven Pierce (2001) ‘Discipline and the Other Body: Correction, 




In Search of the Enemy (i):  Encounters with the Archives of Counterinsurgency 
 
 
State secrets are not necessarily secreted truths about the state but promises of it. 
State secrets make up a basic feature of the archive, the reason d’etre of state 
institutions charged with producing foundational fictions of concealment and access 
embodied in content as well as form.    
Anne Laura Stoler (2002: 99) 
 
 
In Chapter Three I recalled a moment of legal interrogation during the Zietsman 
inquest into the killing of the Cradock Four. At that moment, Col. Lourens Du Plessis 
of the SADF was cross-examining the SAP Colonel Harold Snyman about whether he 
considered Mathew Goniwe an ‘enemy.’ You will recall that the Colonel was 
prepared, at that time, before his amnesty application, to inform the inquiry that 
Mathew Goniwe was a threat to the state, but he refused to be drawn on the question 
of whether Mathew Goniwe was an ‘enemy’. He had good reason to tread carefully 
there, since the Colonel was well versed in the implications of naming someone as an 
enemy. One might say that he was carefully attempting to negotiate law’s aporia that, 
as Walter Benjamin reminds us, it is a scandal to bring out from the shadows the 
sword that is ever present to secure the law when its foundations are called into 
question.  
 
The Schweickerdt Building at no. 20 Visagie Street in Pretoria, the administrative 
capital of South Africa, is in a part of the downtown and on a street that you would 
ordinarily walk by with a disinterested glance. On the surface of a patch of the dark 
red face-brick wall, the lettering D.O.D in adhesive tape marked its identity in an ad- 
hoc and amateurish way. The building’s façade deceptively suggested that it was an 
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unimportant one. But that was hardly the case for this is where that archive of the 
Department of Defence, also known as its ‘Documentation Center’ was housed. I was 
there to understand how the state viewed ‘the enemy.’ When I first visited there in 
2007, the first of three visits, I had an appointment with the archivist with whom I had 
been in touch with via email to enquire about the extent of the records that were 
maintained, and shared with him the broad outlines of my project—my interest in 
how ‘enemy’ came to be, and how figures like Mathew Goniwe and the Cradock Four 
became the enemy.  I shared with him that I thought that these questions might be 
answered in and through the archives, like the ones he was administering, and he 
encouraged me to make the journey from Cape Town to Pretoria, but repeated a 
caution I had encountered from others.   
 
This is a narrative repeated by a number of accounts of the political transition137, 
including the final report of the TRC, that a vast quantity, many tons in fact, of 
documents were hastily incinerated in the steel-smelting furnace of the South African 
iron and steel parastatal ISKOR in the twilight moments of the government of South 
Africa’s last white President, F.W De Klerk. How and in what way were the 
documents potentially incriminating, and for who, are questions we can only 
speculate about. My query about the nature of the documents that were available, and 
the extent to which they might have been preserved was mindful of this.   
 
It turned out that the building on Visagie Street had a vast archive of material that had 
not been destroyed, and that the former apartheid military maintained a meticulous 
record keeping system.  It also meant that the documents that remained in that archive 
                                                




were not regarded as legally compromising of members of the previous government. 
In other words, while the documents spared from the furnaces might deal with the 
administration of violence to secure apartheid rule, they were considered as 
documents free from the legal anxiety of guilt and culpability that could implicate 
their authors in a post-apartheid South Africa seeking justice, or perhaps more 
pertinently for them, seeking revenge. 
 
Under the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act No 2 of 2000), the post-
apartheid government had committed itself to the right of citizens to access 
information. I have also indicated in the previous chapter that this right is not 
automatic. It is and remains a contested one. The PAIA Act does however provide a 
framework within which this contestation is measured against the constitutional 
imperatives of the new state.  
 
The process of accessing documents involved understanding that military intelligence 
security documents had not been ‘declassified’, but the list of files had been 
declassified. The distinction was important.  One could read through the file lists, but 
you would then have to make request to read the file itself. At this point a member of 
the South African National Defence Force would read through the documents in the 
folder and decide whether to declassify the documents or not. If the documents were 
to be declassified the researcher would be able to read them. As is typical, the 
declassified documents bore the red stamp indicating  “DECLASSIFIED”, a set of 
markers all made overly familiar and almost unreal through film images of the 
intrigues of state secrets, and one looks at them with the feeling that they might be 
props which render the real a facsimile or fake. The researcher would also have to 
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pay for each page that the military official read, and one could not tell from the file 
how many pages might be in it. Gaining access to what was once the interior world 
of a labyrinth marked “TOP SECRET”, which gave rise through its reticence to 
fantastical myths about the workings of the state, was in stark contrast to the 
ordinariness of the record keeping that one finds there now.  
 
The military officials who read through the requested files seemed to be of the ‘old 
order’. They would also make routine checks in a friendly, or sometimes stern 
manner to make sure that the materials being read in the reading room  bore the red-
inked “DECLASSIFIED” stamp. It was as if they did not entirely trust that the 
archivist would not share still “classified” files with the researchers. The other 
readers and people who requested files from the Documentation Center, as I 
discovered during that first week I spent there, were all white retirees, and pensioners 
mostly looking into matters to do with the Second World War. Almost all were 
popular or ‘amateur historians’; one was working on the history of small arms in the 
army, another on a history of aviation disasters suffered by the air force in the 
1950’s.  
 
As someone not versed in the organization of the military nor its divisions, I quickly 
learnt that this was an incredibly bureaucratically systematic organization, and that it 
kept its records almost entirely in Afrikaans. This linguistic preference changed at 
some point in the1980’s when records would be kept either in Afrikaans or English, 
alternating every two weeks.  The extent of the documentation appeared to be vast. 
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There was simply no way to know the relevance of a file from its title.138  There were 
many tantalizing listings which referenced files titled “The Strategy of the Revolution 
by Gen. A. Fraser” (1965), to “Soldiers Manual and Solidarity—the Marxist 
doctrine is omnipotent because its True” (1964), to the Mi/STRAT/1/17 file of “a 
strategy for the continued existence of the white population in the Republic of South 
Africa as a nation” (1986)139. This archive is but one of a few that contains the files 
and documentation of the South African state during the apartheid years.  
 
As I read through the files, I realized that one has to continually ask oneself:  is this 
the archive of apartheid’s violence? Or, is it the archive of apartheid as violence?  
The larger question of what the wrong of apartheid was also, I realized, one that I 
was trying to answer in this dissertation. That large question can perhaps be folded 
into this question of what the archive of apartheid’s violence might be. The ways in 
which apartheid is memorialized will be conditioned by what we regard as 
apartheid’s archive, how we read this archive and how we relate to this archive. 
These are questions that we have to ask ourselves as we enter into the fragments, the 
holdings, the deposits scattered all over that make up the archive. As might be 
                                                
138 In an inadvertent way, the right to access this information is truncated by the organization of the 
archive and by procedures required to access the material. This may account for the slowness of work 
coming to fruition based on these archives. A recent example is Sasha Polakow-Suransky (2010) The 
Unspoken Alliance: Israel’s Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa, New York: Pantheon, on 
South Africa’s nuclear programme and its relationship with Israel; there is also the earlier journalistic 
work by James Sanders (2006) Apartheid’s Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa’s Secret 
Service, UK: John Murray. Both accounts seek to show complicity and draw on the archive as 
‘evidence’ of a moral-ethical failure on the part of those governments who collaborated with the 
apartheid regime during the period when sanctions, divestment and isolation had become more 
widespread, turning South Africa into a pariah state internationally.  
139 ‘n strategie vir die voortbestaan van die wit bevolking in the RSA as ‘n nasie’, 95 MI/STRAT/17 
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expected, in this becoming postapartheid moment the question of the archive is one 
of considerable reflection and debate140.  
 
In a volume following the Johannesburg conference on Jacques Derrida’s essay, 
‘Archive Fever,’ which was presented by the eminent philosopher himself, the 
literary historian Bhekisizwe Peterson argued that, “the problem of access seems to 
stalk the archives.” For Peterson, this familiar question often agitatedly posed by 
postcolonial nationalist critics, the question of access refers both to the ways in 
which archives have included, but also how they have excluded. He was particularly 
interested in the question of absences and silences: “The experiences and insights of 
Africans, women, workers and other communities were generally ignored or 
criminalized, at times even banned and destroyed” (2002: 31). This conception of the 
archive suggests an incomplete repository – a form of the nation’s foundational self-
image constantly fought over – defined as modular and yet having its own character, 
and a coming to be through its own singularity, or signature. The archive is the 
nation writ-large in this reading, and as such, must guide and procure in its holdings 
the full diversity of voices and subjectivities that constitute the nation.141 
 
This conception of the archive as something to which we must add, looks very much 
to the future and draws its curatorial vision from a conception of a past based on 
exclusion. The archive is something to be filled in and expanded. There is a set of 
                                                
140 cf Antoinette Burton, ed. Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions and the Writing of History, Durham: Duke 
University Press; Razia Saleh (2002) ‘The South African History Archive’, Innovation, no.4; Verne 
Harris (1994) ‘Redefining archives in South Africa: public archives and society in Transition 1990-
1996, Archivaria, no. 42; Verne Harris (1996) ‘Transforming discourse and legislation: a perspective 
on South Africa’s new National Archives Act’, ARCARM Newsletter, no. 18;  
141 Cf Hayden White (1987) The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical 
Representation, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, p12 
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questions that however might need to precede Peterson’s suggestion. These are 
questions about the archive as an inheritance with which we have to engage. This is 
the facing, the turning to – a material engagement with what exists. In the case of the 
military archive, it is to arrive in search of answers to questions of and about the 
enemy, and to open oneself to those artifacts that have survived the fires.  And it is 
also to become aware of the archive as a set of indexes and codes that are sometimes 
opaque, and about the archive as a set of ontological categories, and an episteme. It 
is with these anxieties in mind, that I entered into the archive, mindful that I was 
neither seeking to implicate individuals who may have committed ‘gross violations 
of human rights,’ nor was I necessarily seeking to ‘expose’ complicity with the 
apartheid state by revealing the extensive levels of military co-operations between 
apartheid South Africa and Taiwan, Uruguay, Chile, and Israel, or the intelligence 
agencies of the United States or Britain, to name a few of the many countries whose 
names appear with regularity in the lists. I was however looking for something else, 
more like a mode and a mood than complicity – something that presents itself with 
an epistemological claim about the certainty of science, a calculus of risk that 
presents the phenomenological world in a language of intelligibility, causality and 
predictability.142 At the same time, I was looking for apartheid’s affects, its desire to 
bring together and the fears that led it to make its subjects apart.  
 
                                                
142 Ian Hacking (1996) The Taming of Chance, UK: Cambridge University Press, and (2006) The 
Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and 
Statistical Inference, UK: Cambridge University Press  
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The anthropologist Anna Laura Stoler argues that since anthropology made its 
‘historical turn,’143 the colonial archive has become an object not simply to be 
viewed extractively but also as an ethnographic site. She writes, 
 We are only now critically reflecting on the making of documents and 
how we choose to use them, of archives not as knowledge retrieval but 
knowledge production, as monuments of states, as well as sites of state 
ethnography…it signals a more sustained engagement with those 
archives as cultural artifacts of fact production, of taxonomies in the 
making, and of disparate notions of what make up colonial authority.144 
 
Stoler makes the useful distinction between an engagement with the colonial archive 
that seeks to “read against the grain,” and her own project to “read along the grain.”  
The first speaks to the early gestures of social history’s engagement with the colonial 
archive, which sought to read the archive for the agency of the native, for the 
categories through which the colonial subject is framed, but in which the colonial 
subject comes to ‘turn things upside down’. This approach to reading the archive 
                                                
143 cf. Nicholas Dirks ed. (1992) Colonialism and Culture, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Frederick Cooper and Anne Stoler. Eds. (1997) Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois 
World, Berkeley: University of California 
144 Anna Laura Stoler (2002) ‘Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance: On the Content in the 
Form’, in Hamilton, C. et al. Reconfiguring the Archive, Cape Town: David Philip p85. This essay 
rehearses an argument she makes more elaborately in (2008) Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic 
Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense, New Jersey: Princeton University Press; Michel Foucault 
(1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, New York: Harper; E. E 
Evans-Pritchard (1951) ‘Social Anthropology: past and present, the Marett lecture, 1950’, in Social 
Anthropology and other Essays, New York: Free Press; Nicholas Dirks.  et al. eds (1994) Culture, 
Power, History, Princeton: Princeton University Press; MacDonald, T. ed (1996) The Historic Turn in 
the Human Sciences, Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Richard G. Fox(1991) ‘For a nearly new 
culture history’, in Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present,  Santa Fe: School of American 
Research Press;  Michel De Certeau (1985) The Writing of History, New York: Columbia University 





seeks to subvert the colonial archive’s authority as the record of domination in order 
to reveal the traces of a counter-hegemonic sensibility,  
 
Stoler argues that we might not only want to read the archive ‘against the grain’, but 
perhaps also ‘along the grain’, for its “regularities, for its logic of recall, for its 
densities, and distributions, for its consistencies of misinformation, omission and 
mistake.” Her debt to Michel Foucault’s view of power as not simply repressive, but 
as productive, is acknowledged and evident.  I have found this a useful way to 
proceed into the archive of counterinsurgency, to think about the archive as a 
productive site, as a site where we might glimpse the formation of a political subject, 
and an account of the enemy. 
 
In Search of the Enemy (ii) 
 
To free my soul I had to reject from the human race the jackals of South Africa, 
refusing to share with them the same humanity. I could destroy them with my hatred if 
I could deface them, erase the definition from their faces, so that I saw, not 
individuals, but faceless masks; it is difficult to savage human beings, one has to 
dehumanize them before exterminating them, like some people drown cats or poison 
rats, or the soldier who goes to war against the black peril, the yellow menace, the 
Communist threat.  
Bloke Modisane (1963: 77) 
 
 
Now that the enemy is increasingly out in the open, so to speak, we have to ask 
ourselves: who was an enemy of the state, how did one become and enemy of the 
state? What deontological implications follow from becoming an enemy of the State? 
And what did it mean to be an enemy of the State in South Africa in 1985? If we are 
to arrive at something of an answer with which to be able think the violence that 
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unfolded in the dark bushes of Bluewaters Bay on that night of 26 July 1985, then one 
would have to, it seems to me, confront how we think the political. 
 
In his thoughtful reflection on the question in relation to the identity of ‘Jew’ and 
‘Arab’ in European philosophical discourse, Gil Anidjar observes that the discussion 
of the enemy often elides into discussions of war, but that the enemy as an ontological 
category possesses an excess that cannot only be explained in and by the identities set 
in motion by the practices of war.145  It is perhaps Carl Schmitt who has most 
influentially (and for some, controversially) dislodged the enemy from the battlefields 
of war and located modern conceptions of the enemy as the constitutive binary that 
founds the political as community. According to Schmitt (Giorgio Agamben has 
recently developed these ideas further), the political community reserves for itself the 
right to go to war while securing the political as the domain of the normal, as the 
condition of possibility for law, and to claim a purchase on conduct through the 
juridical discourse of rights and obligations.   
 
In an essay written in 1927 Schmitt elaborated on his conception of the political as an 
autonomous domain; he described it as irreducible and not commensurate to other 
discrete conceptual taxonomies of the social. The ways in which Schmitt poses the 
question is deceptively simple: if questions of morality are defined by the distinction 
between good and evil, the economy by profit and unprofitability, and aesthetics by a 
distinction between beautiful and ugly, then what distinction would define ‘the 
                                                
145 Anidjar, G (2003) The Jew, the Arab, A History of the Enemy, New Jersey: Stanford University 
Press, pxxiii; See for example, James Aho (1994) This Thing of Darkness: Towards a Sociology of the 
Enemy, Seattle: University of Washington Press; for an example of a view of the enemy as ‘the other’, 
cf. Vilho Harle (2000) The Enemy with a Thousand Faces: The Tradition of the Other in Western 
Political Thought and History,Westport, CT: Praeger. Harle, whilst drawing on Schmitt, seems not to 




political’? Is  “there a special distinction which can serve as the simple criteria of the 
political….?” 146 
 
Schmitt distilled the answer to this question in a now familiar way: “The specific 
political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that 
between friend and enemy” (1996: 26). The enemy has an existential mode of being:  
permanent, and “something different and alien” (1996: 27). It was an instantiation of 
an antithetical identity unique to the political as such. And while the enemy is the 
‘stranger’, the enemy is not and could not be an individual.147 The enemy has a 
collective identity: It “exists only when, at the least potentially, one fighting 
collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity.” It is therefore a corporatized 
identity, neither singular nor private: “The enemy is solely the public enemy…. The 
enemy is hostis, not inimicus…” (1996: 28). While making the distinction between 
war, and politics (as the domain of the enemy), Schmitt argued that although  “[w]ar 
has its own grammar (i. e. special military-technical laws), … politics remains the 
brain. It does not have its own logic. This can only be derived from the friend-enemy 
concept….” (1996: 34).  
 
The domain of the political, defined by the friend-enemy distinction as a public 
demarcation, is the central author therefore of a range of technologies, practices, and 
conceptions of rights and obligations premised on the possibility of the norm. 
According to Schmitt,  
                                                
146 Carl Schmitt (1996) The Concept of the Political, transl. by George Schwab, Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, p26; Samuel Weber (1992) ‘Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and 
Carl Schmitt’, Diacritics, Vol. 22, No. 3/4, Commemorating Walter Benjamin; Horst Bredekamp, 
Melissa Thorson Hause, Jackson Bond (1994)  ‘From Walter Benjamin to Carl Schmitt, via Thomas 
Hobbes’, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 25, No. 2 
147 For a view of the enemy as derivative of our individualized projections, see Arthur  Gladstone’s 
(1959) essay, ‘The Conception of the Enemy’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3, No. 2 
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The state as the decisive political entity possesses an enormous power: the 
possibility of waging war and thereby publicly disposing of the lives of 
men. The jus belli148 contains such a disposition. It implies a double 
possibility: the right to demand from its own members the readiness to die 
and unhesitatingly to kill enemies…To create tranquility, security and 
order and thereby establish the normal situation is the prerequisite for 
legal norms to be valid. Every norm presupposes a normal situation…. 
Every state provides, therefore, some kind of formula for the declaration 
of an internal enemy (1996: 46). 
 
In the manuscript of one of his lectures conducted during the years 1977-1978, and 
compiled in the volume Security, Territory, Population (2007), Michel Foucault 
makes a fleeting   reference—the only one in his work—to Carl Schmitt. Foucault had 
during the course of that year been sketching the outline of his thoughts on the shift 
from disciplinary power to what he would describe as ‘biopower’, and which would 
famously lead him to the argument that the modern state is characterized by the 
‘governmentalization’ of the state.  The notion of governmentality has of course been 
widely taken up, as a way in which to understand modern rationalities of power, the 
shifts in the ‘reason of state,’ and the novel formulation of the target of modern 
power’s application: the coming into being of a ‘population.’149 The shift is captured 
in the illuminating observation that the modern state’s relationship to the sovereign 
                                                
148 jus belli  “was an area of law which dealt not just with philosophical topics of international law 
(i.e."Who has the authority to declare a just war?"), but also the practical issues of mustering and 
disciplining an army.” Cf  Richard Wolin (1990) ‘Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism, and the Total 
State’, Theory and Society, Vol. 19, No. 4  
149 For a sense of the wide ranging influence of the concept, see the edited volume by Graham Burchell 
(1991) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; see 
also Mitchell Dean (1999) Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, UK: Sage 
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power’s right over matters of life and death, shifts from ‘the right to take life to the 
right to make live.”150 
 
In a sketchy fragment from Foucault’s manuscripts of that year, which appear at the 
end of the collated volume of lectures on Security, Territory and Population, a brief 
observation on ‘politics’ is perhaps useful to bear in mind in tandem to Schmitt.   
Foucault observes, in reference perhaps to the overdetermining effects of thinking of 
governmentality as ‘a singular generality’, that there is often in this understanding, a 
conception of the political as omnipresent:  “every thing is political.” This phrase, he 
remarks, has been given two meanings: 
 Politics is defined by the whole sphere of state intervention. To say that 
everything is political amounts to saying that directly or indirectly, the 
state is everywhere. 
--Politics is defined by the omnipresence of a struggle between two 
adversaries…. This other definition is that of K. (sic) Schmitt. The theory 
of the comrade. 
In short, two formulations: everything is political by the nature of things; 
everything can be politicized, everything may become political. Politics is 
no more or no less that that which is born with resistance to 
governmentality, the first uprising, the first confrontation (2007: 390). 
                                                
150 As Foucault observes in Society Must be Defended (2003), “The presence of ‘death’ becomes the 
war- a biomedical war against the permanent presence of death, not as a moment like an epidemic, but 
permanently there, and public health is permanently at war with Death.” p244; Hindness, B (2001) 
‘The Liberal Government of Unfreedom, Alternatives, vol. 26; Mitchell Dean has elaborated on 
Foucault’s conception of Governmentality in a number of publications. Cf. Dean (2004) ‘Four Theses 
on the Powers of Life and Death’, Contretemps 5, December.  He summarises these as follows: 1. 
Right of death is ancient, but the power over life is quite new, and ‘has brought the most devastating 
consequences.’2. It is in the combination, rather than succession or addition of modern powers over 
life, with the ancient right to death, that is important. 3. The connection between the powers of life and 
death are constitutive of the ‘sacred character of the political community’; 4. Biopolitics captures life in 




In that barest slither of a fragment, Foucault distinguished between the permanent, 
existential demarcation of the political (Schmitt), and the specificity of its being 
brought into being, as possibility: ‘everything can be politicized,’ and everything 
‘may’ become political. His is the formulation of the adversarial constitution of the 
political as a potential, and a potential that is born of what he calls ‘counter-conduct’, 
the ‘resistance’ to the imperatives of governmentalization.  
 
In this formulation of politics, with resonances of Schmitt, Foucault was developing 
his conception of the political through the use of ‘war’ as a way in which to think 
about the production of a certain kind of subject, where the political was defined by 
relations of war. It was also a critique of a legal narrative that positions law as the 
opposite of violence and war.  In his lectures of 1975-1976 Foucault had reformulated 
the question of sovereignty and the political subject by reframing the relation between 
law and violence. “Law,” he observed, “is not pacification, for beneath the law, war 
continues to rage in all the mechanisms of power, even in the most regular. War is the 
motor behind institutions and order” (1997: 50). In a phrase that recalls Schmitt, 
Foucault argued for the privileging of ‘war’ as the optic through which to read the 
political: “A battlefront runs through the whole of society, continuously and 
permanently, and it is this battlefront that puts as all on one side or the other. There is 
no such thing as a neutral subject. We are all inevitably someone else’s adversary” 
(1997: 51). Foucault then suggestively encourages us to reverse Clausewitz’s in 




When we retrieve the violence against the Cradock Four from the discourse of law, it 
calls for thinking about war and the enemy shorn of its juridical aporia. It is a question 
that in turn unravels into the question of the political. It seems to me then that we 
need to think of these moments of violence in relation to questions of war and the 
political. To think about the kinds of subjects they put into play, and the kinds of 
practices authorized by a political rationality. It is then to consider the event of this 
killing from within a history of war and the South African colony, as a landscape to 
be negotiated, as a political community to be fashioned, and with friends to secure 
and enemies to defeat. And in a manner that is mindful that this violence has a 
‘worldliness’ to it, both in its colonial and Cold War articulations. In many ways, we 
are involved here in the careful negotiation of a “landscape of treason”, as Margret 
Bovery, writing about postwar Germany, evocatively described in her accounting for 
the “abysmal confusion” that arises when all boundaries of the legitimate and the 
illegitimate become “hopelessly blurred” (1961: 56). 
 
 
Everywhere is War: Partisans and the Political 
 
Addressing the State Security Council on the 18th July, President Botha declared that 
‘the brain’ behind the unrest in South Africa was now in the country, and that it had 
to be found and destroyed.  
Daniels (2009: 50). 
 
In his opening address to a Conference on National Security in Pretoria in 1978, Prof. 
Charles Nieuwoudt, warmly and enthusiastically welcomed the foreign experts to the 




We are happy to have been able to get a group of such well-known 
speakers who have prepared papers on their respective topics. Our 
overseas speakers are acknowledged experts in their respective fields. 
Prof. Erickson from Edinburgh University is a world expert on Soviet 
Military Organisation and Policy. Professor Schwartz from the Armed 
Forces in Germany is an expert on European Defence and he as recently 
begun to take an interest the South Atlantic…. Colonels Katz and Barber 
are experienced military men who have gained their insights into 
psychological warfare in various military campaigns in the US Army.151   
Prof. Niewoudt had in his midst a range of ‘experts’ who were versed in what it meant 
to protect the ‘the West,’ being themselves from the West. At this particular moment, 
the West was not foreign, nor a place in the distant faraway.  In many ways white 
South Africa thinks itself as seamlessly part of the West. And so, in the Cold War 
planning that involved Europe, North America and the NATO alliance, the South 
African state thought of itself too, as an important upholder and defender of European 
civilization’s achievements on the southern tip of Africa. This truth was reinforced 
when Ronald Reagan came to power in the United States and emphasized, with the 
help of a map, on a television broadcast that the strategic position of the South 
African sea-route, straddling the Indian and Atlantic oceans, was too important to 
concede to the Soviet Union and their communist allies.152  
                                                
151 Michael H.H Louw. Ed (1978) National Security, A Modern Approach, Papers Presented to the 
Symposium on National Security held at Pretoria, 31 March-April 1977, Pretoria: Institute for Strategic 
Studies. 
152 In an early strategy paper on the geo-political importance of the Cape sea route,  an SADF General 
had anticipated this moment: “We are like certain shares on the stock market. There was a time when 
nobody wanted us. A time will come when everybody will bid for us.”Hiemstra, R. C Gen. (1970) The 





In what ways was the Cold War translated into notions of the political as it was 
constituted in South Africa? How did Matthew Goniwe and his three comrades who 
were campaigning against a mixture of local socio-economic grievances like high 
rents, poor schooling conditions and the absence of local political representation in 
the Cradock township of Lingelihle, come to be perceived as key instances of a 
transcendental global public enemy? Framed within a political rationality defined by 
the modern expression of colonial imperatives on the one hand, and the Cold War on 
the other, they ended up, I argue, occupying that zone of ‘bare life’, where 
exceptional violence may be, and was brought to bear on them in its most brutal 
forms. 
 
In an important reflection on the Cold War and the kind of violence it authorized, the 
Pakistani political scientist Eqbal Ahmad noted the dissonance between the way in 
which occupying forces understood what and who they were at war with, and the 
animating concerns, demands and objectives of those who were waging resistance 
against occupation. Focusing on the Vietnam war, which he campaigned against 
actively, Ahmad illuminated the distinctiveness of the American approach that rested 
on a much larger mobilization of arms, troops and weaponry as the solution to the 
problems of the Cold War era. For the Americans in the early part of the war, victory 
or failure, observes Ahmad, was a “technical question”.153  
 
                                                
153 As he remarked, “It is amazing that, in a democracy, there were no serious public or parliamentary 
questioning of the consequences of an army considering another country a laboratory…. It is even 
more amazing that six years and at least four million casualties later, General Westmoreland could 
publicly declare in a civilized country that Vietnam had in fact been a valuable laboratory for testing 
new weapons and techniques…” Bengelsdorf, C. et al (2006) Eqbal Ahmad: Selected Writings, New 
York: Columbia University Press, pp48-49 
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Ahmad also discusses at length the French experience of counterinsurgency as recalls 
the history of occupation that preceded American involvement. According to Ahmad,  
French theorists were notorious for describing all ‘insurgencies’ as 
Communism. In their view, Algeria’s FLN was a puppet alternately of 
Moscow, Peking and Cairo, just as their American colleagues view the 
North Vietnam and or China…A logical extension of the conspiratorial 
theory is the belief, held with particular tenacity by counterrevolutionary 
army officers, that any revolutionary movement is inspired, directed and 
controlled from abroad…. (2006: 50-52).  
This view, which was also explained by Craig Williamson at the outset of this 
chapter, dominated South African conceptions of counterinsurgency. As I have noted 
in previous chapters, when we think the violence of South Africa in the 1980s it is 
often understood from the vantage point of two schools of thought. The first is the 
narrative of sovereignty: of the relationship between law, rights and race. It is the 
narrative that I have traced in Chapters Two and Three. It is the narrative that situates 
the violence in relation to a universal law of human rights. In this narrative politics is 
the enemy of law. Its field of application and its targets are determined by the tension 
between the universal, progressivist evolution of a civilization claim, which 
transcends time and space, and the particularity of the political, which roots itself in a 
sovereign sphere of nation tethered to state, and which denies the universal on the 
basis of race. In this narrative ‘law’ is both a ‘heritage and culture’ but must 
simultaneously belong and apply to all. Its radical and disruptive claim is to apply 
‘equally to all,’ but its agonism is that it can only do so by normalizing itself and 




The second narrative wherein we can locate this violence is in a more specific 
discourse on the ‘militarization of the state’ and the society, which dominates South 
African disciplinary knowledge in Political Science and Sociological studies on the 
question.154  It is a body of work that draws on the rights-based juridical approach I 
have described above in order to develop a critique of the re-organisation of the state 
after 1978.  In this narrative, the late apartheid state is constructed around 
ideologically derived imperatives of security, and the enemy is fantastically and 
strategically constructed around the simulated figure of  “the communist.” The 
structure of the state is understood from the vantage point of militarization and terror, 
where terrorist, revolutionary and revolutionary onslaught are both its watchwords 
and its campaign slogans.155  This critical literature on the state was produced under 
difficult conditions of political repression, with limited scholarly access to the kind of 
information that access to State archives now might make possible. That said, the 
descriptive elements of its account of the formulation of a policy focused on the idea, 
articulated most forcefully by President P. W Botha that South Africa faced with a 
                                                
154 I have cited examples of this literature in a previous chapter, but see for example, Richard Leonard’s 
(1983) South Africa at War, Craighall: A.D Donker;   or  the influential edited volume by Jacklyn Cock 
and Laurie Nathan (1989) War and Society: the Militarization of South African Society, Cape Town: 
David Philip; this latter work was produced by scholars broadly considered anti-apartheid in 
orientation. Re-reading it today I am struck by the fact that there was not a single black South African 
contributing author in the twenty four chapters in the volume. Almost every other South African study 
on militarization of the state was authored by white South African scholars too. My point is not to 
question the ethics of representation or inclusion/exclusion in this instance, but  rather to wonder about 
how the critique of state reform, understood as a problem of  ‘militarization’ might derive from  this 
historical particularity? That it springs from those who were South Africa’s  citizens rather than 
subjects, reinforces Ahmad’s observation above, that states involved in counterinsurgency are subject 
to criticism in a liberal democracy from citizens, and therefore seek to reorganize the institutions of 
state in order to make executive power more autonomous from legislative accountability. The 
reorganization of the South African state after 1978, the ascendance of the State Security Council’s 
influence, and the diminished role of the white parliament is certainly an instance of this phenomena. 
The literature on the militarization of the state by white scholars can therefore also be read as the 
critique of the state’s citizens seeking to restore the equilibrium of legislative and executive power that 
defines the liberal democratic state. The question this raises is, to what extent does this critique, which 
becomes hegemonic through the confluence of knowledge, race, power and social capital, sublimate 
the substantive forms that a possible critique from the vantage point of apartheid’s subaltern subjects 
might make? And what might be the political consequences of this sublimation of a subaltern critique 
for the postapartheid present? 
155 For a illuminating study of the discourse of terror and the Cold War as it was deployed in Argentina 
under military rule, see Feitlowitz’s The Lexicon of Terror 
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‘total onslaught’ required a ‘Total Strategy,’ are descriptively insightful and 
illuminating. At the same times, even as this literature tries to account for state 
policies reflected in Botha’s formulation, it fails to get away from normative 
understandings of the political and the state. In other words, it fails to see how 
violence is not separate but deeply entwined with the political and the state. It 
therefore locates its strength in its descriptive capacity, its observation of the 
‘militarization’ of the society, and in its critique, which takes for granted a certain 
conception of a liberal political community. In its critique it disaggregates the 
violence of the state from the juridical realm of citizenship and rights, insisting on the 
possibility of the separation between the two.   
 
There are two elements of this literature that are problematic.  The first is that it tends 
toward individualizing responsibility, embodying the actions of the state in the 
militarist genealogy of a former State President, and those who come with him from 
the SADF into the offices of civil-political power after 1978.156  This obscures the fact 
that, unlike the military dictatorships of Latin American, for example, white South 
African society went to the polls at regular intervals throughout the 1980’s, 
maintaining the ritualistic elements of parliamentary democracy. State policy was 
therefore not formulated simply at the whim of a militarized executive that enjoyed 
centralized power. It was also conditioned by perceptions of what the white voting 
public might endorse, and it was sensitive to the problem of their shifting allegiances, 
from one party to another. What the studies at the time reveal is an overwhelming 
support amongst the civilian white public for the apartheid state’s reliance on the 
                                                
156  For example, in his explanation of the ‘Total Strategy’ as a policy framework adopted by the South 
Africa state, Richard Leonard commences the chapter with a detailed account of the individual 




military and its counterinsurgency practices, rather than a worry about the effects of 
militarization that is expressed in this literature.  
 
A quick glance at aspects of the history of white voting patterns, and public opinion 
may be sufficient to register this point. White South African party politics after 1948 
was largely split along three lines:  1) A center-right position which was the 
majoritarian position held by the National Party (NP) (which only won the popular 
vote outright in 1958). 157 2) Further right were various parties that over the years 
came to represent Afrikaaner conservativism in the parliament, and which became 
stronger as the center became more reformist in the 1980’s. 3) Finally to the left were 
the various incarnations of the minority ‘liberal’ parties whose supporters were mostly 
English speaking whites. Although they had evolved out of the liberal parternalism of 
the United Party that had supported segrationist policies before 1948, by the mid 
1980s, these parties, like the Progressive Federal Parties, were explicitly opposed to 
segregation.  
 
Looking at the voting patterns in elections underscores the point that we cannot 
usefully think of the apartheid state as an institutional bureaucratic assemblage 
implementing policies widely divergent from white social and political attitudes.  I am 
mindful that it cannot be said that voting for the National Party was an explicit vote in 
support of apartheid, just as much as voting for a minority liberal party, the like the 
Progressive Federal Party (PFP) was an indication of an explicit rejection of 
apartheid.  However the trends do allow us to make associative remarks along those 
lines.  In 1976, the year of the Soweto uprisings for example, the support for the 
                                                
157 White South African electoral politics was based on a constituency-based system, which meant that 
a part could win the majority of parliamentary seats without necessarily garnering the absolute 
numerical majority  
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ruling party was at its peak, with 67% of votes going to the National Party, whilst at 
the same time support for the conservative parties, the Herstigte Nationale Party 
(HNP), and the Conservative Party (CP) also expanded.  In the general election of 
1981 the National Party took 58% of the vote, whilst the liberal Progressive Federal 
Party took 19% of the vote. In the 1987 election the National Party support declined 
to 53% but so did that of the liberal PFP (dropping to 14%,), whilst the Conservative 
Party enjoyed 27% of electoral support in that year (Van Rooyen 1994: 117-138).    
These results reveal a growth in pro-apartheid sentiment amongst white South 
Africans in the 1980’s, rather than a decline.  
 
More interestingly perhaps for our purposes, are a series of public opinion surveys 
conducted by Human Sciences Research Council  (HSRC) from the late 1970’s 
through to the late 1980s. Amongst other questions, these surveys were designed to 
track opinion about the state’s reform programme that was being implemented 
alongside the repression of the urban African revolt.  In 1984, the year before the 
killing of the Cradock Four, the survey asked  “urban white South Africans” whether 
they continued to support the “seven fundamental structures” of apartheid. These 
were defined as the “separate voters roll, the black homelands, separate public 
amenities, separate schools for whites, the Group Areas Act, the Immorality Act, and 
the Mixed Marriages Act”.  The survey results showed an average of more than 60% 
support for all the seven features of apartheid. Support for a racially segregated voters 
roll resonated most  (78.6%), with continued support for ‘Black homelands’ a close 
second  (75.7%).  When the survey results were further disaggregated between 
Afrikaans-speaking whites and English-speaking whites, it showed that 92% of 
Afrikaners supported a separate voter’s roll, and 90% supported the ‘Black 
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Homeland’ policy, whilst English-speaker’s registered 65% support for the former 
and 60% support for the latter (Hofmeyer 1990: 37).  In other words, an average of 
70% of white South Africans in 1984 still supported the idea that black South 
Africans should be denationalized!  
 
Another set of surveys conducted between 1977-1988 by the HSRC asked white 
voters annually about their attitudes toward repressive acts by the government  
(Hofmeyer 1990: 38). Given that the HSRC is a state-funded research council, and 
that it conducted much of its research on behalf of, or in relation to the research needs 
of the state, the concern with how the state was perceived is itself an indication that 
the government under P. W Botha conducted its violence mindful of its electoral 
support.  
 
In October 1977 the government had banned a number of organizations as well as a 
number of newspapers, and placed restrictions on the media. When asked their 
opinion on these repressive acts that year, 20% of the white respondents said they 
disagreed, but 68% expressed support for the governments’ actions. In 1983, when 
South African counterinsurgency forces attacked ‘terrorist’ targets in the suburbs of 
Maputo in neighbouring Mozambique, killing mainly civilians, 9% of white South 
Africans said they did not approve, 2% were undecided, but 89% said that this was 
the right thing to do.  The following year, in 1984 an unequivocal 90% of the white 
respondents said they felt that the government was handling  “terrorism” correctly, 
and in the same survey that year 80% of white South African’s said that they felt that 
the government was either under-spending or spending sufficiently on defence 
armaments.  It was only a small minority that indicated that they were worried about 
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the growing expenditure on defence. And in November of 1988, when the HSRC 
survey asked white South Africans whether the government should take stronger 
action against “the ANC and its fellow travelers” [allied organizations like the UDF], 
85% of respondents said they agreed (Hofmeyr 1998: 38).  My point in short is 
therefore that the literature on the militarization of the state obscures this wide-
ranging political and popular support amongst most white South Africans for the aims 
of apartheid, and the repressive actions the South African state was resorting to 
defend the gains of civilization on the southern-most tip of Africa.158 
 
The second weakness of this literature is that it is unable to provide a conceptual-
historical account of the ‘conspiratorial’ sensibility that it so perceptively describes. 
The conspiratorial view is unable to comprehend national liberation movements, and 
their will-to-sovereignty as other than instantiations of subversive ventriloquisms. As 
I. F. Stone observes, they are always already gazed upon from behind the 
metaphorical glass window so that what they say and mean is never really heard.  
 
In his study of counterinsurgency Eqbal Ahmad made the important observation that 
“in order to overcome the checks of parliamentary institutions and public opinion, a 
government involved in counterinsurgency seeks ways to reduce its accountability to 
representative bodies….” (2006:62). Ahmad’s study importantly draws attention to 
the specificity of counterinsurgency as a doctrine applied during the Cold War and its 
relationship to the history of colonial occupation as Europe and the United States 
found themselves entwined in the national liberation struggles in South East Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. Whilst Ahmad’s detailed account of the key elements of 
                                                
158 The ways in which popular opinion and the executive of the state come to shape each other, is 




insurgency warfare provides a rich sense of the ways in which this unfolded in 
Vietnam and Algeria in particular, he too was less forthcoming on the genealogy of its 
conceptual and historical foundations. Can we write a history of concepts and the 
political rationality that underlie counterinsurgency without reducing its apparatuses 
and effects to militarization?  
 
Total War: The Partisan as the Paradigmatic Figure of the Political 
 
They must declare their opponents to be totally criminal and inhuman, to be a total 
non-value. Otherwise, they are nothing more than criminals and brutes. The logic of 
value and non-value reaches its full destructive consequence, and creates ever newer, 
and ever deeper discriminations, criminalisations and devaluations, until all non-
valuable life has been destroyed  
Carl Schmitt (2007: 94). 
 
 
In 1962, Carl Schmitt was invited to present two lectures in Pamplona in Spain.159  
While Schmitt urged that these lectures be read as an ‘intermediate commentary on 
the Concept of the Political,’ they provide us with a useful set of philosophical 
reflections on the forms of war that military strategists in the post World War II world 
began to speak of as wars of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Furthermore, they 
enable us to comprehend these specific forms of violence as parts of a normative 
conception of the political. I have read Schmitt’s reflections as a diagnostic rather 
than a prescriptive theory of enmity, since it is this question that concerns Schmitt 
most: the distinctive existential forms that enmity takes as part of the foundational 
                                                
159 These have been published as ‘The Theory of the Partisan’ (2007) New York: Telos. According to 
Jan-Werner Muller, Schmitt’s engagement with the question of the partisan emerged in dialogue with 
the German journalist Rolf Schroers who had authored a monograph on the question as a contribution 
to political anthropology. Published two years prior to Schmitt’s essays, Schroers prefaces his own 
work by acknowledging the influence of Schmitt in the formation of his argument. Cf. Werner-Muller, 
J (2003) A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought, New Haven: Yale 
University Press; cf Schmitt (2007), p18 fn. 25 
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violence of modernity.160 And that distinctive form of this violence, suggests Schmitt, 
can be found in the figure of the partisan, and in particular in the post WWII world, in 
the concrete figure of ‘the guerilla.’  
 
There are four key elements that constitute the character of the modern partisan:  
irregularity, mobility, intensity of political commitment, and a telluric (or territorial) 
attachment. In the first instance, argues Schmitt, the partisan fights ‘irregularly’ (and 
not by the laws of war codified between European states at the Congress of Vienna). 
161 Secondly, the partisan is not constrained by the bureaucratic cumbersomeness of 
the rules that weigh down the movements of a regular army and makes it sluggish. 
Thirdly, the partisan is distinguished from the criminal by a commitment to political 
community – a public rather than private gain animates it. And lastly, the partisan’s 
telluric commitment grounds the partisan in space – the partisan defends or seeks to 
claim territory.  
 
 In his historical genealogy, it is the Spanish guerilla war of 1808 against the ‘first 
modern regular army’—that of Napoleon— that marks the partisan as a figure that 
comes up against the novelty of a regular conscript army (2007: 4). Shortly thereafter 
in 1809, an attempt is made to emulate this model in the Austro-Hungarian resistance 
                                                
160 Those who accuse Schmitt of pessimistic realism, might note that Schmitt ends the lectures by 
making a hopeful argument for the recovery of politics from the technicism of liberalism. He argues for 
the recognition of the political against the depoliticizating effect of the assertion of international legal 
values as a nomos of the earth. The non-recognition of the political, he argues, creates the conditions 
for absolute enemies to arise [we could say like the generic universal ‘enemies invoked the 
contemporary political discourse of the ‘war on terror’, with its universal protagonists:  ‘enemies of 
freedom’, enemies of democracy, enemies of human rights,  or enemies of civilization’].  He argues 
that the way out of this cycle maybe to recognize the concrete forms of real enmity since it is the 
“denial of real enmity that paves the way for the destructive work of absolute enmity”. It is at this 
point, he suggests that the “theory of the partisan flows into the question of the concept of the political, 
into the question of the real enemy and of a new nomos of the earth.”, pp94-95 
161 cf Gunther Rothenberg (2004) ‘The Age of Napoleon’, in Michael Howard, et al. (1994) The Laws 
of War, Constraints on Warfare in the Western World, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp86-97 
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to Napoleon. As a restorative reaction, the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) 
establishes, amongst other agreements, a set of rules of war that distinguish between 
conditions of war and peace, combatants and non-combatants and the enemy and the 
criminal. It also codified who could legitimately wage war. Wars were to be fought 
between states, through regular armies and between sovereign bearers of ‘the right to 
war,’ jus belli.162  In this context, up until, and during the WWII the regular fighter 
was normalized as the fighter who conducted war between legitimate sovereign 
entities, in a regularized and accepted organization form, organized along and in 
identified and regularized national armies.  
 
The figure of the partisan was, in this context, both a marginal and an illegitimate 
figure of war. This way of conducting war is referred to by Schmitt as ‘bracketed’, 
since it is supposed to be contained within a set of legal prescriptions:  
Fundamentally, war remains bracketed and the partisan stands outside of 
this bracketing. The fact that he now stands outside this bracketing now 
becomes a matter of his essence and his existence. The modern partisan 
expects neither law nor mercy from the enemy. He has moved away from 
the conventional enmity of controlled and bracketed war, and into the 
realm of another, real enmity, which intensifies, through terror and 
counter-terror until it ends in extermination (2007: 11). 
 
But Schmitt argues that whilst the partisan was rendered an illegitimate figure in the 
waging of war in Europe—which should now only happen between sovereign states, 
the partisan as the object of study, and it forms of war, remained a matter to be 
                                                
162 Zamoyski, Adam (2007). Rites of Peace; the Fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna. New 
York: Harper Collins 
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theorized and practiced by Europe in its colonial wars: “Colonial war still remains 
within the purview of the military science of European nations such as England, 
France, and Spain.”163  It is after 1927 that partisan warfare becomes widely invoked 
as a mode of conducting warfare, starting with the Chinese resistance to Japanese 
occupation between 1932-1945. During WWII, Russia, Poland, the Balkans, France, 
Albania, Greece were sites of partisan warfare. And after WWII, argues Schmitt, 
there is its spectacular practice by Ho Chi-minh in Vietnam and in the theorization of 
the practice by General Vo Nguyen Giap, based on lessons learnt while resisting the 
French colonial army.  
 
This trajectory of practice continued in Malaya, Philippines, Algeria and in the Cuban 
revolution, given theoretical form again by Che Guevara. A lesson, notes Schmitt, 
that comes to repeat itself amongst those who find themselves on one side of the war 
against the partisans, is the very order that Napoleon issues to General Lefevre on 
September 12 1813, that “fighting the partisan anywhere, one must fight like the 
partisan” (2007: 13).164 
 
                                                
163 ibid. For example, in colonial Africa the British campaign against the Mahdist mobilization in 
Sudan led by Muhammad Ahmad in the late 19th century comes to mind; one of the three key lessons 
of this experience for the British, argues Mamdani, is that native resistance could not simply be 
“extinguished by force but would have to be co-opted through strategy.” Mamdani, M (2009) Saviours 
and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror, Cape Town: HSRC Press, p153; as a form of 
pedagogical knowledge about the partisan in the colonial encounter,  T. E Lawrence’s (1991)Seven 
Pillars of Wisdom: A Victory, also comes to mind. Written in 1922, it has found new relevance as a key 
text being studied by the United States military in the ‘War on Terror’. The journalist Alisdair Soussi 
reported recently that it   “has found a modern role as part of the American tactics in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. For example, U.S. General David Petraeus recently devised a counterinsurgency doctrine, 
drawing on the writings of Lawrence. At the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, Lawrence is even on the syllabus.” 
http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/3563.cfm accessed 10 October 2010;  
Schmitt does note that the Russian army remained concerned, in Europe with partisan war as it fought 
‘the Asiatic mountain peoples’.  
164 This insight is articulated in Hans von Dach’s famous (1958) manual for the Swiss Army, Total 
War: Everyman’s Guide to Guerilla Warfare, New York: Paladin Press. Schmitt also refers to this text 
(2007: 13).  
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Schmitt’s critique of liberalism draws insight from his argument that precisely 
because the partisan exists outside of law, and is the instantiation of the exception, it 
cannot be normalized within law. The partisan, and those who fight the partisan just 
‘like the partisan fights’, disrupt the normative and evolutionist claims of international 
law, since the partisan smudges the lines between legal and illegal. According to 
Schmitt,  “As regards contemporary partisans, the antithetical pairs of the regular-
irregular and the legal-illegal usually become blurred and interchangeable” (2007: 
16).165 The partisan could therefore be thought of, argued Schmitt, as a paradigmatic 
‘political’ figure: it fights for the life of the community, unconstrained by military 
bureaucracy, and the partisan stands for the exception that can never be normalized 
precisely because of the existential gravitas of the struggle:  “All this teaches that a 
normative regulation of the problem of the partisan is juridically impossible, unless 
one wants to risk juridical formulations that do not catch the concrete status of affairs 
and remain mired in generic and contingent value-judgments” (2007: 35). 
Dislodging the partisan and the friend/ enemy distinction from the abstract realm of 
legal and normalizing values, and transferring it to the concreteness of an adversarial 
existence, Schmitt returns us to the question of the realm of the properly political and 
thus makes politics itself possible. Schmitt makes an additional distinction that is 
crucial for a reading of the kinds of violence that the Cold War puts into play, and the 
pedagogy of counterinsurgency:  a distinction between the real enemy and the 
absolute enemy. Marking as a turning point Lenin’s theorization of the role of the 
partisan in the revolutionary struggle for international socialism, Schmitt argues that 
Lenin grasps the totalizing nature of the partisan as a political figure in the first 
instance. In Schmitt’s words,  
                                                
165 Schmitt argues that these tend to be thought of as “compromise norms”, the “narrow bridge over the 
abyss,” Schmitt (2007) Theory of the Partisan, p32 
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What Lenin was able to learn from Clausewitz, and what he learned 
painstakingly, was not only the famous formula of war as the continuation 
of politics. It was further recognition that the distinction between friend 
and enemy in the age of revolution is primary, and that it determines war 
as well as politics (2007: 51).  
 
Lenin’s grasp of the partisan’s strategic importance for the revolutionary movement 
and his emphasis on the fusion of the partisan and the political, shifts our 
understanding from that of the real enemy to that of the absolute enemy. “It is 
possible”, argues Schmitt, to derive from a study of Lenin’s notes, “a new theory of 
absolute war and absolute enmity that has determined the age of revolutionary war 
and the methods of modern cold war” (2007: 51). Whereas the partisan had been a 
military tactic in its previous incarnations, for example in the Spanish resistance to 
Napoleon’s army, the partisan in Lenin’s articulation, fights a “war of absolute enmity 
which knows no bracketing.” The absolute concrete enemy that Lenin identifies is the 
class enemy, the figure of the bourgeois, and of class struggle who now fights an 
irregular war against the “whole political and social order.” In this tactical shift, the 
“language and conceptual world of bracketed war and prescribed enmity no longer 
were any match for absolute enmity.” The absolute enemy is therefore a total enemy 
against which one fights a total war, which requires the existential negation of the 
enemy.    
 
Schmitt argues later that the greatest contemporary theoretician of this form of war 
was Mao Tse Tung. Mao elaborated on the matter in Problems of Strategy in Guerilla 
War in Japan. Written in 1938, this tract was based on reflections of the defeat of 
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Cheng Kai-shek, the Japanese and the Kuomintang.166 In the formulation of the 
challenge, Mao, argues Schmitt, was able to find the strategic point between the 
universal—the absolute global enemy lacking territorial space—and the concrete 
forms of enmity with a telluric dimension: “racial enmity against the white, colonial 
exploiter; class enmity against the capitalist bourgeoisie; national enmity against the 
Japanese intruder….” (2007: 59). In this historical genealogy of both a practice and an 
accumulation of knowledge as pedagogy, Schmitt traces its movement from Russia to 
China and its spread as a form of the political in its anti-colonial and anti-imperialist 
articulations. It is also, in a mirroring effect, the form of a pedagogical knowledge that 
becomes known as ‘counterinsurgency’—i.e. the waging of war against the partisan 
through the methods used by partisan, if we are to heed Napoleons’ advice. It is in 
South East Asia, and in North Africa that European military strategists, particularly 
through the French encounter with insurgencies in ‘Indo-China’, return to Europe 
with some ominous and important lessons. Schmitt notes, “From their experiences, 
they (the Europeans) developed a doctrine of psychological, subversive, and 
insurrectional warfare,” which produced a voluminous literature of expertise.167   
 
It is no wonder then that besides the Americans, who could offer fresh lessons from 
Vietnam, and the British who were involved in Malaya and Rhodesia, it was the 
French theorists of counterinsurgency—with a long history of partisan warfare in Asia 
and Africa168 who were most influential as the  South African government formulated 
                                                
166 Schmitt (2007) Theory of the Partisan, pp53-54; Cf. Mao Tse Tung (1965) Selected Works of Mao 
Tse Tung, vol. II, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, pp 79-112 
167 ibid, pp61-62; Schmitt cites examples of this literature, which I refer to but have not read since I am 
not proficient in French: Raymond Aron (1962) Paix et Guerre entre les Nations, Paris: Callman Levy; 
Luis Garcia Arias (1959) Etudes des Phenomenes de la Guerre pyschologique des Ecole Militaire 
d’Administration de Montpellier, Paris: Arthuad 
168 This experience, and its effects, was the subject of Gillo Pontecorvo’s remarkably vivid 1965 film, 
the Battle of Algiers. cf. Edward Said (2000) "The Quest for Gillo Pontecorvo". Reflections on Exile 
and Other Essays. Harvard University Press, pp. 282–292 
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its own counterinsurgency strategy in the 1970’s and 1980’s. It is from this 
pedagogical encounter that a “Total Onslaught” was conceived, and a “Total 
Strategy” formulated.  Such a strategy required redistribution of state powers and a 
refashioning of the relationship between various institutions of state since the partisan 
and the war of the partisans could not be normalized within the juridical order. If the 
partisan was to be normalized and juridically circumscribed, a rupture in the juridical 




Bringing War Home 
The territory of the Republic of South Africa was declared an operational area for the 
South African Defence Force 
General Magnus Malan 169 
 
In the South African Defence Force’s (SADF) second submission to the TRC, it 
described how the rapidly altering political conditions on the African continent 
affected its thinking about ‘security’ in the late 1960s.  ‘Winds of change’ were 
sweeping across Africa; Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia, led by a postcolonial 
leadership sympathetic to the sovereign claims of liberation movements in South 
Africa, gained independence. It was at this time that the strategic experts of the SADF 
decided that it was necessary to initiate a study programme of ‘revolutionary 
warfare’170.  
                                                
169 “Statement of General Magnus Malan to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission”, 
7 Apri1997,www.doj.gov.za/trc/pr/1997/p970430a.htm; McCarthy, S (1993) ‘The Relationship 
between the Academic Community and the Intelligence Communities in a Post Apartheid South 
Africa’, South African Defence Review, No. 13 
 
170 South African Defence Force Nodal Point (1996b) Additional Submission with regard to the Former 




This programme of study was divided into two streams. The first was theoretical; it 
consisted of a reading programme of key theorists of war and counterinsurgency. The 
second was more specific and took up case studies of countries whose experience 
could be drawn upon.171 The military strategists read the works of von Clausewitz, as 
well as counterinsurgency strategists J.J McCuen,172 Robert Thompson173 and the 
French army’s General Andre Beaufre,174 the latter a veteran of the French anti-
colonial war in Algeria. They also read the works of Che Guevara and Mao Tse Tung 
to understand the strategy and tactics of guerilla war from the vantage point of its 
advocates. The case studies looked closely at insurgences in Malaysia and Kenya 
(focusing on the suppression of the Mau Mau revolt), which were read as success 
stories, and Algeria, China and Vietnam, which were read as failures,  for lessons 
about strategic errors to avoid.175 
 
In the SADF the figure most associated with formulating this policy at the time was 
Lt. General C. A. ‘Pops’ Fraser. During his time in France as a military attaché in the 
                                                                                                                                      
Force Nodal Point (1996a) SA Defence Force Involvement in the Internal Security Situation in the 
Republic of South Africa, Cape Town: Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; The 
articulation of South Africa’s position in relation to the Southern Hemisphere more broadly can be 
found in the papers presented to a 1973 symposium, ‘Suid Afrika en die Suidelike Halfrond’ [South 
Africa and the Southern Hemisphere], held at Potchefstroom University, and hosted by the Center for 
International Politics. Sentrum vir Internationale Politiek (1973) Suid Afrika en die Suiderlike 
Halfrond: Referate Gelewer by die Geleentheid van die Sesde Simposium oor the Internasionale 
Politiek 25 Augustus 1972, Pretoria: SIP 
171 Visser, D (2002) ‘The South African Military Academy’s Educational Offerings and the National 
Threat Perceptions’, South African Historical Journal, no. 46 
172 McCuen, J. J (1966) The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: the Strategy of Counterinsurgency, 
London: Faber and and Faber 
173 Thompson, R (1996) Defeating Communist Insurgency: the Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, New 
York: Praeger 
174 Beaufre, A (1963) An Introduction to Strategy, London: Faber and Faber 
175 Visser, D (2002) ‘The South African Military Academy’s Educational Offerings and the National 
Threat Perceptions’ South African Historical Journal, no. 46  
Visser, W (1994) The Production of the Literature on the ‘Red Peril’ and Total Onslaught in Twentieth 
Century South Africa; Walker, W Gen. (1978) The Bear at the Back Door: The Soviet Threat to the 
West’s Lifeline in Africa, Sandton: Valiant Publishers  
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early 1960’s Fraser met Beaufre. He was soon converted to Beaufre views of the 
West’s problems and how they could be countered. Beaufre was then the Director of 
the French Institute for Security Studies. Fraser returned to South Africa and brought 
Beaufre’s lessons with him. In 1965 Fraser became the Chief of the Army, and in that 
role formulated his own reflections on the challenges of security, titled Lessons 
Drawn from Past Revolutionary Wars (1966).176  In the preface Fraser thanks Beaufre 
for the wisdom of his ideas.  
 
It is said that one of Fraser’s most enthusiastic South African students in the Army 
was P.W Botha, who would later become the Minister of Defence, Prime Minister, 
and then State President during the 1980’s.177  As I have pointed out, in the literature 
on the militarization of the South African state in the late 1970’s, it is the figure of 
P.W Botha that stares out at one, with his sternly wagging finger. He was after all the 
singular authorial figure who inscribed the Cold War binary into state the logic of the 
state and defined the state’s friends and enemies during this period. South Africa, 
Botha quickly declared upon ascendancy to executive power, would play an active 
role in ‘a global struggle against the forces of communism.’178  
 
I don’t want to simply reinforce Botha’s role in formulation of state policy of the 
time, but I want to emphasize that Botha did not just conjure notions such as Total 
War and a Total Strategy in solipsistic isolation. Rather these terms of battle pertain to 
the conceptual and historical position of the partisan in the realm of the political. They 
                                                
176 Fraser, A.C (1966) Lessons from Past Revolutionary Wars, Pretoria: Dept. of Defence 
177 Daniel, John (2009) “Racism, the Cold War and South Africa’s Regional  
Security Strategy 1948–1990,” in Sue Onslow (ed.) Cold War in Southern  
Africa: white power, black liberation. London: Routledge, p. 38 
178 SADF (1996a) p4 
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come into being through the extraterritoriality of the enemy conceived of in absolute 
terms: the enemy is everywhere, and therefore must be fought everywhere. 
 
With Botha’s appointment as the Chief of the Army, Fraser’s, and via him Beaufre’s, 
ideas were widely circulated in the SADF.  New courses on counterinsurgency 
training were introduced and Beaufre’s An Introduction to Strategy (1963) became 
compulsory reading material in the new curriculum.179 Beaufre’s ideas were also 
presented in a series of lectures held in 1968 at the SADF Headquarters by two 
academics, Prof. Deon Fourie and Benjamin Cockram. General Magnus Malan, who 
became Botha’s ally, Minister of Defence and the head of the SADF, also attended 
these lectures. Between 1968-1974 Beaufre himself met Fraser on a number of 
occasions, one of these being when P. W Botha hosted him in South Africa as a guest 
lecturer at the War College.180  
 
A key effect of this engagement with counterinsurgency theorists was South Africa’s 
shift to a pre-emptive, regionally outward strategy of direct and proxy engagements in 
the region. This involved deployments of South African police units to northern 
Namibia in July 1966 to counter the South West African Peoples Organisation’s 
(SWAPO) influence there as SWAPO had decided to send armed cadres into Namibia 
to wage guerilla warfare. It also involved sending South African police units into 
Southern Rhodesia to fight against Zimbabwean liberation movement forces that were 
                                                
179 Vale, P & Baines, G eds. (2008) Beyond the Border: New Perspectives on Southern Africa’s Late 
Cold War Conflicts, Pretoria: Unisa Press; Visser, D (2002) ‘The South African Military Academy’s 
Educational Offerings and the National Threat Perceptions.’  Venter, A. J (1969) The Terror Fighters: 
A Profile of Guerilla Warfare in Southern Africa , Cape Town: Purnell; Venter, H (1981) Terrorisme, 
Pretoria: HAUM;Woodward, C (1983) Understanding Revolution in South Africa, Cape Town: Juta 
and Co.  
180 Chris Alden (1996) Apartheid’s Last Stand: the Rise and fall of the South African Security State, 
London: Macmillan, pp44-45 
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being assisted by detachments of ANC guerillas during the Wankie and Sepolilo 
campaigns.181 And it also resulted in the South African police’s offer of support to the 
Portuguese armed forces in their war with guerillas of the Angolan and Mozambican 
liberation movements.182 
 
By the mid-1970’s, there was a proliferation of publications and university, policy 
and ‘security studies’ conferences that were being organized in South Africa with or 
in conjunction with the South African Defence Force.183  Very soon all South African 
                                                
181  ANC guerillas, aligned in Zimbabwe to ZAPU, were part of what was known as the Luthuli 
attachment, led by Chris Hani, who later became the Chief of Staff of Umkhonto we Sizwe, and General 
Secretary of the South African Communist Party.  Charismatic and revered by many, Hani was 
considered the second most popular ANC figure (after Mandela) upon his return from exile. He was 
assassinated in 1993 while the political negotiations were underway. Those arrested for the 
assassination, a Polish immigrant with strong anti-communist views, working with a white right wing 
political figure and his wife, are currently serving life-term prison sentences.   For a journalistic 
biography, see Janet Smith and Beurdegard Tromp (2009) Hani: A Life to Short, Cape Town: Jonathan 
Ball 
182 SADF 1996a, p6. This is also the period where counterinsurgency as a mode of fighting proxy wars 
became regularized as a practice. In his biography, the former head of the SADF Special Forces Unit, 
Colonel Jan Breytenbach (the brother of the poet and former anti-apartheid political prisoner Breyten 
Breytenbach), describes how Prime Minister John Vorster asked him to train a force of about 100 men 
as a potential contra-style unit, to destabilize the Zambian presidency of Kenneth Kaunda, who was 
accommodating the ANC in Lusaka. This was happening at the same time that Vorster was advocating 
‘détente’ with neighbouring states in an effort to split the growing regional postcolonial opposition to 
apartheid, and cultivate friendly diplomatic relations with Malawi and the Ivory Coast in particular.  Cf 
Jan Breytenbach (1997) Eden’s Exiles: One Soldiers Fight for Paradise, Cape Town: Quilliere; In 
1979 Brigadier Cornelius van Niekerk was appointed to head up the Department of Military 
Intelligence’s Directorate of Special Tasks (DST), which was mandated to support the Mozambican 
National Resistance (RENAMO), and UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, in Angola, as proxy forces.   
Hanlon, J (1988) Beggar Thy Neighbour, London: James Currey; Minter, W (19940 Apartheid’s 
Contras: An inquiry into the Roots of war in Angola and Mozambique, London: Zed Books 
183 Parallel to this was the popular literature that circulated and apocalyptic literature that warned of the 
evil perils of communism and the Russian agenda for global dominance. Much of this literature 
emanated from various Church-related groupings both in South Africa and in the United States and 
Europe. For example, Pike, H (1985) A History of Communism in South Africa, Germiston: Christian 
Mission International of South Africa; Stallard Foundation (1986) The Accelerating Revolution in 
South Africa, A top priority report for all South Africans, Cape Town: Postma Publications; Greig, I & 
Soref, H (1965) The Puppeteers: An examination of those organizations and bodies concerned with the 
Eliminination of the White Man in Africa, London: Tandem Books; Grim, F (1974) The Attempted 
Rape of South Africa, Kempton Park: Heart Publishers; Greig, I (1977) The Communist Challenge to 
Africa, Pretoria: South African Freedom Foundation, F (1975) Revolution by Stealth, Monument Park: 
Association for the Preservation of Moral Norms in South Africa; I have collected a number of  
examples of this material in charity book shops over the last few years, particularly those run by the 
Cape Flats Distress Association (CAFDA), which raises money for its charity work through funds 
raised from its two second-hand book stores,   in the white suburbs of Claremont and Sea Point. Their 
wide ranging stock derives from donations from private citizens. These fragments of private libraries 
that entered into the second-hand market from the mid-90’s onwards, gives one an anecdotal but 
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war colleges and training programmes were offering courses in the theories and 
practices of counter-revolutionary warfare, and universities were offering 
postgraduate courses in security and strategic studies.184 
 
As Craig Williamson described the framing paradigm of this education to the TRC: 
.... The central tenet of all we learned was that the Soviet Union was 
central to our security problems…that the co-existence of the Soviet 
Union and imperialist states was unthinkable. One or other must triumph 
in the end. And before that end comes, a series of frightful collisions 
between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.185  
 
The ‘carnation revolution’ on April 24 1974 in Portugal had profound effects on the 
Southern African region. The overthrow of the fascist Salazar regime by a faction of 
the Portuguese army led to the end of the counterinsurgency wars in its colonies, and 
to the independence of Mozambique and Angola. From the vantage point of 
insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Southern African region, there were two 
immediate implications: For the liberation movements in Southern Africa, and their 
respective armed wings, it meant increased prospects that ANC (Umkhonto we Sizwe), 
SWAPO (Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia), ZANLA  (Zimbabwean African 
National Liberation Army) and ZAPU (Zimbabwean Peoples Revolutionary Army) 
guerillas would encounter less hostility in countries with governments that were now 
sympathetic to them.  For the counter-insurgents, the South African government, and 
                                                                                                                                      
illuminating glimpse into how some white South Africans were making the political conflict and 
resistance to apartheid underway in the country, legible and intelligible.  
184 Daniel, J (2009) p40 
185 Wiliamson, C (1997), p2; Dept. of Defence archive reports elaborate this view: HVS/201/1 Oorsig 
van die Onkonvensionele Bedreiging teen die RSA   1969-10-31; HS OPS/303/5 Totale Nasionale 
Strategie Direktiewe wat van toepassing is op die onder houde met die weermaglede, 16/17 Oct 1978 / 
10-16-1978 to 10-17-1978. 
  
202 
the government of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia in particular, it meant that the 
cherished ‘buffer zone’, or ‘cordon sanitaire’, as it was known in strategic security 
thinking, had just been erased. As Peter Vale was to note at the time, the cordon 
sanitaire provided the South African government with “the cushioning effect of the 
presence of colonial governments in South Africa until 1975…seen from the outside, 
this cordon sanitaire enhanced the stability of the white-minority regimes and, by 
extrapolation magnified the stability of South Africa itself.”186 
 
What was ominous from the South African government’s standpoint was the 
ascendancy of movements such as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA), the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) to state power in 
Angola and Mozambique respectively. Both the movements had explicit Marxist 
ideological orientations as well as Soviet backing.187 These events were also 
significant in the larger Cold War battle that was taking place since the end of the 
World War II. 188 They were a sign that anticolonial nationalist political aspirations 
and movements had become subsumed in complex ways within the larger strategic 
visions of the nuclear superpowers and within the polarized world of the ‘East’ v/s 
‘West’ dichotomy between the Soviet Union and the United States. Transformed into 
absolute enemies, local movements were viewed as proxies – allies or enemies—and 
the use of proxy forces became a pattern of conducting a very hot Cold War, most 
markedly at the time in South East Asia. As is well known, this war was further 
                                                
186 Peter Vale (1984) ‘The Botha Doctrine’, in South African Research Services, ed. South African 
Review 2, Johannesburg: Raven Press, p191. 
187 Shubin (2009) presents a fascinating historical account based on the declassified archives of official 
state documents of the period is Piero Gliejeses  (2002) Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, 
and Africa, 1959-1976, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press. 
188 In the case of Ian Smith’s regime in Southern Rhodesia, there was also the prospect of Chinese 
involvement since the ZIPRA guerillas were backed by China. The Chinese government also supported 
the training of the cadres of the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA), the armed wing of the other 
major South African nationalist movement in exile, the Pan African Congress (PAC).  
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escalated after Reagan’s accession to power, and the cultivation of Islamist 
movements as counter-insurgent proxies in Afghanistan in particular. During this 
period, as Mahmood Mamdani argues, the ‘center of gravity of the Cold War had 
shifted to Southern Africa’.  
 
Within the South African state, the 1974 coup in Portugal gave impetus to those who 
were advocating a far more interventionist and pre-emptive form of 
counterinsurgency based on the insights derived from their French counterparts, and 
at the urging of sections of the US State Department.189 Up until then Prime Minister 
Vorster had utilized the South African Police as the institution through which to 
conduct the counterinsurgency war under the direction of his long-standing political 
confidant, Hendrick van den Bergh, who had created the Bureau of State Security 
(BOSS).190 In October of 1974, swayed by Botha’s argument that the events in 
Angola and Mozambique be located within the logic of the Cold War, and accepting 
the increasingly shared doxa in security thinking about the importance of 
counterinsurgency as strategy,191 Vorster authorized Botha to actively support the 
Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA).192 
                                                
189  A declassified report acknowledged that, “The US has been heavily involved in the current civil 
war in Angola. The CIA informed the Committee that since January 1975 it had expended over $31 
million in military hardware, transportation and costs and cash payments…. The beneficiaries of US 
aid are two of the three contesting factions, the National Front for the Independence of Angola (FNLA) 
and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)….” Extracts from the 
Presidentially Censored House Report on the CIA, January 19 1976’, in A El-Khawas, M. A  & Cohen, 
B (1976) National Security Study Memorandum 39: The Secret Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, 
Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Company, p183.  
190 The complex relationship between Vorster and Van Den Bergh, and the conspiratorial and illegal 
actions of BOSS has been fictionalized in a novel by a former security police officer, Alan D. Elsdon 
(2009) The Tall Assassin: The Darkest Political Murders of the Old South Africa, Johannesburg: 
Umuzi.  
191 For example, D.O.D n.d Die Bedreiging teen die RSA met die spesifieke verwysing na Sowjet 
beplanning en die rol wat die SA en die kommunistiese party van Suid Afrika speel. 
192Ibid; Deon Geldenhuys (1984) The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, 




The intervention in Angola also came at the urging of the US Secretary of State, 
Henry Kissinger, and was encouraged by the CIA, after the power sharing ‘Alvor 
Agreement’, between the major parties in Angola, had failed to hold. It took dramatic 
proportions when a secret full scale troop incursion to install UNITA, by the South 
African Defence Force, was approved by Vorster in August 1975. This move had 
however been opposed as unstrategic by Van Den Bergh and BOSS.193  The invasion 
of Angola, virtually unknown in South Africa itself, lasted eight months, and was 
terminated only when it became public and potentially embarrassing to the United 
States government. In an interview with a journalist in 2000, P. W Botha described 
the objectives of ‘Operation Savannah’ and the reasons for its official termination: 
The CIA had an informal agreement with us that the US would mine the 
harbour of Luanda and we would take Luanda with the help of 
Savimbi…Viljoen [Chief of the SADF, Gen. Constand Viljoen], and Col. 
Jan Breytenbach made use of certain parts of the army with the help of the 
Air Force to clear the southeastern parts of Angola from communist 
infiltration… at the very last moment, when our troops were near Luanda, 
I received a phone call from our Ambassador in the US telling me that the 
US Congress had laid restrictions on President Ford194 not to assist 
Angola and we decided to withdraw.  
                                                
193 Annette Seegers (1996) The Military and the Making of Modern South Africa, London: IB Tauris, 
p210 
194 Botha was referring here to Executive Order 11905, signed into law by Gerald Ford in February 
1976. The Order came in the wake of two congressional commissions into covert operations, and was 
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the need for greater use of proxy forces, and the cultivation of groupings in the strategic interests of the 
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As Schirmer relates it, later in the interview, Botha recalled that when he next met 
Kissinger some time thereafter in Pretoria in 1976, Kissinger acknowledged to Botha, 
‘I owe you an apology,’ to which Botha replied ‘yes, you do, you left me in the 
lurch’”. 195 
 
Beside the realization that its weapons needed major upgrading, there were two 
crucial and portentous lessons the SADF learnt in the Angolan invasion and the fall-
out from it: Its leadership realized that it needed to work more systematically through 
proxy forces rather than take the risk of sending its own conventional ground troops 
into action. This was both politically risky, as well as proving to be a cumbersome 
enterprise and increased their visibility and detection, creating greater possibilities for 
public scandal.196 It decided that the use of small counterinsurgency units, which 
could operate with great mobility and discretion, would be crucial in its ‘battle with 
communism’ in the Southern African region.  
 
It was the SADF’s moment of turning more systematically to ‘fighting the partisan 
like the partisan fights’, and led to the formation two key counterinsurgency units. 
                                                                                                                                      
US, such as the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, and UNITA in Angola, and the Contra’s in Nicaragua, 
revealed in the details of the Iran-Contra scandal. Cf. Chalmers Johnson’s (2004) Blowback, Second 
Edition: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, USA: Holt Paperbacks, p288. 
195 Schirmer, Jennifer (2000) Transcript of an interview with P.W Botha,  
Wilderness, 15 September.  
196 The secret nature of the incursion meant that the regular troops that were used were forbidden from 
communicating their whereabouts or their activities to their families or friends at the time.  Those that 
suffered injury or death were accounted for through non-specific or fictitious narratives issued by the 
SADF. Talked about as ‘going to the Border’, the memoir as a genre through which to narrate the 
individual autobiographical experiences of former white army conscripts who partook in these and 
other military operations of the SADF,  has become prolific activity: Holt, C (2004) At They Call We 
did not Falter: A Frontline Account of the 1988 Angolan War, as seen through the eyes of a 
conscripted soldier, Cape Town: Zebra Press; Piet Nortje (2003) 32 Battalion: The Inside Story of 
South Africa’s Elite Fighting Unit, Johannesburg: Zebra; Gear, S (2002) Wishing Us Away; Challenges 




The first unit was created under the command of the SADF, named the Special 
Battalion 32 (the so-called Buffalo Unit), which integrated about 1800 Portuguese-
speaking former members of the FNLA with SADF commanding officers. This unit at 
its peak numbered around 9000 personnel, including mercenaries from Britain, 
America, Australia and Portugal. Under its founding Commander, Lt. Col. Jan 
Breytenbach, its first major sphere of operation was in South West Africa. The 32 
Battalion operated alongside a companion unit, the 31 Battalion, or ‘Bushman 
Battalion,’ made up of San trackers, who were often recruited to the unit through 
coercion. 197 Its reputation became legendary in security circles, and it was considered 
a considerable achievement to be conscripted to become a member of 32 Battalion.  
 
The second unit put into operation was the South West African Police- Counter 
Insurgency Unit, SWAPOL-COIN, or ‘Koevoet’ [Crowbar], as it is more popularly 
known. Formed in 1978, Koevoet was formed under Colonel Hans Dreyer, who later 
became a Major General in the South African Police. It modeled itself on the 
Rhodesian Selous Scouts, and many of its recruits had gained battle experience in 
Southern Rhodesia. They were now also trained in the theories and practices of 
counterinsurgency that had become the focus of South African security strategy.  At 
its peak the unit numbered just over a thousand members, with about 300 white South 
African officers, and the remainder recruited from local Ovambo communities, many 
of whom were highly skilled trackers. Koevoet’s ability to track Swapo guerillas on 
foot became a hallmark of the unit’s capabilities.198  
 
                                                
197 SADF (1996b), p8; DOD: MI/STRAT/ 1/4 Die Terrorisbedreiging teen die RSA en SWA- Huidige 
stand en verwagte uitbreiding Sep 74- Sep 74. 
198 Peter Stiff (2000) The Covert War: Koevoet Operations in Namibia 1979-1989, Galago Publishing 
Pty Ltd, 2000. Turner, John W. (1998). Continent Ablaze: The Insurgency Wars in Africa 1960 to the 
Present. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, pp 127-168 
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The way these two units are memorialized by those who fought in them is revealing 
of the kind of violence that was normalized and rewarded. The first account I quote 
below, is from a newspaper report of an ‘All for Nothing Reunion Party’ held just 
outside Cape Town in 2000, organized by former members of the unit. I retrieved this 
report from a website dedicated to the history, achievements, and fate of Koevoet, 
regularly updated by a group of its former members. The report of the reunion recalls 
practices of the unit that the regular rules of modern conventional warfare might 
consider inappropriate (like ‘cutting off opponents’ ears’), and is not entirely 
flattering in that sense. The article is however displayed on the website without 
critical commentary that might deem it a misrepresentation of what happened. In fact 
it is part of a section that describes the “proud history” of the unit. The second 
account I quote immediately thereafter, is by a former member of the SADF’s 32 
Battalion, Piet Nortje, who has written an entirely hagiographic account of his fellow 
‘Buffalo Soldiers.’  
In her report of the Koevoet reunion of 2000, the journalist Emsie Ferreira describes 
the evening, not without a certain amount of irony and pathos: 
South Africa's former Koevoet (Crowbar) fighters gathered near Cape 
Town recently to reminisce about their glory days as the apartheid 
regime's most efficient killers of terrorists and to help each other cope 
with being outcasts now.  The specialised police unit sometimes 
celebrated by slashing off the ears off its victims and stringing them into 
necklaces. Officers used to drag bodies behind their vehicles to instill 
fear. ‘We did good work. We were described by many an international 
journalist as the best anti-terrorist unit in the world,’ Brigadier Isak van 
der Merwe, the former second-in-command of Koevoet, told AFP as 180 
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of his men holed up at a holiday resort near the rural town of Paarl outside 
Cape Town last weekend. Koevoet earned its reputation killing members 
of the South West African People's Organisation (Swapo) in neighbouring 
South West Africa before that territory became independent as Namibia in 
1989. The unit numbered only 300 South Africans, backed by co-opted 
native Namibians, but managed to kill more than 10 times as many 
members of Swapo. The statistics are proudly emblazoned on the labels of 
wine bottles emptied at the reunion -- 3861 Swapo were killed compared 
with 153 Koevoet members who died in action.199 
Now let us immediately turn to the effusive account of the South African Defence 
Force’s counterinsurgency unit, 32 Battalion by Piet Nortje: 
 
Every war as at least one—a unit so different, so daring that it becomes 
the stuff of which legends are made and heroes are born. Amongst the 
South African forces fighting in Angola from 1975 to 1989, that unit was 
32 Battalion. Founded in the utmost secrecy from the vanquished 
remnants of a foreign rebel movement, undefeated in 12 years of front-
line battle, feared by enemies that included both conventional Cuban 
armies and Nambian guerilla fighters, the Buffalo Soldiers became the 
South African army’s [sic] best combat unit since World War II, with no 
few than 13 members winning the highest decoration for bravery under 
fire…a consistently high kill ratio had become a trade mark of the unit, 
and the troops were justifiably proud of the skills they had acquired…. 
 
                                                
199 http://koevoet.webklik.nl/page/the-story accessed October 2 2010 
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It is not without poignant if not tragic significance that the exceptional violence 
narrated and celebrated above, formulated in the discourse of the partisan, and 
commemorated by those who pioneered South Africa’s foray into counterinsurgency, 
originated as a practice in South West Africa/Namibia. There is after all already a 
terrible story of exceptional violence that resides in that region, which precedes the 
more contemporary South African story.  Administered as a German colony from 
1884, the territory of South West Africa was the site of the first genocide of the 20th 
century: the extermination of the Herero and Nama peoples between 1904-1907.200 As 
a precursor, it was also the place of the pioneering of a total form of war in the region, 
at the massacre of Hoornkop in 1893.  
 
The leading Nazi figure, Herman Goring’s father had been the first German governor 
of the South West African territory, but was transferred to Haiti when he failed to 
bring the region’s ethnic groupings and clans under German control and ‘protection.’ 
Goring was replaced in 1889 by Curt von Francois, who had been working as a 
mercenary in the Belgian Congo, where he had earned a reputation for ruthlessness in 
dealing with ‘the natives,’ on behalf of the Belgian colonial army. Although 
instructed by the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck to avoid open conflict with 
the locals, von Francois set about his mandate with the sensibility he had learnt in the 
                                                
200 In a recent study of this genocide, Olusoga and Erichsen argue that in a prelude to the larger 
genocide, in 1905 on Shark Island, a small island off the coast of the town Luderitz off the South West 
African coast, the ‘death camp’ as a form of military apparatus was invented when in an experiment 
three thousand five hundred Africans “were systematically liquidated” by German colonial 
administrators. To this day, according to accounts from divers, “Shark Island is surrounded by a ring of 
human bones and rusted steel manacles. The human beings who were made to wear those chains and 
whose remains like beneath the waves have been almost erased from Namibian and world-history…. 
The Herero, Witbooi Nama, Bethannie Nama—mean nothing to most people outside of Namibia”.  
Olusoga, David and Erichsen, Casper W. (2010). The Kaiser's Holocaust. Germany's Forgotten 
Genocide and the Colonial Roots of Nazism. UK: Faber and Faber, p11 also Lindqvist, S (1997) 
"Exterminate All the Brutes": One Man's Odyssey into the Heart of Darkness and the Origins of 




service of King Leopold. It was he who is said to have invoked the violence of the 
partisan against the largest clan of the Nama, led by the now legendary figure of 
Hendrik Witbooi, a local Nama clan leader who had consistently refused to sign a 
treaty subjecting his clan to control of German colonial administration.  
 
In the darkness of night, on the 12th April 1893, von Francois set off with a small 
party of soldiers for the mountain valley of Hoornkop, where Hendrik Witbooi and 
his followers were camped just 100km’s outside of Windhoek. Von Francois had 
come to the conclusion that Witbooi could not be outsmarted diplomatically, nor 
could he defeat his clan in regular open battle, since Witbooi’s soldiers outnumbered 
the colonial forces, were skilled horsemen, and experts in their agile ability to traverse 
the harsh landscape.  It was then that Von Francois decided “to surround the tribe as 
they slept and exterminate them.”   
 
Hendrik Witbooi and his men were camped apart from the main camp of the clan 
when Von Francois’s soldiers were given the order to open fire. They witnessed with 
shock and astonishment across the valley as the soldiers first fired, then strafed the 
survivors with bayonets and set fire to tents with the occupants inside.  It was not that 
the Witbooi clan was going to be at war with Von Francis that was surprising.  After 
some months of threats, Hendrik Witbooi had anticipated a war, and had encamped to 
the mountains for tactical reasons to prepare for it.  He had also separated the men 
from the women, in anticipation that if there was to be a battle, it would unfold in the 
‘regular way’201 between the armed men on both sides, sparing the women and 
                                                
201 Although at war with the German state as a colonial occupier, Witbooi was known to treat only the 
German colonial army as the enemy, and not German travelers, traders or farmers, whom he would 
give assurances of safety to as they traveled through land under his control. This further deprived von 
Francis of a pretext to go to war against the Witbooi  Nama. As one German farmer described his 
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children. What shocked Witbooi and his men, besides the surprise nature of the attack 
that left them scrambling and unable to respond adequately, was that the women and 
children in the camp were deliberately targeted.  
 
This set the Hoornkop massacre apart as unprecedented as a form of colonial violence 
in the region, and marked a turning point for the German colonial state. A little less 
than a century later just as this was to be the place of, this region also became the site 
of a turning point in the South African state’s practices of war. It was here that South 
Africa’s first counterinsurgency units were given free reign to practice violence 
without the constraints of law. This region on the west coast of Southern Africa also 
contained the only deep water port in the region, at Walvis Bay. The port was 
annexed by the British in 1878 and became part of the Union of South Africa in 1910.  
In the aftermath of the Hoornkop massacre, Hendrik Witbooi, educated in missionary 
schools, and considering himself a Christian, petitioned the support of the British 
magistrate at Walvis Bay in a letter, in which he implored Magistrate John Cleverly to 
relay the message to European powers, with the hope that they would, after the Berlin 
Conference, call the German government to account for their actions. Witbooi wrote,  
Please let these miserable and frightful events be quickly known to all the 
great people in England and Germany. I cannot think that such a war as 
the Germans have now made is done by such a mighty and civilized 
people—is it a straight forward or usual way of making war? 
 
                                                                                                                                      
experience, in the aftermath of the Hoornkop massacre: “Witbooi new full well that we were Germans 
with whom he was at war and that he might have captured the 500 oxen without a shot being fired; but 
we, for our part, knew just as well that Hendrik would keep his word whatever happened, and we were 
not disappointed.” Olusoga, David and Erichsen, Casper W. (2010). The Kaiser's Holocaust. 
Germany's Forgotten Genocide and the Colonial Roots of Nazism. UK: Faber and Faber, p77 
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Cleverly’s response captured well the distinction Schmitt made about the disjuncture 
between the regular forms of war that had come to characterize Europe and the 
contrast with the manner in which colonial wars were conducted: “I cannot 
understand” Cleverly remarked in his letter to Witbooi a few days later,  “how there 
could have been a killing of women and children such as you tell me of. European 
nations do not make war in that way.”202 
 
 
After World War I, the entire region was put under the administration of the League 
of Nations and declared a mandate territory, with South Africa responsible for 
administration. The Mandate was to be transferred to the United Nations after 1945, 
but the South African government objected and refused to relinquish administrative 
control, despite a number of international resolutions calling for its handover. In some 
moments, South African government’s actions were also condoned by international 
legal rulings.203  Nevertheless the government did not proclaim South West Africa an 
official province of the Republic of South Africa. The territory was left in a legally 
indeterminate zone, subject to South African administrative fiat, but without access to 
its legal codes.  
 
                                                
202 The quotes in this section are from Olusoga, David and Erichsen, Casper W. (2010). The Kaiser's 
Holocaust. Germany's Forgotten Genocide and the Colonial Roots of Nazism. UK: Faber and Faber, pp 
64-65, 76 
203 In 1950 the matter was brought to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)  for the first time. The ICJ 
ruled that South Africa was not obligated to hand over the territory to the UN, but had to fulfill its 
mandate obligations set out by the League of Nations in 1915. In 1960 the governments of Ethiopia and 
Liberia brought the case formally to the ICJ again, arguing that South Africa was not fulfilling its 
mandate obligations. The ICJ dismissed the case on the grounds that Ethiopia and Liberia were not 
eligible parties to bring the matter to the court. Cf. Elizabeth Landis (1964)  ‘South West Africa in the 
International Court of Justice’, African Affairs, vo. 11. No. 4; United Nations Security Council 
Resolution No. 435 (1978) was the last major resolution, establishing the grounds for a ceasefire 
agreement and UN administered elections under a transitional UN peace keeping force, which South 




It was therefore the ‘ideal’ political space, partly resembling a zone of bare life, where 
the South African government could allow its newly formed counterinsurgency units, 
first 32 Battalion and later Koevoet, to act with impunity against ‘terrorists,’ without 
having to worry too much about scandal, or about national or international law. The 
territory was, as the government claimed, within the scope of its policing mandate 
even though this was in violation of certain aspects of its international legal 
obligations.  South West Africa/ Namibia was also beyond the purview of South 
Africa’s white citizens, and officially reports of what was happening there were 
severely circumscribed. These nonetheless circulated as stories about ‘the border’ 
akin to the narratives that Vietnam War veterans told about their experiences. From 
1977 onwards, all white males over the age of 17 had to perform regular annual 
period of military duty in addition to the two-year period of conscription as adults. 
This meant that white males had periodic forays into ‘the bush’ or the ‘the border’ and 
then returned to their ‘normal’ lives, where they were not supposed to speak about the 
kinds of experiences in these zones of exception which they were often party or 
witness to.204 
 
In September 1978 P.W Botha replaced John Vorster as South Africa’s Prime 
Minister. Botha quickly disbanded the Bureau of State Security, and elevated his 
fellow enthusiast of the French counterinsurgency theorist Beaufre, General Magnus 
                                                
204 Patricia Hayes and Ian Liebenberg have recently compiled a visual archive of this period (2010) 
Bush of Ghosts: Photographs of daily life and combat, on both sides of the South African Defence 
Force bush war in the 1970s against Swapo and Cuban forces in Angola, Johannesburg: Umuzi Press 
and Karen Batley has compiled a volume of poetry written by former soldiers of the SADF who fought 
on ‘the border’, in Angola,  (2007) A Secret Burden, Memories of the Border War by South African 
Soldiers who fought in it, Cape Town: Jonathan Ball;  a mixture of poetry and short prose pieces, all 
the contributors to this volume speak of  doubt, regret and trauma, and the bewilderment of having 
fought for a patriotic cause that they might not have shared an investment in;  this is in stark contrast to 
another proliferating form of memorialization of these experiences,  the celebratory recollections born 
of solidarity, and which are increasingly to be found in the form of web communities, which are also 
often critical of the political settlement, and the postapartheid government. Eg. www.32battalion.net/  
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Malan, to the position of Chief of the SADF. Malan was tasked with formulating the 
1979 White Paper on Defence.205 As part of its production, two conferences were 
organized: the first at Fort Klapperkop in Pretoria, and the second at the naval base of 
Simonstown in Cape Town. The Fort Klapperkop meeting started with an 
acknowledgement of two strategic challenges that faced South Africa. The first was 
the likelihood that the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia would be unable to continue 
much longer. The second was the implications for South Africa of the ANC’s study 
tour of Vietnam, led by its President, Oliver Tambo. During this visit the ANC 
delegates met with a number of leading South Vietnamese military strategists, among 
them the famed General Vo Nguyen Giap, and the delegates gathered at Fort 
Klapperkop were worried about lessons they would have learnt there for conducting 
an armed insurgency in the country.  
 
The retired former US marine, Colonel William Barber, in his address to the meeting, 
articulated a view we are now very familiar with, and did so by framing the challenge 
for the delegates present as that of one that was shared amongst friends against a 
mutual enemy. He said,  
In support of wars of national liberation, the Soviets instigate, assist and 
encourage acts of terrorism…The Soviets and their partners have become 
very skilled at the export of terrorism…Your experience in Angola, and 
ours in Vietnam, provide recent examples of this aspect, and also 
                                                
205 DOD: SF/504/1/15 Jan 1979 Defence White Paper; HSP/ Dapa/ 504/1/1 16 Jan 1979 Defence White 
Paper; HS OPS/ 518/20/2 13 Nov 1978 Witskrif oor verdiging; LMH/ 518/20/2 19 December 1978 
White Paper on Defence; C Army/D Plan/ 518/20/2 4 Jan 1979 Defence White Paper; VSH/518/20/2  5 
Jan 1979 White Paper on Defence 1979; GG/518/20/2 9 Jan 1979 Defence White Paper 1979 
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demonstrate the difficulties and frustrations in countering Marxist 
sponsored wars of liberation.206 
 
In 1977 P.W Botha had also been active in formulating the precursor to the 1979 
White Paper.207  Therein he argued that the Soviet Union was orchestrating 
revolutions in the Southern African region and that South Africa was facing a ‘Total 
Onslaught’. To counter the Total Onslaught, Botha argued for a similarly all 
encompassing response, a ‘Total Strategy.’ Botha drew on two central insights that 
Beaufre had developed in his manual on counterinsurgency planning. Firstly, that 
only 20 percent of a counter-revolutionary strategy should be rely on military 
planning, and secondly that 80 percent would have to based on ‘political elements,’ 
and that this would take the form of a process of political reforms.208 These ideas 
were incorporated into the 1979 White Paper, and given an institutional form, the 
National Security Management System (NSMS: see Figure A below). The plan 
envisaged moving the State Security Council to the center stage of executive decision 
making, unlike its marginalized role where it had only met once after its formation in 
1972 during the Vorster years. The State Security Council comprised of high ranking 
military officers, police and intelligence, and a small group of Cabinet members—the 
State President, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice and Police.  The 
State Security for the second time in 1979, and then at “least 20 times per annum for 
the next ten years.”209  
 
                                                
206 Colonel William Barber (1977) ‘National Security Policy’, in Louw, H. H (1977) National Security: 
A Modern Approach- papers presented at the symposium on National Security, Pretoria: University of 
Pretoria, p50 
207 Republic of South Africa (1977) White Paper on Defence and Armaments, Pretoria: Government 
Printers 
208 ibid, p7 






Figure A: Structure of the National Security Management System (NSMS).  





The State Security Council was supposed to be a committee of the Cabinet, which 
would make recommendations to Cabinet. However it became clear that the powers 
on paper were exceeded by its influence in practice; between 1979-1988 the cabinet 
never overrode a ‘recommendation’ of the SSC. The SSC quickly grew into a network 
that expanded across the country, with its own secretariat, thirteen inter-departmental 
committees and eleven regional management committees with nearly 500 district and 
local committees.210 The global context by the end of the 1970’s, particularly the 
election of Margaret Thatcher in the UK, and Ronald Reagan in the USA, provided an 
ideological consensus that favoured the counterinsurgency planning which was 
unfolding in Southern Africa.211 This consensus provided the green light for a more 
pre-emptive military strategy on the part of the Botha led government, with bolder 
forays into the Southern African region by its security personnel.   
 
In Craig Williamson’s account of the period, he recalls that the political leadership at 
this point told the counterinsurgency agents ‘to take the gloves off.’ McCuen’s 
manual on the Art of Counterrevolutionary Warfare, by then the established textbook 
in the military, advocated the use of a ‘fight fire with fire’ approach, by using the 
methods and tactics of guerilla warfare against the guerillas.212 The object was to 
assert South Africa’s political, military and economic dominance in the region, and to 
destroy the liberation movements wherever they may be. The period took a heavy toll 
                                                
210 ibid 
211 For a discursive study of Reagan’s penchant to view the world in the binary of good versus evil, see 
Rogin, M (1987) Ronald Reagan The Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology, California: 
University of California Press 
212 Che Guevara, in his thoughts on guerilla warfare, made a distinction between ‘terror’ and guerilla 
warfare, advocating the latter, but criticising the former.  Guevara argued that guerilla fighters need the 
active support of the population if they were to swim  ‘like fish in water’. Terror would only alienate 
the population from the guerilla.  Che Guevara (2005) Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, 
New York: Ocean Press. This distinction between the tactics of guerilla warfare and ‘terror’ seemed 
however not to be heeded by those practicing counterinsurgency. 
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on South Africa’s neighbouring states.213 By 1985, the counterinsurgency strategy 
was in its fulcrum. The South African government had now armed, and cultivated 
relationships with local surrogate groups in Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and 
Zambia. It had organized specific units within the security forces who could cross 
borders and carry out political assassinations, abductions and torture. It was actively 
targeting the infrastructure, the personnel, and the facilities of the liberation 
movements. These attacks on neighboring states eventually forced President Samora 
Machel from Mozambique to sign a non-aggression pact, the Nkomati Accord, which 
meant that the ANC could no longer operate military access routes through 
Mozambique enroute to South Africa. All neighbouring states, except Botswana and 
Zimbabwe, had signed non-aggression pacts with the Pretoria government by 1986. 
 
Conclusion 
In previous chapters, I have discussed the legal narrative of culpability and recorded 
the immediate events surrounding the death of the Cradock Four as police officers 
accused of the Cradock Four’s murder recounted them to the TRC. In that discussion I 
also described how Mathew Goniwe and others were considered enemies of the state. 
This put them on the radar of both surveillance and the state’s counterinsurgency 
agencies. In the previous section I have also established the context within which the 
South African state turned to counterinsurgency, to address a ‘total war,’ and 
established its early counterinsurgency agencies in the military and the police. These 
agencies in turn participated in acts of exceptional violence across the borders of the 
                                                
213 An empirical of assessment of the violence, translated as direct lives lost, indirect mortality, and 
economic and infrastructural damage to the Southern African region, can be found in Phyllis Johnson 
and David Martin’s (1989) Apartheid Terrorism, the Report on the Devastation of the Frontline States 
for the Common Wealth Committee of Foreign Ministers, London: James Currey; Minter, W (1994) 




country. It was there that questions of legality and illegality were set aside as the 
political rationale of friends and enemies was forcefully revealed as the  calculus of 
political being.  
 
The key members of that group of seven police officers who applied for amnesty for 
killing the Cradock Four had, we must bear in mind, learnt their theory and cultivated 
their practice of counterinsurgency as members of Koevoet in South West Africa. 
They were transferred in the mid-1980s to internal counterinsurgency units or to 
regional security branches where they were tasked with eliminating the ‘enemy’ 
inside the country as part of the counterinsurgency offensive, which was now also 
turning inward. Johan van Zyl told the amnesty committee that he had acquired 
combat experience in the former Rhodesia, Namibia, Mozambique and Angola. He 
was transferred to Port Elizabeth from the Koevoet unit in Ovamboland in early 1985.  
Another amnesty applicant in the case, the former Koevoet officer Major Eric Winter, 
was also transferred to the Eastern Cape at that time and, based on his success in 
South West Africa, was promoted to commander of the Security Police in Cradock. 
Eugene De Kock, who had played a support role in the Cradock killings, in his 
capacity as the commander of the internal counterinsurgency South African Police 
unit C1 better known as Vlakplaas, was a founding member of Koevoet in 1978. By 
the time he left South West Africa in 1983 to take up command of the C1 unit, De 
Kock commanded his own unit of soldiers within Koevoet, that according to his own 
claims, “boasted the highest kill rate of all the Koevoet units.”214    
 
                                                
214 Eugene de Kock (1998) A Long Nights Damage, Working for the Apartheid State, Johannesburg: 
Contra, p87; In private ceremonies, De Kock was awarded medals of honour by the Minister of Police, 
Louis Le Grange for his ‘achievements’ in Koevoet, as well as for his role in the bombing of the ANC 
offices in London in 1983. 
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I conclude this chapter by summarizing the relationship between the political and law, 
as Eugene De Kock articulated it. In his words,  
To us in the security forces it became clear from very early on that the 
suppression of resistance would not be possible in terms of the existing 
legislation. We were forced to rely more and more on acts of terror… I 
knew that [President] P.W Botha had used his powers to protect soldiers 
against prosecution. This also served to reinforce our belief that we could 
operate above the law and could ‘take out’ enemies of the state without 
risking punishment (1998: 98). 
 
De Kock, like the others, had learnt in Namibia that the regularity of being was to be 
secured through the war of the partisan, the war of the irregular. It was a political 
rationality that they had not invented. Its genealogy preceded the police officers who 
devised the plan to kill Matthew Goniwe and his comrades. It was one element of the 
answer to the natives revolt, a technique for the instillation of a proper degree of 
terror that was part of a pedagogy of counterinsurgency that had accumulated over 
time, forged in Congo, the experiments of Shark Island, the mountains of Hoornkop, 
the desert of the Namib, the Frontier Wars in the Eastern Cape, and the bushveld of 
Southern Rhodesia. It was a technology of violence, but its rationality was to be found 












Apartheid’s Predicament:  
The Native as Insurgent 
 
 
[I]f our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as the black people 
are concerned, there will not be one black man with South African 
citizenship…[e]very black man in South Africa will eventually be 
accommodated in some independent new state in this honorable way and 
there will no longer be a moral obligation on this Parliament to 
accommodate these people politically.215 Dr. Connie Mulder, Minister of 





 Mathew Goniwe and his comrades , within the pedagogy of counter-insurgency, had 
become enemies of the state. They were also political subjects that occupied a zone of 
existence that troubled the coming into being of apartheid. They were  apartheid’s 
urban subjects,  a form of the political subject that apartheid would seek, in its most 
ambitious moments,  to erase as a category of being. Tracing the transformation of  
the figure of the urban African, and the urban revolt,  into the absolute enemy,  
requires that we locate the genealogy of this figure within apartheid’s discursive and 
institutional violence: the merger of territoriality and political identity in the course  
of the late 19th and  20th century.   
 
An understanding of apartheid’s wrong after the TRC, as a question of human rights 
violations, which we have discussed in a previous chapter, displaced the hegemony 
                                                
215 Connie Mulder, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development House of Assembly Debates 
(1978) vol.72, 7 February, col. 579 
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that had been occupied for a number of decades by the so-called  ‘Race -Class’ debate 
as the conceptual grounds for the critique of apartheid. The Race-Class debate was 
another displacement, I have  argued , of  the anxiety that is central to apartheid  as a  
form of colonial governmentality, and the questions of  citizenship, subjection and 
violence that attend this anxiety.216 The violence of the partisan then—of insurgency 




In a pioneering revisionist Marxist critique of liberal South African historiography, 
the former treason trialist and exiled scholar Harold Wolpe opened his study with an 
observation on the relationship between race and ethnicity in South Africa:  
 The social definition of groups in South Africa is imposed and 
maintained in all the spheres of the social formation and is embedded in 
the legal, political ideological and economic institutional order. Given this 
conception, no distinction is made between ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ for the 
purposes of this book, except where this may be required by the context. 
217  
 
 Combining the dominant sociological debates at that time on the articulation of 
modes of production, supplemented by  historical archival material, Wolpe argued 
that the Bantustan system of ethnicized homelands were created  as a reserve system 
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for the supply of cheap labour to the mining industry,  and therefore reflected the 
dominant interests of mining capital.  
 
The distinction that  Wolpe erased between race and ethnicity was some  years later to 
be the very distinction that Mahmood Mamdani described as the central feature of the 
colonial logic of apartheid rule:  it's  distinction between racial citizens and ethnic 
subjects (1996). It was this bifurcation between racial citizen and ethnic subject, 
argued Mamdani, that made apartheid a form of colonial rule, and therefore not 
exceptional to the African and colonial experience.  
 
In a recent study of an earlier act of colonial violence in the Eastern Cape-- the 
mutilation and beheading of the Xhosa king Hintsa, by British colonial forces  in 
1835— the historian Premesh Lalu  has asked pertinent questions about  the 
nationalist narrations of violence in the post-apartheid present.218 Revisiting the 
dominance in South African historiography of the debate  about Race and Class, Lalu 
notes that in the early settler liberal historiography on South Africa, ‘[c]olonialism 
appears as an absent cause in the later development of capitalist relations of 
exchange, extraction and production. In South Africa, the history of colonialism as a 
specific technology of power, as opposed to the basis of a later economic 
development, was perhaps prematurely terminated ...”219  The disarticulation of race 
and colonialism, and its articulation to the processes of capital accumulation, defined 
the problem with 'apartheid' as racial-capitalism.  “In some respects” notes Lalu,   
the critique of the forms of capitalist accumulation has obscured- and 
perhaps rendered inconsequential- the critique of colonialism as a 
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condition of power in its own right. In South African historiography, the 
critique of colonialism assumed a secondary status, as a form of 
articulation of colonial hegemony generally surrendered to the larger 
conclusions of a racially defined system of capitalist accumulation. 220  
 
This epistemic gesture also has the effect of removing certain social processes and 
political rationalities from scholarly as well as ethical-political scrutiny.  Framed 
within the “problem-space” of domination and resistance, its articulation of an 
emancipatory  project derived from a critique of  the totalizing narrative of  capital 
accumulation, the author of  modern World History. In other words, the critique of 
apartheid became the critique of the universalized, and absolute class enemy; 
apartheid was the secondary manifestation of the extractive rationality of capital 
accumulation. 
 
More generally,  Africa’s place in World History is of course a question with a long 
genealogy of dispute. It was Herodotus who is said to have alluded to the geography 
of monstrosity. And Hegel who dismissed the possibility of History in Africa: ‘At this 
point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the World; 
it has no movement or development to exhibit’ (Hegel, 1991, p99). Africa was 
therefore not constituted as an agent of historical change, nor a place considered the 
source of knowledge that would be considered Historical.  Africa, in its semiotic 
form, is a sign which makes various appearances and disappearances in the story of 
‘world-history’. The conception of ‘South Africa’, as it appears in this narrative, also 
undergoes various transformations. One is the conceptual-historical dislocation of 
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South Africa from the African narrative of colonialism, and its insertion into a 
Eurocentric narrative of capitalism.   
 
Walter Mignolo  (2002) argues that in the postcolonial period, in countries which 
experienced forms of colonial rule,  
the colonial difference was not considered in its epistemic dimension. The 
foundation of knowledge that was and still is offered by the history of 
Western civilization in its complex and wide range of possibilities, 
provided a conceptualization (from the right and the left) and remained 
within the language frame of modernity and Western civilization 
(Mignolo, 2002, p64).  
 
 The question for Mignolo is partly an existential one that derives from the philosophy 
of Being and Time, in its Eurocentric formulation, and the different relationship of 
Being and Place, which marks the colonial emergence of subjectivity as different: 
‘coloniality of being cannot be a continuation of the former…but must be, rather, a 
relocation of the thinking and a critical awareness of the geopolitics of knowledge 
production’ (2002, pp66-67).  
 
 
Similarly, in his reflections on postcolonial  African historiography,  the  Congolese 
historian, Jacques Depelchin (2005)  addressed the specificity of the colonial 
experience through the use of the concept of ‘silences’. These operate at multiple 
levels from the somatic to the epistemic to the mundane: ‘the things left unsaid’. 
African history, he argues, has been configured between the syndromes of ‘discovery’ 
and ‘abolition’. On the one hand, the possibility of an African history is denied, and 
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on the other hand when an African ‘history’ is discovered, those who take 
responsibility are like the abolitionists who take responsibility for the ending of the 
slave trade: they silence the victims in the discussion of justice. The insertion of 
Africa into the world-system, argues Depelchin,  should be approached with caution if 
we are to write African history out of the narratives it has been determined by:  ‘The 
adoption of the model is so complete that it overwhelms from the start  the specificity 
of African history as compared to European history’ (Depelchin, 2005, p93).  
 
I have flagged briefly the contention about the nature of apartheid’s wrong in the 
Race-Class debate because I wish to bring to the fore the discursive erasure in that 
debate of an aspect of apartheid’s biography: its colonial genealogy. It is in the 
colonial genealogy of apartheid that a certain kind of political subject – the urban or 
‘detribalized native’- is produced which ultimately becomes a significant cause of 
anxiety for the apartheid state. The claims that would emanate from this subject—the 
claims for citizenship—  could not be recognized without bringing apartheid itself  to 
its eventual institutional crisis and termination.  The revolt of the urban African 
subject then was the revolt of the concrete enemy of apartheid, translated within the 
pedagogy of counter-insurgency into the figure of absolute enemy. 
 
Squeezing the Native out of the Urban   
 
On the 17th March 1985, with the assistance of the Eastern Cape Advice Office of the 
Black Sash,  two men made an impassioned plea to the  Minister of Co-operation and 
Development.  Writing on behalf of the resettled Glenmore community who were 
relocated from South Africa to the ‘independent’  homeland of the Ciskei, Mr. Botlani 
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and Mr. Peters  implored the Minister to allow the community to return to South 
Africa.  The tone of the letter was polite, but it described vividly their anguish as they 
struggled to adjust to life under the Native Authority’s coercive powers, including the 
punishments they were suffering under customary law, for having ‘Westernised’ 
ways:221 
We are requesting a place to live because we are not happy here….We are 
not happy here because of the things that are being done to us…Please 
take us out of this hole; we are burning…The township people were 
pushed around at gun-point by the Ciskei police. We were made to pay 
R30. 00 fines for having table knives and forks.  We sleep on our knees 
for we have no rights like people in other places…The South African 
government does not want us. We are a people without citizenship and 
without rights. 
 
The most striking forms of injustice suffered by the victims of apartheid occur well 
before the 1960 cut-off date of the TRC and are forms of injustice that emerge from 
the colonial genealogy of apartheid: its attempts to legalize and stratify citizenship, to 
spatially re-order race, ethnicity and territory, setting off mass dislocations, terror and 
violence on a scale that accounts to millions of victims. As Mamdani observed,  
 
[w]hat gave apartheid its particularly cruel twist was its attempt to 
artificially deurbanize a growing urban African population. This required 
the introduction of administratively driven justice and fused power in 
African townships; the experience can be summarized in two words, 
                                                
221 Rhodes University Cory Library, MS 18 848/21 ‘Botlani and Peter to Minister of Co-operation and 
Development 17 March 1985’ 
  
228 
forced removals, which must chill a black South African spine even 
today.222  
 
 One of the most pernicious and consequential legal tenets of modern apartheid 
before1960 was  enshrined in the Native Land Act of 1913. The Native (Black) Land 
Act  circumscribed  African legal  ownership of land initially to seven percent,  later 
extended to thirteen percent of the country223. It was to be accompanied in 1923 by 
the  Native (Black) Urban Areas Act. Both pieces of legislation were designed to 
enact on a national scale a technology of rule already implemented in pockets in the 
provinces. As South Africa shifted from a collection of territorially administered 
colonial units, to a Union (1910) and later a Republic (1961) these practices were 
homogenized. The Glen Grey Act (1894)  for example, in Natal, drew on the legacy 
of indirect rule that had been pioneered by British Imperial rule in other parts of the 
world.  The Native Land Act would have the aim of removing millions of ‘native’ 
South Africans from the urban realm to the rural where they would be subjects of 
customary law. It marked the shift, as Partha Chatterjee argues in relation to the 1857 
Indian mutiny, from the civilizational claims of  Empire to the pragmatics of the ‘rule 
of colonial difference’.224 From now on, the ‘native’ would not be an object of 
assimiliation, but rather embedded in a permanence of  ‘otherness’. 
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Indirect Rule and the Creation of the Bantu 
 
In 1964 Govan Mbeki, the Eastern Cape intellectual,  political prisoner and senior 
ANC leader, set out the challenge for the South African state with remarkable clarity:  
The problem was plain—apartheid had to find a new way to administer 
Africans, because the pressure for more rights was growing too strong a 
challenge…The traditional system in South Africa had been one of direct 
rule: White government officials sat over Chiefs. Everyone knew that the 
Commissioner was the boss. Yet now the White government official has 
become too visible and accessible a target for anti-government action. 
The need was clearly to devise a system under which the Africans 
appeared to be managing their own affairs. This, too, of course, was 
nothing new. Indirect rule had been carefully evolved by Lord Lugard for 
the British colonies in Africa; Nigeria and the former Gold Coast had 
been governed this way, but the Nationalists had taught their followers to 
regard British policy as their constant and implacable enemy, so that the 
British system of indirect rule cold not be directly copied.  
 
The Nationalists’, Mbeki went on to note, 
 
 ‘set to work to evolve a variation. It turned out to be a hybrid of direct and 
indirect rule. It was given the grand name of self-development’. The ‘Native 
Commissioner’ was now “rechristened a Bantu Commissioner, in vogue with 
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the term ‘Bantu’, which the Nationalists insisted should replace the more 
compromising word ‘Native’.225 
 
Mbeki noted two important points:  firstly, that the formulation of apartheid was not 
peculiar to South Africa, but had a pedigree in colonial practice elsewhere in the 
colonial and African world; secondly, he was mindful too that it had a specific 
iteration-- it had to be reformulated in relation to the specific historical conditions, 
taking on the historical burdens and tensions within settler colonialism in South 
Africa.  That apartheid was an iteration of indirect rule, was as I pointed out in the 




 It was a shift that left a segment of the native population in a dire state of anxiety:  
the early beneficiaries of civilizational benevolence, schooled in Missionary promises 
of ‘equality for all civilized men’, given the franchise in the Cape based on meeting 
civilizational claims, and eager to enhance their claim to the status of civilized men 
among men on the stage of world history. This segment of the African population felt 
with foreboding anxiety the promises made to them were quickly disappearing, and 
that their  modernist futures shaped in opposition to rural ‘backwardness’,  was at 
stake. They were  in a state of ‘betwixt and between’ but without the movement of 
liminality (Von Gennep226) They had invested their futures in the  self-fashioning of 
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civilized men and were now confronted with the violence of the rule of colonial 
difference.  
 
This anxiety is evident in the writings of one the most eloquent African intellectual 
and political figures of the period, Solomon (Sol) T. Plaatjie (1876-1932), particularly 
in his most well known collection of essays on the condition of native life227. In 
current nationalist discourse, Plaatjie and his generation have become subsumed in 
the pantheon of African nationalism’s patriarchs228, yet his writings prefigure the  
sovereign claims of anti-colonial nationalism. What we find is a petition to belonging- 
the quest to become a citizen of the Empire. This moment is an important one, I will 
suggest, because it marks the breath of ambition of the bureaucratic violence of 
apartheid rule and sets the stage for the forms of political subjectivities that were to 
emerge in response to the consequences of this violence in later decades.   The   
Native urban dweller as a reluctant rural subject,  resistant to that identity,  but also 
denied legal personhood and therefore citizenship, and seeks  recourse to rights on the 
plane of the  universal, ie, to have the right to ‘the rights of man’, and the right to 
possess and claim human rights, as defined by Empire. 
 
 Solomon Tshekiso  Plaatije, although appended with a surname of Dutch provenance, 
was of Baralong origin,  born in the Boshof District of the Orange Free State in1876. 
He grew up in a German Mission station in the town of Pniel, in the Northern Cape, 
where he had received his primary education. From there he moved to the diamond-
mining town of Kimberly, employed as a letter carrier for the Post Office. During his 
spare time he engaged in study, and was fluent in six African languages as well as 
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three European languages: English, Dutch and German. This linguistic dexterity 
enabled him to later move to the town of Mafeking, where he took a job as a 
translator in a local magistrates court. During the South African war, or Anglo-Boer 
war (1899-1902), the town of Mafeking was placed under siege, and Plaatjie emerge 
as a journalist and war correspondent. These experiences were described in a 
collection of articles that have become known as the ‘The Mafeking Diary: A Black 
Man’s View of a White Man’s War’ (1973)229.   
 
While  in Kimberly,  Plaatjie became of the most active members of  an organization 
called the South African Improvements Society, formed in 1895. The aims of the 
organization were twofold: firstly, “to cultivate the use of the English language, 
which is foreign to Africans; secondly, to help each other by fair and reasonable 
criticism in readings, English composition, etc, etc.”230  During this time he had also 
cultivated a deep interest in the writings of Shakespeare, and became  a play-write 
himself, with performances of his works staged at the Kimberley Theater.  
 
Two years after arriving in Mafeking,  Plaatjie left his translator position in the Cape 
civil service to become the editor of an English/Setswana newspaper, Koranta ea 
Becoana, the Bechuana Gazette. It was financed by a local Barolong Chief, Silas 
Molema. Under Plaatjie it rose to some prominence, illuminating issues that affected 
African social and political life, but the paper was financially unstable,  and forced to 
close by 1910. Plaatjie  moved on to a new role as editor of the Tsala ea Becoana, 
‘Friend of the Bechuana’, which was later renamed Tsala ea Batho, ‘Friend of the 
People’.  During this time Plaatjie had also become a founder member of the South 
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African Native National Congress, the forerunner to the African National Congress, 
and in 1912 was elected as its first General Secretary231.  
 
Plaatjie set out in Native Life to produce presciently the ‘narrative of a melancholy 
situation’ (2007, p15). It is worth pondering on the invocation of the notion of 
melancholy. It speaks to a disappointment, a gentle sadness, rather than an anger or 
indignation. And yet, in its muted and mediated ways, all these emotions are present 
in the text, including a feeling of betrayal.   The reason for this melancholy is alluded 
to in Brian Willan’s forward to the book: ‘It was written in a period where great hope 
was placed in the due processes of law, in the patient representation of grievances 
through reasoned statement, debate, appeal and petition’ (2007, p1). Native Life was 
Plaatjies ‘reasoned’ appeal to British readers to bear witness to injustice and suffering,  
through a journalistic description of the  social effects that the 1913 Land Act was 
having on black South Africans.  Motivated to object, Plaatjie and  members of the 
South African National National Congress  embarked on a petitionary delegation to 
England, to draw attention to the ‘removal of the “civilized” native from the 
scheduled areas’ (2007, p69). It was an anxiety based on the realization that the future 
of Native life in South Africa imagined by the enactment of the 1913 Land Act was to 
be the negation of the very biographical subject that had been produced by 
colonialism’s civilizing mission. It would be the negation of Plaatjie and others.  
 
The eviction of black South Africans from land and the denial of land tenure in 
‘scheduled areas’, would lead, Plaatjie noted, to ‘the complete arrest of native 
progress’ (2007, p58). He declared sharply that it was a ‘law of extermination’ (2007, 
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p66). This ‘extermination’ would transform (and bifurcate ) black South Africans into 
‘serfs’ on the one hand, and ‘fugitives’ and ‘refugees’ on the other (2007, pp78-79, 
112).  Plaatjie’s writing documents a pathos that spreads across the country, as he 
speaks to  peasants and share croppers, urban intellectuals and politicians, and hears 
stories of evictions and insecurity, of homelessness and disposition, of defiance and 
opposition, and here and there of futile and tragic local solidarities between ‘well 
meaning’ white farmers and  their now illegal tenants .  The delegation and petitions 
of the South African Native National Congress appealed in writing and in person, to 
the civilizing proclamations of the British Empire. It was to pit Empire against Union, 
the universal versus the particular in the hope that the latter, both through reason and 
might, would prevail over parochialism and provincialism. Increasingly aware that the 
Union of South Africa could legally enact limits to citizenship on a national terrain, 
Plaatjie and his fellow delegates lodged their appeal on the stage of world history, on 
the universalist claims of Empire. If it was  a ‘melancholic narrative’, it  was because 
of  the realization amongst the educated elite of Africans that Empire was politely 
abandoning  them to a republican and therefore national fate. They were destined to 
become  subjects  of apartheid,  not the promised civilized citizens of the 
Commonwealth’s South Africa,  for which they had been cultivating themselves.  
 
In a bid  to seek recourse outside the nation-state, Plaatjie and his colleagues set off in 
delegations to petition Empire almost  around  the same time that Hendrik Witbooi 
was also relying on the sensibilities of those who were the bearers of progress and 
civilization to account for the Hoornkop massacre in South West Africa. Although, 
drawing on  David Scott’s illuminating reflection on the Carribbean modern, Plaatjie  
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and the SANNC were  among colonial modernity’s most committed ‘conscripts’,232.  
They were also to be among its most tragic conscripts. Reading their letters and 
petitions today  one is struck by the vigour of their faith in Enlightenment’s promises, 
by the energy of their enthusiasm, imbued  the zeal of a new convert who has seen the 
light. One is also struck by the gradual coming to the surface of their fears as well: the 
anxiety that they would be recast as that which they have self-fashioned themselves  
against:  the ‘rural’, ‘backward’ native, ‘the heathen who lives in darkness’. 
 
 
Squeezing the Native out of the Urban II  
 
“If I were to wake up one morning and find my self a Black man, the only major 
difference would be geographical.”  




In an article published in the newspaper Liberation in 1959,   Nelson Mandela 
rehearsed his objection to the then draft Promotion of Bantu Self Government Bill, a  
concern articulated in the language  that Plaatjie had drawn on many years earlier. “It 
will be seen”, argued Mandela,  
that the African people are asked to pay a high price for this so-called 
‘self-government’ in the Reserves. Urban Africans- the workers, 
businessmen, and professional men and women, who are the pride of our 
people in the stubborn and victorious march towards modernization and 
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progress—are to be treated as outcasts, not even ‘settlers’ like Dr. 
Verwoed234.    
 
Mandela bannered his article with two epithets that contrasted two alternative visions 
of political community in South Africa. The first epithet was the opening quote from 
the Freedom Charter, a document that had been adopted by a large gathering 
organized by various nationalist and trade union organizations aligned with the 
African National Congress at Kliptown in 1955, known subsequently as the Congress 
of the People. The resolution that Mandela quoted stated that “South Africa belongs 
to all who live in it, black and white’.  The second epithet was a quote from Dr. W. M 
Eiselen, an anthropologist by training, and the then Secretary of the Department of 
Bantu Administration and Development: “All the Bantu have their permanent homes 
in the Reserves and their entry into other areas and into the urban areas is merely of a 
temporary nature and for economic reasons. In other words, they are admitted as 
work-seekers, not as settlers”235.  
 
In those contrasting epithets Mandela was not only pitting an increasingly powerful 
African nationalist political movement against one of the dominant ideologues of the 
apartheid State at the time.  He was also setting out the political trajectory of two 
distinct visions of political community in South Africa, and posing the question of 
who would ‘belong’ to the nation-state?  Who had a ‘right’ to belong, and on what 
basis? Faced with the prospect of creeping pincers of the state’s intention to 
implement indirect rule across the country, this was a foreboding question to pose.236  
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Belonging to the nation has often been positioned as a ‘universal’ and chronologically 
replicated desire, the repository of which is the citizen that often has to transcend 
more time bound, particularist identities237. In Africa this has been counterposed as 
the ‘nation’ versus the ‘tribe’ within modernization theories238 .  The modern South 
African  ‘nation’ was racialized and ethnicized. This bifurcated identity was  
naturalized  through  discursive shifts in the status of Africans, transformed from  
‘Native’ to ‘Bantu’.  
 
The condition of possibility of republican ‘South Africa’ relied on a conception of 
belonging which simultaneously included and excluded. Some claims to belonging, to 
land in particular, would be naturalized at the same time that other’s were 
denaturalized. The process through which this came into being relied on the 
hegemony of particular historical narratives,  articulated by sections of the  Afrikaner 
intelligentsia, like anthropologists, historians,  and sometimes clergy.  
 
The production of a stable settler subject- as a cultural, legal and political subject-was 
not only based on the invocation of a vision of the future, but also of a vision of the 
past.   Addressing a campaign meeting in 1962, the Minister of Finance, Dr. Donges,  
explained that it was the past, and not the actions of human beings that  determined  
the   political order: “It is history that has drawn the boundaries not the government, 
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for the Bantu Homelands are the area [sic] which the Non-White originally occupied. 
Therefore they have no moral claim to more land.” 239  
 
The production of a hegemonic and coherent settler narrative which would naturalize  
settler communities, was not something that emerged from the pristine intellectual 
endeavor of those who saw themselves as an ‘Afrikaner intelligentsia’. It was a 
historical narrative that drew on previous histories of conquest.  In this case it drew on 
a body of historiography produced by intellectuals associated with the British empire 
in particular. The trope that threads these moments together is the migratory thesis. 
 
The most influential body of  historical scholarship drawn upon at the time was that of 
George McCall Theal.  A Canadian by birth, Theal had produced a monumental 
eleven volume ‘History of South Africa’ (1964).  As a government official, he had 
arrived in South Africa in the 1870’s during the last years of the Frontier Wars, which 
he referred to as the ‘British Kaffrarian Wars’.  Theal served briefly as mayor of the 
small Eastern Cape town of Alice during the Xhosa resistance wars, where he was 
confronted with claims against the right of settlers to land.  In 1880 he argued for the 
creation of, and was eventually installed in, the grandiose titled position of ‘Keeper of 
the Government Archives’- a position which gave him privileged access to the 
colonial archive, which he was to  draw on prolifically, eventually leading to his  
appointment in 1891 to the position of  ‘Colonial Historiographer’.  
 
 In the preface to one of his monographs Theal opined that  “[i]n reality this country 
was not the Bantu’s originally any more than it was the white man’s, because the 
                                                
239 Quoted in Mbeki (1984) [1964], p16 
  
239 
Bantus were immigrants…most of their ancestors migrated to South Africa in 
comparatively recent times”.  He would go on to note that,  “we must prove to these 
people that we were no more intruders than they were, and that they enjoyed now as 
much as they were entitled to”. The writing of History was thus of paramount 
importance for Theal. It was to be a modernist logocentric history that was distrustful 
of orality, reliant on an archival authority  derived from textual sources produced by 
early traders,  travelers, missionaries and European and Arab chroniclers.  In a more 
sanguine statement of his central thesis about ‘the Bantu’, Theal noted that  
 their  ancestors had come down from the north less than four centuries 
ago…Near its center they met, and then a struggle ensued as to who could 
go further. Bear in mind that it was not an attempt of white men to take 
possession of land owned by black men, it was an effort on both sides to 
get as much unoccupied land as possible.240  
 
Theal’s own work, as well as the scholarship produced  under his direction,  was   of 
consequence to British settlement in South Africa. His official position as Colonial 
Historiographer was to make his work one the authoritative references to be consulted 
in disputes about land and belonging faced by colonial officers241. As ‘expert 
witness’,  Theal’s History, imbued with unquestionable  historicality, provided the 
authoritative narrative against which a local population’s oral testimonies were 
reduced to ‘noise’ in the ears of Justice- a ‘monolingualism of the Other’242 .  
 
                                                
240 Quoted in Van Onselen, (1988, p40).  
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As a whole it is a body of work marked by two overriding themes. The first is that 
migration was represented by settlement in waves, a constant ebb and flows. These 
waves were further marked by a temporal dimension- later waves would follow 
earlier ones and where these met, they resulted in a conflict. This would be its second 
major theme,  in which the stronger would prevail. In the first volume of his eleven 
volume magnum opus, titled ‘Ethnography and Condition of South Africa before A.D 
1505’ (1910),  Theal anthropomorphized his wave theory by proclaiming ‘Bushmen’ 
as the original inhabitants of the southern most part of Africa 243.  
 
Bushmen were driven to the mountains of Cape Town and the arid deserts of the 
Kalahari by a wave of Hottentot (Khoikhoi) migration, a group of people with North 
African origins244. These groups are further displaced by “the Dark Skinned People 
Termed by the Europeans as Bantu”245, “the band of immigrants” who “conquered a 
section of the earlier inhabitants, and incorporated its girls, possibly some of its boys 
also, but destroyed all others. Then after a time it separated into two more tribes, each 
of which pursued a distinct career of conquest…”246. The recent immigrants did not 
descend “as one great horde”, but arrived in different periods: “there was a constant 
swirl of barbarians, plundering, destroying and replacing one another…one clan was  
constantly pillaging another, so that discord and strife were perpetual’247.   
 
In settler historiography the image is one of constant warfare naturalizing the right of 
might. In contrast, for Africans, this history is recalled differently: ordered within a 
narrative of  state formation and disruption, known by the Nguni term Difiqane, and 
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in  Sotho languages as Mfecane.  Whereas African historical narratives describe 
conflicts between political authorities, in colonial historiography, “there was no 
paramount power over all, every chief who was strong enough to hold his own being 
absolutely independent of every other.” 
 
 The meeting of the European settler wave with the immigrant settlement flowing 
from the North required  an overarching power over all- the Leviathan of the colonial 
administration was, as  Kipling out it,  the “white mans burden”.  It was no wonder 
then that the Voortrekker leader Hendrik Potgieter  would later share with Adam Kok, 
the Griqua leader, the comment that   ‘[w]e are emigrants together with you…who 
together dwell in the same strange land and we desire to be regarded as neither more-
nor-less than your fellow emigrants, inhabitants of the country, enjoying the same 
privileges as you’248. 
 
 Where ‘the Bantu’ are referenced they are for the most part almost always also 
referred to as ‘immigrants’, leaving us with no doubt as to their non-indigeneity.   
 
Another work of interest, produced under the guidance and editorial hand of Theal, is 
George Stow’s posthumously published ‘The Native Races of South Africa’, subtitled 
‘A History of the Intrusion of the Hottentots and Bantu into the Hunting Grounds of 
the Bushmen, the Aborigines of this country’ (1910).  Theal had developed the  
‘intrusion’ theory to  dispel the writings  of some missionary chroniclers, who were 
drawing on African  oral histories. Stow observed with some consternation that 
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 the simple fact that certain tribes were found occupying some given tract 
of country at the time of the missionaries arrival was of itself, without 
further question,  deemed irrefragable proof that these particular natives 
must have been the rightful owners from time immemorial. The white 
nations were looked upon, and spoken of, as the only intruders into the 
ancient domains of the ‘poor natives’249  
 
What stands out in this for our purposes is the Darwinian connection between time, 
migration, and entitlement so clearly underlying Theal and Stow’s  work250. As well 
as a claim to belonging naturalized through historical memory.  White settlers, in this 
historical narrative, were no less ‘settlers’ than Blacks were. Wars of conquest were 
thus transformed into mutually credible claims of belonging to be decided by legality 
of ‘the right of might’251.   
 
By privileging migration, common arrival, and strength, this historical narrative was 
also a narrative about the absence of a history.  It drew on history to prove that neither 
had a historical claim. This history was therefore also inadvertently  telling a story 
about ‘the settler’- a story which made settler claims to land, based on conquest, 
equally, if not more valid. European settlers, in this account,  were merely the latest of 
a ceaseless history of waves. Military superiority or inferiority of those that preceded, 
                                                
249 Stow, (1905) [1964], ppviii-ix 
250 For a discussion on the epistemic link between Darwin, race theories and colonial genocide see Saul 
Dubow’s (1994) Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa, UK: Cambridge University Press; also 
Sven Lindquist’s Exterminate the Brutes (1996) pp 101-109. 
251 It is not my concern here to prove the facticity or otherwise of the historical claims discussed. There 
is a body of work, both historical and archaeological, which suggests that the land had been settled for 
thousands of  years before Theal suggested . Cf Cornevin (1980) for a refutation of what she calls the 
‘myths’ of apartheid, and Maylam (1986) for a particularly well researched account of the South 
African iron age.  
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or arrived at the same time, was a valid basis on which belonging and ownership 
could be decided.  
 
 
Empty Land, Migration and Divine Mission 
 
The idea of two migrations- a  ‘Bantu’ movement south and a European movement 
north, was one that featured prominently in much of the work produced by those 
working towards the realization of, a particular hegemonic Afrikaner political project 
and subjectivity. If the Native Question was never posed as the Settler Question by 
members of the  British colonial intelligentsia, it was  posed by those who saw 
themselves as Afrikaner nationalists. Afrikaner nationalists set their claim to 
belonging apart from the English- to some extent the major part of  their ‘constitutive 
outside’ in  formative moments. The idea of the British as ‘Uitlanders’, as foreigners , 
was to render an Afrikaner identity no longer a settler one, but  rather as native one.  
The settler question, for Afrikaner nationalists of the 1930’s and 1940’s was  resolved 
through the articulation of two broad arguments within Afrikaner nationalist thought- 
the one was a general claim which I have outlined above: all had equal claim to the 
land since all arrived at more or less the same time and therefore an no prior claim252. 
This argument had an intellectual lineage that was not confined to Afrikaner 
nationalist thought, but drew on English colonial thought as well.  The second broad 
argument was  undergirded  by the essentializing of Afrikaner self-identity and 
belonging in Africa as one pre-ordained by divine will and intervention.  But this was 
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to be reworked and compounded. For one, it came to be framed more explicitly within 
the discourse of ‘race’.  
 
As part of  a series of works released  under the series title ‘The Second Trek’ (Die 
Tweede  Trek Reeks), the geneticist G. Eloff  published his ‘Race and Racial Mixing’ 
(1942). Eloff, in this work, draws on the historiography of Theal, particularly the idea 
of a mutual arrival, but tells the story slightly differently, emphasizing the 
racialization of migrations. It was a theory of racialization influenced by the Hamitic 
hypothesis. In particular, it was influenced by what Edith Saunders (1969) described 
as the modernist version of the Hamitic hypothesis- marked by the Napoleanic 
expedition into Africa. Prior to Napoleon’s expedition, the idea of Africans as the 
Canaanites condemned to servanthood by Noah (as in Genesis, Chapter Five, of the 
First Testament),  held sway. Following the Napaleonic ‘discovery’ of the Egyptian 
signs of ‘civilization’, a gradual process of de-Africanizing Egyptians took place at 
the same time that these artifacts were to be accounted for by a European-Asiatic 
influence. The well-known racial ‘evidence’ were the Berbers in North Africa, and of 
course the Tutsi in Central Africa253.  
 
This version of the Hamitic hypothesis conflated language and origin- a shared 
linguistic identity came to signify a common racial origin.  Racial identities could in 
effect be read off linguistic ones254 .  Furthermore, this version of the Hamitic 
hypothesis racialized the distinction between pastoralists and agriculturalists:  
‘Because Hamites discovered in Africa south of the Sahara were described as 
pastoralists…pastoralism and its attributes became endowed with the aura of 
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Tutsi, see  Malkki (1995) and Mamdani (2001). 
254 Saunders (1969) p528 
  
245 
superiority of culture, giving the Hamite a third dimension: a cultural identity’.255 The 
post-Napoleanic version seperated those living on the African continent, between the 
‘indigenous’ and those of  Hamitic descent, as coming from elsewhere. After colonial 
settlement, Hamitic, as Caucasian was  refined, making hierarchical distinctions 
within it. Contemporary settlers could therefore act paternalistically toward the 
historically Hamitic descendents.  
 
Racializing the migrations described by Theal256 more explicitly, Eloff invoked the  
‘Bushmen’ of Southern Africa- the Khoi and San,  as Hamitic descendants originating 
in North Africa.  For  the geneticist Eloff, the “existing races of mankind” could be 
divided into three broad “stocks” (afstammelinge). These were “Yellow, Black and 
White”, all descendents of either Shem, Jephet, or Ham.”257  Drawing on the Hamitic 
argument, Eloff continued to develop the distinction between those indigenous and 
those less indigenous, as the basis of belonging.  
 
Whilst it may not be coincidental that Eloff’s account so strongly privileges the 
Biblical tale, Andre du Toit (1994) has cautioned that the notion of Afrikaner divine 
origin as “a chosen people”258 cannot be read as an uninterrupted linear concept in  
Afrikaner religious, and particular neo-Calvinist thought. It should be understood as 
                                                
255 Saunders (1969, p530)  
256 A I have indicated, Theal argued that ‘Bushmen’ were of  North African origin. Although the 
argument about racial migration and civilizing influence of Caucasians is also to be found in Theal, it is 
less explicit. Writing at that time he is less concerned with the Verwoerdian  concern for the 
‘separation of the races’, and is more concerned with conquest and domination. Theal's history is 
replete with non-pejorative accounts of ‘mixing’ , and is produced in the context when colonial 
belonging was still argued for as a civilizing project.  
 
258 A view described by J. M Coetzee (1988, p95): “…the Afrikaner has his type in the Israelite, tender 
of flocks, seeker after a promised national homeland, member of an elect race (volk) set apart from the 
tribes of the idolatrous, living by simple and not-to-be-questioned commandments, afflicted by an 




an idea traced in relation to various sections of the (competing) Afrikaner 
intelligentsias and clergy, with a meaning intimately derived from  the politics of a 
particular moment.  It is also to be traced to the the influence of late 18th and 19th 
century immigrants from the Netherlands, who brought with them the neo-Calvinist 
inspired ideas of Groen van Prinsterer and Abraham Kuyper:   “the Kuyperians 
among them explicitly set out to transfer to the South African context both the neo-
Calvinist philosophy of the ‘sovereignty in its own sphere’ (sowereiniteit in eie kring) 
, and a strategy of “strength through isololation”’259.   
 
A later generation of students returned to South Africa from Holland and Germany  
and brought with them adapted forms of Kuyperian ideas, as well as Fichtean inspired 
notions of the organic nature of volkhood.  The confluence of religiosity and 
nationalist discourse, by no means a unique one in the making of nationalist thought 
generally,  provided the context for privileging belonging by drawing on three 
genealogies: the  Old Testament,  a version of the Hamitic hypothesis, and Kuyperian 
prescriptions about the foundations of community identity260.  The political leader D. 
F Malan eloquently articulated this confluence, observing that 
 
 God wills the differenc of nationality and nationality. And this is His 
will, since God has a distinctive destination and a distinct calling for each 
people…I cannot escape the impression that God has willed our national 
existence. And He has willed that because He has a distinct calling for our 
people with its own national character261  
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The National Party leader Nico Diederichs, on the campaign trail in 1936,  roused the 
audience by pointing out that “the nation has a calling to fulfill and a task to carry 
out”262. That calling, and that task would be articulated by those closest to the 
hegemonic factions of Afrikaner political and religious thought. The idea of  
“sovereignty in ones own sphere”,  the difference of nations,  and  the idea of a divine 
right to belong, to be ‘native’, were powerful elements of  the discursive world-view 
out of which developed what came to be known as Apartheid.  
 
 
 From Native to Bantu 
 
Since the notion of citizen overlaps with nationality, the colonized, 
being excluded from the vote, is not simply consigned to the fringes 
of the nation, but is virtually a stranger in his/her own home263. 
                                                                                    Achille 
Mbembe 
 
The Nationalist Party victory in 1948, and the vision of apartheid that came into 
existence consolidated, amongst other things, a way of  dealing with the 
Settler/Native distinction. The settler was recast as ‘belonging’ and the native came to 
be recast as ‘foreign’. The Native Question has broadly been answered in three ways. 
Firstly by decimation, as experienced by the San and Khoi encountered by the early 
free burghers as they trekked north from the Cape out of the shadow of British rule. 
Secondly, it could be resolved through assimilation, as with the various  
Christianization and civilization projects, largely associated with particular periods of 
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British colonial rule,  particularly in the Cape and Natal provinces.  And thirdly, it 
could be  resolved through difference and segregation. All three answers were applied 
in South Africa, sometimes at the same time in different parts of the country. Each 
built upon, rather than replaced the other. The result is a heterogeneous, and 
sometimes contradictory set of arguments which has as effect, white rule.  Each 
provided a different rationale of rule and a different mode of administration over 
those ruled.  However after World War II there is a shift towards coherency. State 
consolidation under Afrikaner nationalist rule confronted ‘the Native Question’, and 
confronted the challenge of working out a comprehensive and single answer to be 
implemented systematically across the territorial breadth of South Africa-  in other 
words, confronting the challenge of synchronizing the ‘time of the nation’264. 
 
The South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC) 1903-1905,  had established  
that “the word ‘Native’ shall be taken to mean an aboriginal inhabitant of Africa, 
south of the Equator, and to include half-castes and their descendants by Natives”265. 
The report of this commission was to establish a series of recommendations which 
would in various ways establish the broad elements of state segregationist policy with 
regards to the “Native Question”. It  recommended ‘Native Reserves’ based on 
‘ancestral lands held by their forefathers’266 At the same Christianization, the value of 
hard labour, and government of  Natives through Tribal administration were put 
before the government as answers to the Native Question.267  . Here we glimpse a 
moment of the simultaneity and contradictory co-existence of rationales of 
domination. The SANAC invocation of ancestral lands overlaps temporally with 
                                                
264 I am alluding here to Benedict Anderson’s (1983)  reference to the relationship between  
‘homogenous empty time’ and the imagined community of the nation.  
265 Ashforth, (1990,p33) 
266 ibid, p35 [416] 
267 For a critique of ‘ancestral lands’  see Ashforth (1990, pp35-36). 
  
249 
Theal’s writings which discount the valence of ‘presence’ as right to ownership. This 
Janus-faced moment contains two political rationalities: an answer to the Native 
Question which looks toward the future of state formation and citizenship, whilst  the 
other looks toward the past and the moment of conquest.  
 
The 1913 Land Act, the Black Administration Act of 1927, and the  Native Trust and 
Land Act of 1936 were a trio of legal enactments of some of the recommendations of 
the SANAC report. A total of 13% of the land would be designated for Natives, 
governed by the Governor General who would act as ‘Supreme Chief’. The 
designation of Native was not only a descriptive one, but also a legal one: to be  
classified as Native  was to have spatially circumscribed implications in relation to 
movement, and particularly with regards to land ownership, employment 
opportunities,  and land tenure practices. Parts of the Union, like the Cape, still gave a 
certain amount of  franchise rights to those Natives who could pass various 
‘civilizational’ criteria. Assimilationist practices therefore still continued, but, with 
the proposed ‘Herzog Bills’ of 1936, these would be revoked268. 
 
Between the 1920’s and the 1940’s a series of developments, relating both to 
urbanizaton trends of  Africans, as well a growing African nationalist movement 
spurred on by the looming threat of the Herzog Bills, led by 1950 to the establishment 
of a commission to re-examine the Native Question.  This  ‘Commission for the 
Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa’, 
or the ‘Tomlinson Commission’ was to mark a key shift and consolidation of 
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different form of black representation. 
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elements of previous policies which would be drawn together under the term 
‘apartheid’.  
 
The Tomlinson Commissions terms of reference were “to conduct an exhaustive 
enquiry into and to report on a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the 
Native Areas with a view to developing within them a social structure in keeping with 
the culture of the Native and based on effective socio-economic planning”269.  The 
eighteen volume report addressed the effects of ineffective segregation and urban 
black settlement, both intended and unintended , noting that  “a gradual process of 
overlapping has taken place, for whereas at one time only a few Bantu were to be 
found on the roads with old motor cars, there were now many in possession of such 
vehicles.”. It went on: 
 
“(vii) Where at first, the European only knew the Bantu as labourers and tenants on 
the farm, as unskilled workers in the mining industry and as messengers and domestic 
servants, he now beholds the Bantu mason wielding his trowel, the Bantu teacher in 
front of his class, the Bantu doctor visiting his patients and the Bantu newspaper 
editor at his desk…The European is confronted with an inescapable choice…the time 
has arrived for choosing between the maintenance of separate identities and the 
process of coalescence, between the traditional South African and the Neo-Western 
way of life”270. 
 
‘Coalescence’ and ‘overlapping’, the report concluded, could not be allowed: “Either 
the challenge must be accepted or the inevitable consequences of the integration of 
                                                
269 Houghton ,1956, p1 
270 Kuper, 1988, p37-38 
  
251 
the Bantu and the European populations groups into a common society must be 
endured”271. What were the ‘consequences’ which the report ominously hinted at?  It 
noted that “the ultimate result-though it may take some time to materialize- is 
complete racial assimilation, leading to the creation, out of the original communities, 
of a new biological entity”272. The Tomlinson report reflected a series of tropes that 
pervaded sections of the academy and state connected intellectual inquiry about South 
African life at the time. These themes, particularly, ‘culture contact’, was prominent 
in anthropological discussions, and could be found in both broad traditions of South 
African anthropological work- the social anthropologists273 and those who worked 
within what came to be known as the Volkekunde tradition. It was their conception of 
racial characteristics and cultural identity that was particularly illuminating.  
 
The report had been written largely by intellectuals aligned with the Afrikaner 
nationalist movement. Three of the eleven commission members were 
Volkekundigers, anthropologists who took the Romanticist-inspired ‘volk’ as their 
ontological unit of analysis. I want to read the report within the context of shifts 
within the Afrikaner intellectual thinking about the nature of belonging, and its 
relationship to race, religion and citizenship. 
 
The report concluded strongly in support of segregation, rather than ‘coalescence’ or 
‘overlapping’. Afrikaner anthropologists were to play a more significant role at this 
                                                
271 Houghton, 1956, p59 
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273 The social anthropological tradition, closely linked to British social anthropology, was mostly 
structural-functionalist in early orientation- the first Chair at the University of Cape Town was held by 
Radcliffe-Browne in 1921. A number of students had studied under Malinowski, who himself wrote 
“The Dynamics of Culture Change” (1945) after a visit to Africa in 1934. He also edited a collection of 
works by his students, “Methods of Study of Culture Contact in Africa” (1938). Cf Hammond-Tooke 
(1997) and Sally Falk-Moore (1994, pp 29-73). 
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point- both in terms of offering a scientific language for the rejection of racialized 
segregationist tendencies, as well providing an alternative language in which 
segregation again become a self-evident ‘solution’. The requirements of  governing a 
modern state, of  conceiving Bantu ‘administration’ as  a scientific activity,  meant 
that ‘disciplinary expertise’ was brought to bear on matters. Academics, like 
anthropologists, therefore became more prominent after 1948. They spoke from  
positions of secular authority within institutions of modernity,  like ‘national 
universities’.  The student newspaper of the Afrikaans National Student  Union put 
the matter as follows: 
“ The Liberalistic and negrophilistic sections of our country’s intelligentsia is much 
better organized, and in many cases better equipped than the Afrikaner to propagate 
their viewpoint of racial equality which can only result in eventual racial integration. 
It is necessary for the Afrikaner intelligentsia to scientifically formulate the Boers’ 
point of view about non-white groups”274.  
 
This statement illuminates a sentiment within the Afrikaner nationalist movement, 
increasingly associated with the state,  that  articulates segregationist policy within a 
rationality grounded in ‘disinterested’ ways of knowing. A shift in my view from 
sovereign power and what Georgio Agamben (1998) calls ‘bare life’ to the 
conceptualization of the ‘native’ as a bio-political subject of (colonial) 
governmentality275. At this point the most significant anthropological figure that 
emerges is W.W.M Eiselen, who was appointed to the post of Secretary of Native 
Affairs under Verwoerd, and under whose institutional auspices the Tomlinson 
Commission worked. Eiselen was the son of a German missionary and had studied at 
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the Hamburg Colonial Institute in Germany. He took up the first professorship of 
Ethnology at the University of Stellenbosch in Cape Town in 1932, the same year 
Verwoerd was appointed a professor of Sociology there.  In 1929 he had delivered a 
lecture titled ‘The Native Question’, in which he queried the scientific basis for 
claims of racial superiority.  The problem, suggested Eiselen, was that the Reserve 
system was not being adequately implemented and that this was leading to an erosion 
of  ‘traditional culture’276. 
 
In his influential  report on Bantu Education, produced for the National Party in 1948, 
Eiselen noted the adverse effects of labour migration and urbanization, ‘These 
phenomena give rise to two schools of thought: firstly, those who believe that Bantu 
culture is inferior and must gradually disappear, and secondly those who believe that 
while the old traditional Bantu cultures cannot cope with modern conditions, 
nevertheless they contain in themselves the seeds from which can develop a modern 
Bantu culture fully able to satisfy the aspirations of the Bantu and to deal with the 
conditions of the modern world’277. Segregation was thus given a paternalist tenor. It 
was not just a matter of separation ,but also development- toward a different 
modernity.  It was not just about fixing the ‘native’ in ‘tradition’ as ‘subjects’ through 
customary law, but also a process of  modernizing tradition, and therefore also a re-
negotiation of what it meant to be a ‘subject’. It offered the possibility of a modern 
way of being ‘Bantu’- and a modern form of belonging-ie,  in a Bantu state. And it 
was to place difference within parallel but differentially calibrated temporal spheres 
of belonging- sites from which eligibility for citizenship would be adjudicated 
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The policy of creating clearly demarcated Bantu Authorities recruited anthropologists 
who would advise on the cultural borders of the Authorities and identify the ‘correct’ 
chiefs to lead them, particularly amongst groups like the Mfengu in Transkei and  
Ciskei, and the Tsonga in Transvaal. The latter  lacked, in their view,  the  necessary 
degree of centralized political authority required in the vision of rule imagined by  
Bantu Authorities.  A lack of extended field trips meant that the anthropologists who 
worked “on the ground” in these matters lacked local ‘contacts’ and informants278, but 
their recommendations were given credibility, speaking from the subject position of  
the Volkekundiger – the ‘expert’ on Bantu life. 
 
One of Eiselen’s brightest students was Pieter Coertze, who later became  Professor 
of Ethnology at the University of Pretoria; for twenty years he was considered the 
most influential figure amongst those who aligned themselves with Volkekunde- both 
amongst the anthropologists at the Afrikaner universities, as well as by those who 
taught at tertiary educational institutions set up for African students within the 
‘homelands’.  
 
Coertze claims to have developed the idea of ‘Ethnos Theory’, which he defined in 
the following way: 
‘By Nature man is also a social being and cannot survive by living alone. As 
ants and bees, for example have their existence in natural, organic social 
entities, nests and hives respectively, so has man his existence in culturally 
determined, organic social entities, ie, ethnies, (sing. Ethnos), whose 
structures and existential activities are culturally determined. Such units 
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cannot be organized but originate organically as the outcome of the 
combined actions of the forces controlling and determining human existence. 
Ontologically speaking, human existence is an existence within the 
framework of various ethnical units, each having a separate corporal 
existence. This is man’s normal existence, he cannot survive and lead a 
happy life in any other way’279. 
 
For Eloff race was the determinant,  but for Coertze   ‘ethnos’  and  culture, was 
central. The affinities with strands of German Romanticist thought and Herder in 
particular, are evident.  Coertze’s  conception of  ethnography also drew on aspects of 
American cultural relativist theory and the work of  Franz Boas280,  but avoided the 
more structural-functionalist approaches dominant in the British academy at the time.  
Coertze was also a member of the Broederbond281, and a believer in the chosenness of 
Afrikaners as a ‘volk’:  
 
I am’ he noted with appropriate gravitas, ‘the heir and bearer of Afrikaner 
traditions for which heavy sacrifices have been made. I am pledged to my 
ancestors and to the future Great Afrikaner People that I must never be 
false in my friendship or to the Christian principles and the national ideals 
which form the foundations of the Afrikanervolk282. 
 
                                                
279 Coertze, P.J, ‘Volkekunde’, Etnologie, 1, 1.  
280 Hammond-Tooke (1997, p132) notes  that although Volkekunde may have drawn on Boas, ‘it parts 
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American roots’.  
281 The Broederbond (Brotherhood/Union) was a secret organization of influential Afrikaner males set 
up in 1918. It included intellectuals, businessmen, and politicians. Between 1948 – 1990 all Prime 
Ministers, and Presidents of South Africa were members of the organisation.  
282 Eloff, JF and Coertze, RD (1972) pp2-3 
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In order to realize the identity of the Afrikanervolk, the nation self-evidently needed a 
state. The ethnos of South Africa, in theory, would thus be predominantly Afrikaner. 
In actual terms there always was an accommodation with the white English ‘ethnos’ 
within the ‘nation’ of South Africa. This accommodation could be tolerated since both 
shared a common racial origin. Other ‘ethnies’ however, would have their own 
homelands. The intellectual world-view of ethnos and its relationship to the political 
leadership of the Afrikaner ‘nation’ was not exactly hand in glove.  The theories of 
the Afrikaner intelligentsia, like those of  the Coertzes at the University of Pretoria, 
would sometimes meet with reluctant acceptance or benign neglect by  the political 
leadership. They also had to contend with the economic imperatives and structural 
constraints of governance  and had to  mediate between a range of different interests, 
both within the country, and internationally,   as representatives of a sovereign state 
within the juridical framework of international state system.  
 
Coertze. and Eieselen before him,  had advocated apartheids most ambitious desire:  a 
complete removal of black South Africans and an end to reliance on African labour. 
This never took place on the scale  imagined of course, and the violence it occasioned 
is something we are concerned with here283.  Nonetheless, it is quite clear that the 
intellectual grounds  was a powerful scientific discourse, infusing various policies 
                                                
283 Verwoerd, as Minister of Native Affairs, shared this view: ‘Considerable extension of  the area set 
aside was accordingly envisaged on the assumption that the Native reserves would have to be the 
homes of the great majority of the then four million Bantu. There they were to live and develop a Bantu 
way of life, and thence they would come as migrant labourers (chiefly to the mines) to the European 
areas’ (Verwoerd,, ‘Native Policy of the Union of South Africa, Pretoria: State information Office of 
the Union of South Africa, 1952). As Ivan Evans notes- even though he tends to overstate Verwoerd’s 
role in my view:  
‘Verwoerd’s position was that his department was not obliged ‘to consult’ with Africans since they 
were merely ‘guest workers in South Africa’, (1997, p94).  With the beginning of government reforms 
in 1983 many volkekundes anthropologists left the National Party and joined more rightwing 
movements. The governing National Party  ‘betrayed’ the Afrikaner people when it entered into 
negotiations with representatives of the anti-apartheid movements,  in their view, and many are 
currently involved in a campaign for an ‘Afrikaner homeland’, within post-apartheid South Africa. Cf 
Van Rooyen (1995) and Vestergaard (2001).  
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which were implemented, some more successful than others.   Coertze, more than any 
other anthropologist set the intellectual itinerary for successive generations of 
students at Afrikaner universities, where  his book,  the Introduction to General 
Ethnology284 was the foundation text. Ethnology entered into the emerging ‘white’ 
national imaginary becoming a subject at  government primary and high schools for 
Afrikaners and many a ‘popular  expert’ on Bantu life could be found285.  
 
Cultures, around the world, for P. J Coertze, fell into two categories- ‘free cultures’, 
and ‘bound’ cultures. In the former,  individuals tend toward a greater degree of 
independence in their actions in relation to the culture they are born into. The latter 
refers to ‘primitive cultures’, and these are largely endogamous, resulting in limited 
change over time286. South Africa was a situation where a number of closed ethnies 
where in contact with an open one. The closed ones were numerically dominant and  
the higher civilization could  only preserved itself by being apart from the others:  
through apartheid. Coetze’s son, R. D, later confidently proclaimed:  “[t]his goal 
which we have formulated [apartheid]…is beyond any academic criticism…in our 
judgment there can be no reason why anthropologists cannot co-operate 
enthusiastically in the achievement of this ideal’.287 
 
What is clear is that Ethnos, as an idea through which the idea of volk is conceived, 
relied on a pre-political conception of cultural community which discursively 
rendered visible groups in two broad ways in government documentation- Whiteness 
                                                
284 Coertze, P. J (1973.a)  
285 see Becker (1974) for an example of this kind of ‘popular ethnology’, which is largely descriptive 
and  thematically laments the effects of urbanization on the hitherto static ‘traditional African way of 
life of the Bantu’.  
286 Coertze, P. J (1968) p22 
287 Coertze, R. D (1968), p11 
  
258 
was split into a British ethnos and an Afrikaner ethnos (who were also a chosen 
people). And those classified as Native became Bantu. Bantu was further refracted 
into two broad groups, based on linguistic communities. The first was Nguni, which 
comprised of Zulu, Ndebele,  Xhosa and Swazi. The second was Sotho,  which 
comprised of South Sotho, North Sotho, Tswana, Venda and Tsonga peoples. Here 
again, linguistic communities were being mapped into cultural communities. And 
cultural communities would evolve into political boundaries.  The broad category of 
‘Native’ was refracted into a number of different Bantu ‘tribes’ around which 
territorial and political boundaries would be circumscribed.  
 
The discursive shift was now almost complete- Settlers had become Natives, and 
Natives now belonged, but they belonged elsewhere- they were to become foreigners. 
If the boundaries of cultural communities were also to be the boundaries of political 
community then membership of differing cultural communities meant belonging to 
different political communities.  South Africa was conceived of as a white ‘Nation, 
made up of the Afrikaner volk, and the English speaking whites of European descent. 
To be tribally defined made one racially an outsider, and ethnically a member of a 
different political community-a ‘homeland’.  
 
 
The Tomlinson Commission best exemplifies the discursive shift I am referring to. 
Firstly, there is shift in naming. No longer do we find reference to Natives as the 
primary way in which to speak about the African population, but rather to ‘Bantu’. 
This shift has been attributed partly to Eieselen, who had argued that because “we 
refuse as government and People to recognize Bantu culture, because we measure the 
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native with the measure of European culture, we [were] albeit, unconsciously, 
apostles of assimilation’288.  
 
In the discussion on land tenure in the report, the historical association of Bantu with 
land is not told as one of migration, but rather as a diachronic one of eternal 
settlement, disrupted only by an increase in population leading to a shortage of game 
for hunting, and secondly to ‘the coming of the whiteman’ who required labour. 
African men drawn into towns to perform such labour thus neglected their ‘traditional 
roles’ as ‘warriors, hunters, and stockowners’289.  The Tomlinson reports’s 
developmentalist tenor was posed in terms of the development of the Bantu in 
accordance with a way of life suited ‘to them’.  All African labour in ‘European 
areas’-essentially the sign for  ‘South Africa’-  becomes ‘migrant’290. 
 
For the historian Theal, ‘belonging’ was a connection to settlement, of being able to 
make an historical claim through demonstration of the physical presence of  being. 
Conquest, for Theal, involves incorporation, and incorporation involves mixing, 
cross-linguistic and cross-‘tribal’. For ethnos theorists and government documentation 
inspired by it, ‘belonging’ is an ‘ethnic’ question, less concerned with the question of 
conques and more concerned with policing the boundaries of belonging and 
difference:  cultural ‘organic’ boundaries rather than physical spatial boundaries. The 
physical spatial boundaries would  follow as an administrative need that  had become 
both ‘rational’, as a scientific way of governing,  and  historico-organically logical. 
As the Tomlinson report noted : 
 
                                                
288 Eiselen quoted in Evans (1996), p229 
289 Houghton (1956) p25 
290 cf Ashforth (1988) p172 
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The present geographical dispersion of the Bantu Areas will make socio-
economic development difficult, unless coherent nuclear spots are 
established within which communal bonds can be developed. 
Consequently the Commission suggests that long-term policy should be 
directed to the systematic expansion of seven main blocks around the 
logico-historical centers of the groups mentioned above: Tswanaland, 
Vendaland, Pediland, Swaziland, Zululand, Xhosaland, and Sotholand, in 
each of which, in terms of the Bantu Authorities Act, the Bantu 
themselves will exercise administrative functions to an ever increasing 
extents291 (My italics). 
 
Yet the form  that these administrative units would take, and the degree of 
‘independence’ they would have  was the subject of wide-ranging and serious 
disputes within the government and amongst intellectuals associated with bodies like 
the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA)292. Furthermore, the costs of 
implementing the recommendations of the Tomlinson report alarmed government 
officials.  
 
However much it could not be fully implemented, due partly to the pragmatics of  
political life at the time, it was not benign. The dramatic wave of forced removals of 
the 1960’s were very much the attempt to get rid of ‘black spots’ which dotted the 
otherwise white map of  ‘European areas’. The Surplus Peoples Project (1984) 
estimated that between 1960-1982 more than 3.5 million Africans at been forced to 
                                                
291 Houghton (1955) p 55 
292 For a useful discussion of these debates see Evans (1997), pp 234-239 
  
261 
relocate from their land or homes.293 More than half of the targets of forced removals 
were urban Africans, or ‘de-tribalized Bantu’, as Verwoerd preferred to call them,  
who had attempted to settle in towns, many of whom were  survivors of the  African 
peasantry squeezed off their land in the 1930’s.  
 
 In the end, all who were part of this  biopolitical population, now  racialized and 
ethnicized, ‘belonged’, but both together and apart.  The political question for pastoral 
power was: how do we live  ‘harmoniously’ and ‘peacefully together’, but ‘separate’ 
and apart, that is, in apartheid. It was this challenge that those who governed towns 
like Cradock in the Eastern Cape faced as they wrestled with the Native Question. 
And that those who were governed-- the African residents of these towns, like 
Matthew Goniwe—  faced as an existential violence born of the ‘Native Question’. 
The figure of the urban African remained a constantly awkward and insurgent dweller 
in the town, disrupting the vision of apartheid as a bifurcated state in the making. And 










                                                






From Victims to Enemies 
 
“The rebels ripped the veil off the face of the colonial power and, for the 
first time, it was visible in its true form: a modern regime of power 
destined never to fulfill its normalizing mission because the premise of its 




In the focus on the overtly repressive nature of the covert aspects of counter-
insurgency, and the absolute enemy as its target, and the scandalous violence that 
compels our attention, there is a tendency to lose sight of the centrality of the concrete 
political objectives of the  apartheid state—the bringing into being of a society 
premised on bifurcated citizenship where the question of who a citizen and who a 
foreigner was, would be decided by the legally enforced social taxonomies of race 
and ethnicity.  And to lose sight of the popular support that this vision enjoyed 
amongst white South Africans, as well as the popular support that existed for the 
forceful implementation and defense of that idea. In its most ambitious rendering,  the 
apartheid objective was to naturalize a settler minority while denationalizing a native 
majority, reconstituting the boundaries and borders of the political. Between 1976 and 
1981 four ‘independent’ homeland states came into existence, Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, commonly referred as the TBVC states. 
 
                                                
294 Partha Chatterjee, (1999) ‘The Nation and Its Fragments’, The Partha Chatterjee Omnibus, New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, p18 
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The question of who would and could belong, and how they would belong to ‘South 
Africa’—the ‘national question’—had its origins in a colonial problematic, and the 
answers and challenges to it were hardly singular or uncontested, amongst both those 
who governed and those who were governed. In its most coherent moments however,   
the concrete enemy for the apartheid state is the figure that increasingly disrupts the 
neat binary between a racialized citizen and an ethnic subject—the concrete enemy  is 
the urban African population who were either urban by location ( Mamdani’s ‘rural in 
the urban’), or urban by aspiration  (the ‘detribalized native’). It was this category of 
the population who presented apartheid’s planners with their most vexing conundrum, 
which they had sort to resolve legally and spatially, through a mixture of coercion and 
reforms. They tried forcefully removing and resettling African communities. And 
they tried regulating movement by enforcing a strict system of Influx Control through 
the Pass Law system, which accounts on the largest scale for the criminalization of 
the African population between 1948 and 1986.   
 
Despite concerns about South African exceptionalism as a discourse that sets South 
Africa apart from the colonial history of the African continent, and that situates it as 
part of the West, there was an important phenomena that  did set South Africa apart 
from much of the continent,  with respect to the social basis as well as the spatial 
topography of resistance to domination:  “unlike most African countries, the center of 
gravity of popular struggle was in the townships and not against Native Authorities in 
the countryside. The depth of resistance in South Africa was rooted in urban-based 
worker and student resistance, not in the peasant revolt in the countryside”.295 
 
                                                
295 Mamdani (1996) Citizen and Subject, p29 
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This difference was not lost on those charged with formulating a strategy to contain 
native revolt whilst at the same time finding a  solution to the national question.  
Colonel ‘Pops’ Fraser, the key counter-insurgency theorist of the SADF in the early 
1970’s was at pains to point out that whilst force was necessary as part of a strategy, it 
would have to be a minor part of the overall strategic process and one weapon in the  
arsenal  used to support the realization of a political objective. In his reflections on 
counter-insurgency and the challenges for white South Africa, Colonel Fraser warned 
that there  “is always a temptation to let the military direct the entire process but this 
must be resisted by all means. Giving the soldier authority over the civilian would 
contradict the major characteristics of this type of war, i.e, that it is a political war”.296 
 
By the end of the 1960’s the key African nationalist movements—the ANC and the 
PAC were banned (October 1960) and become movements in exile. The Communist 
Party had already been banned in 1950. The leadership of the ANC’s newly founded 
military wing were either in exile, as in the case of Harold Wolpe and Joe Slovo, or in 
prison serving life long prison sentences, as in the case of  Nelson Mandela, Walter 
Sisulu, Ahmed Kathrada and Govan Mbeki. So too were key figures of the Pan 
Africanist Congress, like Smangaliso Robert Sobukwe297.  Although these repressive 
actions had thrown organized African resistance to apartheid into disarray, there was 
still cause for concern by State. Three key events rankled the more forward looking 
                                                
296 Fraser, n.d ‘Lessons from Past Revolutionary Wars’, p21 D. O. D archive 
297  The treason trail was formally known as “the State vs Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Dennis 
Goldberg, Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Mohamed Kathrada, Lionel Bernstein and Raymond Mahlaba (sic)” 
charged with  ‘being members of an association of persons within the purview of Section 381 (7) of 
Act. No. 56 of 1955, as amended, known as the High Command, the National Liberation Movement, 
the National Executive Committee of the National Liberation Movement and the Umkonto we Sizwe 
(The Spear of the Nation),”, alleging that they “conspired to commit…wrongful and willful acts of 
sabotage, preparatory to and in facilitation of, guerilla warfare in the Republic of South Africa, coupled 
with an armed invasion of, and a violent revolution in, the said Republic…” AD 1844/ A vol. 1, Cullen 
Library, Historical Papers, Wits University;  De Villiers, H.H.W (1964) Rivonia, Operation Mayibuye: 




political leadership in the National Party. What to do about them increasingly divided 
supporters within the party along factional lines. The fault line was between the 
complacency of then Prime Minister Vorster, and the sentiments  of his incumbent, 
the Defence Minister, P. W Botha.  
 
Two of the three foreboding events that divided the white ruling elite originated 
internally, not surprisingly, from within  the urban African population. The first arose 
from the sentiments on the factory floors of the cities that congealed into a dramatic 
movement of African workers in the mining and manufacturing sectors of the 
economy.  The manufacturing boom of the late 1960’s had given rise to the need for 
more African labour in the cities. Worker advice offices had sprung up too, like the 
Advice Offices of the Black Sash, many started by young white student groups, 
excluded from and unable to find space for political expression in the Black 
Consciousness Movement. They turned to organizing workers around shop floor 
issues, finding a focus on ‘class’ to be a way to circumnavigate the exclusion that a  
turn to Blackness as an identity of resistance implied for them.  There was an 
effervescence in the  growth of union organizing. A wave of strikes occurred, starting 
in Durban in 1973, but quickly making a national imprint298 .The strikes were led by a 
nascent independent black trade union movement that, although bitterly divided over 
ideological and strategic questions, did not confine itself to workplace grievances 
only. It also asserted a leadership role in  “community struggles.”299   Many of these 
workers lived in urban townships, informal settlements, and hostels and began to 
                                                
298 cf. Sakhela Buhlungu. ed. (2006) Trade Unions and Democracy, Cosatu Worker’s Political 
Attitudes in South Africa, Cape Town: HSRC Press; Steven Friedman (1987)  Building Tomorrow 
Today, Johannesburg: Ravan Press; Jeremy Baskin (1991) Striking Back: A History of Cosatu, London: 
Verso 
299 The divide split the movement leadership between those known as ‘workerists’, who maintained 
that the movement confine itself to workplace issues, and the ‘populists’, who sought to forge ‘political 
unions’, which would be the organizational locus of community-based African urban resistance.  
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provide the formative leadership of new popular political grassroots  formations 
which replaced those decimated by the repression and bannings of the 1960’s300.   
 
I am truncating the historical formation of these movements here, and obscuring along 
the way what was a deeply  fractious and fateful relationship between the residents of 
the urban townships themselves and the hostel-dwellers who moved between the rural 
and the urban areas. This would later give rise to, between the mid-1980s to mid-
1990’s, one of the violent political conflicts in South Africa’s recent past, which 
spread  across Johannesburg’s Vaal region, as well as in Natal, pitting the supporters 
of the Zulu-dominated Inkatha movement against those who aligned with the 
‘comrades’, the supporters of  United Democratic Front (UDF).  Although the state’s 
counter-insurgency units became deeply involved in fermenting this conflict through 
support and training of various factions, as proxy forces within the country, and by 
actively encouraging suspicion and distrust, they were not, contrary to most critical 
studies at the time on the ‘third force’, the originators of the conflict301. Rather, as 
Mamdani has argued in a penetrating assessment of this violence,  the  history of the 
figure of the migrant labourer within the bifurcated zones of political authority is 
crucial to understanding why the violence took the form that it did. It was shaped 
primarily by the forms of domination, the discourses of revolt  and  the political 
identities that were fashioned in relation to it. 302   
                                                
300 Baskin (1991) Friedman (1987)   
301  For example, see Matthew Kentridge (1990) Unofficial War: inside the conflict in 
Pietermaritzburg. Cape Town & Johannesburg: David Philip;  Stephen Ellis (1998) The Historical 
Significance of South Africa’s Third Force, Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 24, no. 2 
302 Mamdani, M (1996) ‘The Rural in the Urban’, in Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the 
Legacy of Late Colonialism, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp 218-284; In an earlier study 
Doug Hindson (1987) had noted that the process of urbanization had created a chasm between settled 
and migrant Africans, although he focused on this as a form of differentiated labour re-production 
rather than on the social and political consequences that attended the process: “Influx controls, job 
allocation and housing policies, and the municipal tax and expenditure system were consciously 




The second internal event that deeply disturbed sections of the political ruling elite 
was the 1976 student uprising. It had started in Soweto but too spread across the 
country, initially focused on opposition to Afrikaans as the language of instruction 
prescribed for use in state schools. It soon extended to the disparities in the allocation 
of resources between African schools and their white, ‘coloured’ and Indian 
counterparts.  The dominant organizational and ideological form of resistance inside 
the country was the Black Consciousness movement, which cohered around the 
insights of Steve Biko.  Invoking a sovereign black political subject,  the student 
uprising  and the Black Consciousness movement made citizen-like claims that 
required recognition and responsibility for black South Africans as full citizens of the 
South African state  rather than as urban interlopers. This was at a moment when the 
apartheid state still imagined that the long term biopolitical responsibility for the 
urban African population—education, healthcare, and welfare—would eventually fall 
under the administrative responsibility of a Bantustan government of one kind or 
another. In a clumsy precursor to the more systematically planned use of political 
assassinations, within a year Steve Biko was killed while being interrogated in police 
custody,  and the Black Consciousness movement was banned.  
 
 The third major worry, as I have already discussed,  was the chastising experience of 
the failed incursion into Angola in 1975. This took the hubristic glow off the political 
leadership’s reliance on the military brass’s capabilities at that time.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
dwellers relative to temporary migrants. The effect of these measures was to promote a process of 
stratification within the urban African population.” Hindson (1987), pp406-407 
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To address the challenges posed by the urban-based and urbanizing African 
population, two commissions of inquiry were initiated; the Wiehahn Commission,  
which would  look into the question of what to do about the newly formed black trade 
unions, which were  not recognized under law at the time;  and the Riekert 
Commission303, which  would consider the fate of urban African workers. By this 
time there was a creeping realization amongst some sections of the ruling elite that 
politically cleansing white South Africa of its urban African population, and turning 
every African into a migrant labourer who was a foreigner, might just be an  
unrealisitic prospect.304 If a minority was going to maintain its rule over a majority, 
new techniques of subverting native sovereign claims, and new technologies of rule 
might be required.  
  
The Total Strategy is not reducible to the militarization of the state. It was first and 
foremost a panoply of political interventions pressed in the service of a political 
project, which would be secured through a counter-insurgency strategy. The Total 
Strategy would take into account the key recommendations of the Wiehahn and 
Riekert Commissions. Particularly it would translate into law the recommendations 
for the recognition of black trade unions, and the acceptance of a certain kind of 
legality for urban Africans as workers residing ‘in South Africa’. The Total Strategy 
sort to reconfigure the relationship of apartheid to urban Africans but with the 
                                                
303  Chaired by Dr. P. J Riekert, formally known as the  (1979) Commission of Inquiry into Legislation 
Affecting the Utilization of Manpower. 
304 For example,  a survey conducted by the state-funded Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) at 
the time, found that in the case of North Ndebeles, only 5.5% lived in the ethnically designated ‘own 
area,’ [meaning Bantustan]  whilst 54.9% lived in ‘white South Africa’ [meaning South Africa] , and 
39.6% lived in other Bantustans; Swazi-speakers were divided as follows: 78.3% in ‘white area, and 
14.5% in ‘own area’; Zulu-speakers registered 40.5% in ‘white area’, and 58.4% in ‘own area’; quoted 
in  Simkins, C (1981) ‘The Distribution of the African Population of South Africa by Age, Sex and 
Region Type 1960, 1970, and 1980, SALDRU Working Paper no. 32, University of Cape Town; see 
also Smit, P (1983) ‘Die Sosio-Ekonomiese en Politieke Posisie van die Stedelike Swart Bevolking’, 
unpublished paper presented to the annual congress of the South African Sociology Association.  
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continued aim of maintaining  its three core elements: the Bantustan system, influx 
control and the exclusion of Africans from national political representation- in other 
words, a colonial rationality seeking denationalization of the native population 
remained its guiding ethos.  As David Scott has presciently reminded us: 
 the formation of colonial modernity would have to appear as a 
discontinuity in the organization of colonial rule characterized by the 
emergence of a distinctive political rationality— a colonial 
governmentality—in which power comes to be directed at the destruction 
and reconstruction of colonial space so as to produce not so much 




If Beaufre was an important influence in the turn to insurgency, the institutional 
reform process was influenced by the advice of the American  political scientist, 
Samuel P. Huntington’s theory of citizenship based on group-rights  decentralized 
through consociational forms of democracy306.  The constitutional reform process 
gave urban black South Africans local forms of political representation,  and  
‘coloureds’ and Indians diminished forms of political representation at a national level 
                                                
305 David Scott (1999) Refashioning Futures: Criticism After Postcoloniality, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press 
306 Huntington’s affinity for  the apartheid state was not without its consequences for him. In an 
obituary for the late author,  Lee Jones recalls that Huntington’s  “nomination for membership of 
America’s National Academy of Sciences was also rejected in 1986, following a determined campaign 
by Yale mathematician Serge Lang. Lang exposed Huntington’s use of a pseudo-scientific ‘frustration 
index’ in ‘Political Order’ to argue that apartheid South Africa was a ‘satisfied society’”.  Lee Jones 
(2009) ‘In Memoriam: Samuel P. Huntington’, The Oxonian Review, Issue 8. No. 1, 29 January;  cf. 
also Swilling, M.  ‘State Power in the 1980’s’, in Cock, J & Nathan, L (1989) War and Society, Cape 
Town: David Philip,  p138; A controversial Cold War figure, more recently associated with official US 
policy-making, through the theory of a ‘clash of civilizations’, Huntington has proffered influential   
formulations of the absolute enemy, most recently as Islamic in  the post 9/11 US ‘War on Terror’. For 
a critique of Huntington’s culturally essentialist  rendering of the primary faultlines of humanity after 
the Cold War, see Edward Said (2002) ‘The Clash of Civilizations: on Samuel Huntington’, in 
Reflections on Exile and Other Essays, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
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in a ‘Tri-Cameral’ parliament307. The new constitution took effect on 3 September 
1984, enacted by the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983. 
Elections for ‘coloured’ representatives were held on 22 August 1984 for a designated 
House of Representatives, and elections for Indians on 28 August 1984 in a 
designated  House of Delegates. A ‘coloured’ and Indian minister joined the cabinet. 
A new President's Council was constituted involving whites, ‘coloureds’ and Indians. 
The control and administration of Black affairs remained vested in the State President.  
 
This created an enormously differentiated bureaucracy, disproportionate one might 
say from an efficiency-minded public administrators point of view, for a country with 
a total population of just over thirty five million people. As the liberal politician and 
critic of the National Party, Frederick van Zyl Slabbert enumerated with incredulous 
alarm at the time: 
 
By 1985 the political system had given birth to thirteen houses of 
Parliament or legislative assemblies, as well as  the President’s Council 
with quasi-legislative functions. There are three legislative chambers in 
the Central Parliament, six legislative assemblies in what are termed the 
“nonindependent black states,” and four legislative assemblies in the 
“independent states.” Occupying seats in these fourteen bodies are 1,270 
members, consisting of 308 members of the three houses of the Central 
Parliament; 60 members of the President’s Council, 501 members of the 
                                                
307Between 1982 to 1984  the three so-called Koornhof bills (after the Minister) were 
 introduced. Two were eventually  passed, one was not. They were the Black Local Authorities Act 102 
of 1982, the Black Communities Development Act 4 of 1984 and the Orderly Movement and 
Settlement of Black Persons Bill.  ‘Historical Background to Apartheid Laws’ n.d  Unpublished 




legislative assemblies of the non-independent black states, and  401 
members of the legislative assemblies of the independent black states of 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei. Of the 1,270 persons, 121 
are ministers of government(approximately one out of ten), and in 
addition, there are at least 21 deputy ministers. Each of the legislative 
organs has government departmental structures which, by August 1986, 
had spawned 151 government departments in South Africa. These 
departments included 18 departments of health and welfare; 14 
departments of education;  14 departments of finance and budget; 14 
departments of agriculture and forestry; 12 departments of works and 
housing; 13 departments of urban affairs or local government; 9 
departments of economic affairs or trade and industry, as well as 5 
departments of foreign affairs, transport, posts and telegraphs, labor and 
man- power, law and order, defense or national security; 3 departments of 
justice, 1 department of mineral and energy affairs, 1 department of 
environmental affairs and tourism. Finally, these 140  departments were 
responsible to eleven presidents, prime ministers, or chief ministers in 
South Africa.”308 
 
An important and transparent aim of this reform was to split the potential for a 
cohesive black solidarity. The institutional fragmentation displaced the possibility of 
majoritarianism as the grounds for democratic political community. And by creating a 
black middle class elite of ‘urban insiders’ it could also fragment blackness as a 
singular unity in resistance to a common target.  In order to implement this latter 
                                                
308 Frederick van Zyl Slabbert (1987) ‘The Dynamics of Reform and Revolt  
in Current South Africa’,   The Tanner Lectures on Human Values,  Delivered at Brasenose College, 
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strategy the policy of Influx Control, the Riekert Commission suggested, needed to be 
regulated more intensely. A new law was proposed, the Orderly Movement and 
Settlement of Black Persons Bill of 1982309.  
 
The municipal ‘urban rights’ for Africans, recommended by the Riekert Commission 
reforms,  were translated into semi-autonomous municipal institutions  in the form of 
Black Local Authorities (BLA’s). These would have powers to build communal 
public infrastructure, allocate housing, and authorize trade sites310. The BLA’s were a 
key component of this reform process. It was the primary technology designed to 
contain and domesticate discontent through the co-option of a layer of local Africans 
as councillors. The councillors would rule over the urban African population at local 
government level.  As the Constitutional Guidelines advised, the “principle of 
maximum devolution of power and decentralization of administration at local 
government level, and of minimum administrative control over local authorities” was 
sort.311 Black South Africans would ‘govern themselves’ through Black Local 
Authorities, whilst ‘coloureds’ and Indians, confined to specific racialized areas, 
would also govern their ‘own affairs’, through local Management Committees 
(MC’s). Some of the functions of Administrative Boards, which had previously 
governed urban African life, would now be transferred to the BLA’s.   
 
The 1983 Constitution replicated a softer version of the bifurcated state within official 
South Africa (sans  homelands) by distinguishing between ‘own affairs’  and ‘general 
affairs’.  Black South Africans were now governed and had ‘representation’ in 
                                                
309 Hindson, D (1987) Pass Controls and the Urban African Proletariat, Johannesburg: Ravan Press 
310  This was introduced into parliament as the Black  Local  Government  Bill in 1980. The bill was 
passed into law in 1982 as the Black Local Authorities Act 
311 Republic of South Africa (1982) Constitutional Guidelines, Pretoria: Government Printers, p8 
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provincial administrations, regulated by the Black Local Authorities Act and the 
Black Communities Development Act 4 of 1984. The exception remained that those 
who were already resident of homelands would remain regulated by existing Native 
Authorities via the legislation of their respective Bantustans312.  Dr P. J Riekert, who 
was charged with making recommendations on the fate of Africans ‘outside the 
Bantustans’, did not fudge the issue of why the reforms were undertaken. He 
explained to a journalist that the pragmatic purpose of the BLA’s were to “defuse 
pent-up frustration and grievances against the administration from Pretoria.”313  At the 
core of state reform then, was the desire to maintain minority dominance through 
containing a growing urban revolt.  
 
 Importantly, and with significant consequences for the counter-insurgent aims 
underpinning the hopes of the state, the regulation of black life under this reformed 
local government system could not distinguish and demarcate the residential life of  
black South Africans along ethnic lines within South Africa, as it did in the 
homelands. Urban African townships were a heterogeneous mix (this is not to say that 
socially there were not ethnicized spatial enclaves within townships decided on by 
Africans themselves). The state had to contend now with a spatial mode of control in 
its regulation of life in African townships. It had to govern native life through the 
corporatized identity of blackness, rather than its preferred taxonomic classification of 
Africans as multiple ethnicities, as it did under customary law stipulations in Native 
Authorities. This forced it to shift slightly from its imaginary of the bifurcated vision 
of apartheid, divided between racial citizens and ethnic subjects, and a country of 
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multiple minorities.   It had to also therefore find an alternative mode of regulation 
and control, of law and order, if it could not hope to govern urban African life through 
the ‘decentralized despotism’ of the Chief. It was conceding the legitimate the right of 
Africans to be resident in ‘white South Africa’, rather than enforcing their  status  as  
temporary sojourners, and therefore permanent potential criminals for being merely 
present in an urban setting.  
 
There were two key problems that this process of reform confronted from the outset. 
The first was that the reforms denied Africans political representation at a national 
level, whilst at a national level it truncated the forms of political representation it 
offered apartheid’s ‘subject races’—‘coloureds’ and Indians. It was therefore 
immediately burdened by a crisis of legitimacy amongst those active in campaigning 
against apartheid and became a target for resistance.  
 
The second flaw in the reform process derived from the funding formula to procure a 
revenue to support the  Black Local Authorities (BLA’s). The fiscal burden for 
funding the promises and responsibilities of the new BLA’s—housing, health services 
and infrastructure for urban African townships—would have to be procured from the 
tax-base of  these  very communities.  This was to have disastrous consequences for 
the success of the BLA’s, and in fact rather than contain a revolt, it contributed to it, 
quickly becoming a concrete target for mobilization.  As two prominent development 
economists noted,  
 
privatisation' of housing and other forms of township collective 
consumption required that these councils be able to take on the financing 
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and regulation role that the central state had previously applied. This 
required a major expansion of the local revenue base, occasioning severe 
rises in rents, rates and township service charges.314 
 
Two movements of protest congealed into an urban revolt that spread across South 
Africa’s black townships. Focused nationally on the lack of legitimacy of the 
constitutional reforms, and locally on the rise in the cost of rents and services, the 
largest of these movements of resistance took the organizational form of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF), founded in 1983. The UDF drew together more than four 
hundred local and national organizations, from youth to civic, to religious 
communities, and aligned itself with the ‘Freedom Charter’, the document adopted by 
the ANC in 1955 containing its guiding principles for a future South Africa. This 
adoption of the Freedom Charter by the UDF signaled its affinity for the policies of 
the banned ANC315.  
 
Despite the State’s attempt to isolate its leadership through detentions, the UDF’s 
capacity to organize and the grievances it foregrounded found widespread resonance 
amongst many urban township dwellers. It also found many able organizers, from 
amongst the large amounts of unemployed youth and students.   In the end the poll for 
the elections of the new Tri-Cameral parliament in 1983 turned out to be low, 
averaging participation levels of between 10-23% percent across the country.  At the 
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local level, the cornerstone of the States’ reform plan—the Black Local Authorities 
were in a crisis, as the co-opted councilors became  the most visible targets of 
resistance, violence and boycotts by civic and youth movements in the townships.  
The political scientist Mark Swilling studied the state of local government reforms 
over three years, and found the project floundering: 
 
Thirty four [BLA’s] were introduced in I983 and one hundred and four 
were due to be established by I984; by April I985, there were only three 
still functioning. In addition, between September I984 and July I985 two 
hundred and fourty black officials resigned from local government bodies 
because of their lack of legitimacy, and three hundred and sixty black 
policemen were forced to flee the townships to avoid attacks on their 
person and property. This has left many townships ungovernable.316 
 
The demands of the UDF focused on a demand for citizenship on one hand, and on 
the other,  a biopolitical demand for the right to  care and welfare for the population.  
There is another view that I have been tracing the contours of, and that is a view that 
reads events as signs on a “landscape of treason” that are given a life form by an 
exterior animating energy. From this perspective,  the resistance to the state’s reforms 
resided in the invisible  mind of an enemy which was absolute. This invisible enemy  
manifested itself in the claims for sovereign representation which adorned the 
banners, the songs and the slogans of those organising against the Black Local 
Authority. This was a view of the world from within the pedagogy of counter-
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insurgency.  It was a view of the world that we glimpse in the declassified, formerly 
secret documents that are now open in their limited forms  to perusal and scrutiny.  
 
There are a copious amount of reports on the UDF and its affiliates in the archives of 
the Defence Force, Military Intelligence and in the files of the Security Branch, as 
well as the archive of the State Security Council317. When they consider the 
organization in its entirety, these intelligence security reports largely repeat a certain 
format;  they describe the UDF  firstly by  its organizational form;  secondly by what 
it stood for (to be read through its filiations and affiliations);  thirdly they drew a  
connection between  its stated objectives, its modes of organising, and the absolute 
enemy against which a war was being waged. Viewed through counter-insurgency’s 
grid of intelligibility, the UDF as sign and symbol was transformed into a 
insurrectionary object, and a target of war. 
 
 
                                                
317 For example: Department of Military Intelligence SADF (1985) Secret: Spesial Veiligheidsoorsig 3 
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One such declassified intelligence report reads as follows: 
 
The UDF is in effect a revolutionary front organization which consists of 
+-12 000 subordinate organizations affiliated to the UDF. It is estimated 
that about 1.5 million people are affiliated to the UDF….The UDF 
functions in effect, as the ANC’s internal wing and uses the Freedom 
Charter as the basis of its political mobilization process in support of the 
SACP/ANC. The aim of the UDF is to politicize and organize the masses 
of the RSA from the local to the national level, in order to overthrow the 
existing system of government, by united mass resistance actions. The 
organized masses serve as the source of recruits of the ANC’s mass 
“Peoples Army”. The UDF has the ability to plan, co-ordinate and 
conduct revolutionary actions from local to national level against every 
component of the state’s power base….  
 
Between that paragraph and the next one, in large bold black type-face a quote was 
inserted : 
“V. I Lenin:  The Communists…must create a duplicate illegal apparatus everywhere 
that, at the decisive moment can help the Party perform its duty towards the 
Revolution.” 
The report then reverts to the regular type-face, and proceeds to explain the link 
between the ANC, the Communist Party and the UDF.   The ANC works through a 




 trained to establish a variety of front and support organizations at local 
level. The most important organization is the local Residents Civic 
Association to which locally established and organized youth, scholars, 
womens, church, workers and other organizations are affiliated. These 
organizations are used to further politicizing and organizing of the 
population and nearly every aspect of daily life….In the event of the 
above being achieved the neighbourhood will become a revolutionary 
‘liberated’ area and revolutionary authority structures will be used to 
govern the neighbourhood.318 
 
The insertion by the intelligence agent of the quote by Lenin into the report on the 
UDF has the obvious function of interpreting the organisation for its readers.  It 
renders the UDF’s demands for representation, and its practices of creating popular 
forms of democratic rule, chimerical manifestations of the real.  What the 
organization says, and what it does can only confirm and conform to what the 
counter-insurgency agent has been trained to look for. It now becomes the illegal 
‘duplicate’ structure;  a tangible and surface manifestation of Lenin’s  prescription.  
Reading the surveillance reports on Matthew Goniwe one reads how he, as a UDF 
leader, and skilled activist, confirms what the intelligence agents of the State already 
believe to be the real motives behind his actions. They watch and listen to him 
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helping youth movements organize themselves, as he forms and leads a powerful 
civic association, and as he builds alternative popular democratic structures. 
 
Any activist in South Africa under the surveillance of the South African Security 
Branch was allocated a file number. Mathew Goniwe’s file number was S4/ 43620.  
On the 25th May an intelligence report by Lieutenant  Roeland to the Pretoria office 
on the activities (bedrywighede)  of Mathew  Goniwe reported that he had addressed a 
meeting on Saturday of 18th May in the Eastern Cape Town of Hanover. At this 
meeting he  congratulated a group of young people, telling them that ‘the youth are 
doing good work by establishing their own organizations”.  He reminded the students 
that schools were important sites to organize, and according to the report, admonished 
them: “schools should not be burnt down”.319 
 
A secret report on the situation in Lingelihle issued under the letter-head of the  
National Security Management System (NSMS)  dated 3 February 1985, and authored 
by the Cradock Joint Management System, expressed a concern that the newly formed 
Cradock Residents Association (CRADORA) had decided, under Goniwe’s 
leadership,  to organize a large national meeting to mark a “significant event”.  
Invitations were issued by CRADORA to all the United Democratic Front regions 
across the country, requesting that they send delegates.  The agent writing the report 
commented that “thousands of blacks from all over South Africa were  expected to 
arrive.”320   
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On the 31 January 1985, three days before the scheduled meeting, a banning order 
was issued by the Police under the Internal Security Act no. 74 of 1982.  In response 
Matthew Goniwe retained a lawyer and lodged an appeal with the High Court of 
Grahamstown  to set aside the banning order. His request was dismissed by the Judge.  
The security police were well aware of the purpose of the meeting and why they did 
not want it to go ahead. It was called by Goniwe to celebrate, in the company of 
activists from around the country, the resignation of the entire Lingelihle Town 
Council. The council had resigned after concerted pressure from the leaders of 
CRADORA over many months. The intention of the meeting, in the view of the 
security police, was to encourage the invited delegates from around the country to 
emulate the organizational success that CRADORA had achieved by de-legitimating 
its Black Local Authority.  
 
The significance of the meeting Goniwe was organising troubled them indeed: it was 
the first mass resignation of an entire Black Local Authority council in the country. 
The intelligence report remarked with consternation on the growing reputation of 
Matthew Goniwe in the civic organization CRADORA. It also reminded its readers 
that a decision had already been taken about Goniwe’s fate,  and communicated to the 
Department of Education and Training , and this needed to be implemented as a 
matter of urgency. The Joint Management Council was “adamant that MATTHEW 
GONIWE and FORT CALATA MUST NOT be re-appointed to a teaching post. This 
decision” it emphasized,  “must be communicated as a matter of urgency before they 
can begin to re-organise.”321 
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In another secret report from the South African Police’s security branch submitted by 
Lieutenant Colonel Botha,  an informer described how Matthew Goniwe and two 
others visited the town of Hofmeyr on the 24th May 1985.  The file summary 
description referred as follows:  “Mathews [sic] Goniwe S4/43680: Establishment of 
Organisations: Northern Cape Area.”322. In a supplementary commentary on the 
informers report,  Lieutenant Colonel Botha added his own conclusive observations:  
 
“5.1 It is clear to me that Mathews Goniwe (sic) is the founder as well as the 
organizer of all these organizations in the towns of this operational area;  
5.2. It also appears that Goniwe is busy organizing the youth in this unrest area on a 
large scale.”323 
 
The State’s view of what the UDF —a view I have described as properly political, 
drawing on Schmitt—was derived from reports from intelligence officers who in turn 
drew on a range of sources: informers accounts, documents produced by the 
organization itself,  electronic listening devices such as phone-taps,   studies by other 
counter-insurgency analysts, and an education in counter-insurgency. Together these 
discursively formed an understanding of a ‘threat perception’ in the “operational 
area”324. Reports were relayed from the intelligence operatives to the political 
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leadership via the military or the police and were presented for discussion to the 
various members of the National Security Management System (NSMS). In turn the 
reports were tabled at the State Security Council. A vast amount of  information 
flowed vertically and horizontally between the different levels of the Joint 
Management Centers, as ‘threats’ were debated and discussed in the technical 
discourse of counter-insurgency.  
 
The threat assessment gave an account of potential and existing ‘problems’, along 
with recommendations for solutions.  These solutions exist in the minutes of 
meetings, in the whispers, the nods and the winks in a corridor, or a conversation over 
a drink or social gathering.   The solutions are also found in the ‘signals’ which 
describe, as we now know, how the solution to a problem would be to ‘permanently 
remove’ certain individuals from the society.  It is in these problem-answer 
formulations of counter-insurgency that those who pursue juridical justice in the form 
of individual culpability seek tangible evidence of acknowledgment,  of ‘the order’ or 
the ‘instruction’.   
 
The affective purchase of being in a mediated proximity to this killing—an illegal 
killing—derives from  the pronounced and intimate material form that the archive of 
counter-insurgency takes. It is embodied in a cast of individuals- those watching, 
listening, talking, waiting, and then acting. And those being watched and acted upon, 
in the most violent and brutal ways.   
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This turns us all into voyeurs of a moment of suffering within a story with deeply 
tragic dimensions. We take on the elevated vantage point of reading this archive as   
we observe a cast characters moving towards a fate we  see on the horizon, but that 
remains obscure to those being watched by the watchers.  And in the glance we cast 
over these events that have now passed into the realm of historical time, they still 
remain immune to time, since we cannot exercise any agency to alter the course of 
events on the night when the white Honda left Port Elizabeth, or  intervene and agree  
with Matthew Goniwe’s comrade, Derrick Swartz, when he recalls suggesting that  
they rather spend the night at his place and drive home to Lingelihle in the safe haven 
of day light the next day. They were all well aware by then that state secrets are 
performed in the dark.  
 
Yet we have to remind ourselves that those who were watching Matthew Goniwe, 
were not watching him because he was an individual. By that time he had evolved 
into a form that transcended the concrete figure of the individual. He had become a 
symptomatic figure of the political, along with Sparrow Mkhonto, Sicelo Mhlauli and 
Fort Calata,  an  absolute enemy.  Symptomatic of the absolute enemy, but 
importantly not the absolute enemy, for they were its chimerical double.   As activists 
they were under surveillance because they were leaders of a civic organization that 
was affiliated to the United Democratic Front. And the UDF had aligned itself to the 
ANC which in turn was seen as an externally driven proxy of the absolute enemy.  By 
the time the agents of counter-insurgency, those veterans of Koevoet and the ‘war on 
the border’,  pulled Matthew Goniwe’s car over at the side of the road in June 1985, 
the four activists had become figures inhabiting a plan—recall the intelligence report 
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on the UDF as a front for a revolutionary onslaught within counter-insurgency’s grid 
of intelligibility: local leaders recruited, youth movements mobilized, state institutions 
undermined, and liberated zones formed.  And at the center of it all, the success of the 
plan, or its failure, hinged on the recurrent figure of Matthew Goniwe,  who had now 
officially come to be known not only by the file name S4/ 43620, but also as “The 
Goniwe Problem”, tabled as such at the highest institutional form of executive power, 
the State Security Council. It was here that decisions could be made not only about 
who could be made to live—the biopolitical  prerogative of modern power, but also 





















I started this inquiry  with a reflection on the relationship between violence and 
radical social change during which I  rehearsed elements of my own biographical 
formation in the anti-apartheid student movement in South Africa in the mid-1980’s. 
This coincided more or less with the killing of the Cradock Four and the proclamation 
the very next day of a nation-wide State of Emergency, on the 28 June 1985.  It was 
one of the first campaigns I recall becoming involved in, which was also an education 
in the organizing skills, political  acumen and resilience  that existed in communities 
like Lingelihle that was   brutally cut short.    
 
In the midst of extensive state repression, it came as a surprise to many of us when  
President F. W de Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC, the Communist Party, 
the Pan-Africanist Congress, and the intention to release Nelson Mandela at the 
beginning of 1990.  Less known internally at the time in the rank and file of the anti-
apartheid movement was the extent to which secret talks were underway between 
sections of the ANC leadership in exile, the government and Mandela in prison325. As 
well as the extent to which the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the political 
settlement of the wars in Angola and Namibia, involving the United States and Cuba 
as well, would impact on the South African political ruling elite’s resolve to hold on 
to dominance in South Africa.  
 
With the announcement that negotiations were imminent, deep and intense ideological  
divisions were momentarily set aside to celebrate, even if skeptically.  Debates 
                                                




quickly followed however.  What would the prospect of a negotiated political 
settlement, rather than an outright political victory or defeat, mean for the creation of 
a ‘just society’ after apartheid?  
 
 By that time the anti-apartheid movement had become one of the largest social 
movements in the world.  Apartheid had already been declared a ‘Crime against 
Humanity’ at the United Nations. The events and images that were coming out of 
South Africa gave international television screens and newspapers vivid portrayals of 
the brutality of  the South African security forces, and moving accounts of the 
immense restrictions that truncated freedoms considered as rights. Internally too, a 
strong movement had emerged. Focused on constitutional and local government 
reforms, it had also chosen human rights violations as the discourse through which to 
mobilize disaffection.  
 
The campaign to know who had killed the Cradock Four, and to hold accountable 
those responsible for the killing, became one of the most visible and important 
campaigns, along with others involving the mysterious deaths of activists.  In these 
campaigns the question of responsibility was central, and the prospect that the 
settlement would produce answers to the question of who exactly was responsible was 
uppermost in the minds of many of us who had been part of them.   
 
I have argued that the pain and suffering induced by apartheid was mediated at the 
TRC through a hegemonic discourse of human rights law. It is a universalizing 
language which argues that apartheid denied the majority of its citizens access to a 
sovereign political community, and performs their exclusion  on the basis of race. It 
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was an articulation of the critique of apartheid that resonated internally as well 
externally,  in a world where racial discrimination had become an increasingly 
normalized wrong.  
 
Since the 1950’s this critique had mobilized activists in the country, and also gave rise 
to a coterie of progressive white citizens who mediated the pain and suffering of 
apartheid’s black subjects through the courts. Providing advice, pressing for changes 
and the relaxation of discriminatory legislation, these critics also raised difficult 
questions in the racially exclusive parliamentary system.  Theirs was a minority 
critique of apartheid that drew on what the esteemed South African human rights 
scholar John Dugard, called the ‘majesty of law’. It pitted universal law against 
apartheid’s own legal claims.  Explicitly locating itself in a genealogy of law which is 
celebrated as an achievement of ‘Judeo-Christian civilization’, this critique of 
apartheid considered the legalization of apartheid as a danger not only to apartheid’s 
black subjects, but also to the security and future legacy of Western law on the 
southern-most tip of the African continent.  
 
 
The case of the Cradock Four was the first case to be heard by the Truth and 
Reconciliation’s amnesty committee. The subject of two previous inquests, it offered 
the prospect of gaining an intimate understanding how exactly  they were 
‘permanently removed from society’ and who did it.  The question of why they were 
killed seemed less compelling at the time, since the answer to this question seemed 
self-evident. And yet when we revisit this question we become aware that it is worth 
thinking not only about how the state had come to constitute Matthew Goniwe as a 
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political enemy, but how the resistance movement constituted him as a victim. And 
how that understanding had come to be a taken-for-granted way of thinking about the 
injustices of apartheid itself. In other words, it prompts us to think about how the anti-
apartheid movement had come to accept that  the deaths of political activists were 
primarily to be thought of as ‘gross violations of human rights’.   
 
It is an often lauded observation that the post-apartheid constitution is one of the most 
democratic and forward looking constitutions in the world. Underpinned by a Bill of 
Rights, it contains a series of statutory institutions focused on the protection of human 
rights. The constitution itself was authored by the most senior and widely respected 
South African human-rights lawyers, many of whom were centrally involved in 
human rights oriented litigation during the 1970s and 1980s.  The depth of experience 
in South Africa of human rights violations had given South Africa’s new 
constitutional drafters the conviction that a postapartheid society would have to build 
a corrective ethos to undo this history.  
 
In a view that diverges strongly from the rather self-congratulatory disposition of the 
human rights legal narrative that characterizes scholarship on the issue in South 
Africa, the legal historian Martin Chanock has made a cutting observation about the 
status afforded this legal discourse in the post-apartheid constitution: 
 
As it had been nearly a century earlier, South Africa was colonized in the 
1990’s by a new kind of internationally sanctioned state: this time not the 
‘Westminster system’ but the ‘Constitutional State’. A form of political 
liberalism that had notably failed over the whole history of the South 
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African state to attract significant support from any segment of the 
population, found its philosophy entrenched at the heart of the new 
constitution. The constitution inflated the role of law, and the political 
power of judges, in an attempt to remedy the faults of the previous state’s 
version of the ‘rule of law (Chanock 2001: 513).326 
 
What Chanock describes as “colonization” by the constitutional state,  could perhaps 
be accounted for by the hegemony of human rights as a way to talk about the wrong 
of apartheid. If the injustice of apartheid was the violation of  human rights  on a large 
scale in the past, then justice in the future would be thought of as the  commitment to 
the elevation  and protection of human rights in the present. 
 
Understood as such, I realized that the reason that we are not encouraged to dwell 
much on an understanding of  apartheids’ exceptional violence, and what makes it 
thinkable, is that a human rights claim on it made further thought redundant if not 
questionable.   Juridical formulations of the problem take as an ideal-type a universal 
abstraction, with clearly demarcated boundaries and borders that transcend time and 
space. A human rights violation is decided upon by a range of taxonomic categories, 
and measured through a range of visible and verifiable somatic effects. In as much as 
the TRC sought to consider a political motive for violence, it ultimately 
individualized this violence, and found itself returning to a criminological 
adjudication of violence, requiring an individual perpetrator and an individual victim. 
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Political violence thought of as simply a rights violation is less interested in how we 
might account for a wrong   Further knowledge of, for example, the history or  the 
context of an act or event is discouraged,  and may even be construed as the 
production of a narrative of exculpation designed to provide a justificatory post-facto 
rationale for a wrong. 
 
The first challenge has been to recover the violence from the legal discourse of right, 
from this self-evident categorical register.  This has meant recovering the violence 
from the overdetermining ontology of juridical discourse, and from the universal 
abstraction that underpins it.  Dislodging the violence from this universal abstraction, 
we can now begin to think about its specificity.  And dislodged from thinking about 
the violence as an individuated act and a human rights violation, we can also begin to 
think about it once more as an instance of political violence. 
 
No sooner however that we dislodge the subject of violence from the universal 
abstraction of legal norms – as the universal victim-- to insert it into the political, do 
we find ourselves moored to another universal. This time it is that of the absolute 
enemy: of the communist as terrorist. In this view of the world, Matthew Goniwe and 
his comrades became treasonous figures. They were manifestations of the exterior 
designs of ‘global communism’ and its plans to destroy all that was good, right and 
civilized in South Africa. From this vantage point, this society at the southern-most 
tip of Africa needed to defend itself by any means necessary from those who were 
proxy forces desiring its  destruction and reconstruction in the image of the antithesis 
of Western civilization: “Like the Greeks at Salamis who did the impossible in 
defeating the Persian horde, South Africans”, argued an anti-communist publication 
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on the Cold War,   “may be the decisive people at an equally critical juncture in the 
history of Western civilization.”327  
 
There is a curious and troubling sense in which this formulation above, written by a 
right wing anti-communist author, shares an epistemic affinity with the critique of 
apartheid articulated by the liberal left in South Africa.  In terms that could easily 
supplement the view above, desiring to protect the achievements of Western 
civilization in an African country,  the critic of apartheid Jean Sinclair was to lament 
in her Presidential Address to the annual  general meeting of the Black Sash in 1964:  
 
Seven hundred and fifty years ago the Magna Carta laid down the basis 
on which Western civilized standards of justice have been founded…In 
sixteen years, with the help of a mass of statutory legislation this 
Government has plunged South Africa back into the social anarchy of the 
middle ages. They have abandoned centuries of political progress, have 
manipulated Christian doctrine to suit their own philosophies and have 
subverted the common law in the interests of sectional dogma.328 
 
 Both formulations assert universal abstractions and absolute enemies, contesting  a 
purchase on South Africa’s future as a political community.  On the one hand,  a 
universal abstraction of the majesty of  law, and the progressive civil-legal legacy it 
seeks to protect from a ‘return it to the dark ages’.  And on the other hand, in the first 
narrative, South Africa must be saved in the universal struggle of good versus evil, 
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where at stake too is a choice between  chaos and anarchy. In both sets of universals, I 
argue it is the colonial specificity of the ‘natives revolt’ that struggles to emerge,  and 
that remains a subaltern discourse.   
 
Apartheid as the assemblage of performative acts and technologies of rule which 
seeks to construct and fashion the native-as-subject, to rule with colonial ambitions- 
has in the end become discursively sublimated. This narrative then – of the concrete 
enemy—can only be understood from the vantage point of the formation of native 
subjects. 
 
 It is the political predicament presented by the urban African subject, embodied in 
the revolt lead by Matthew Goniwe in townships like Lingelihle, that disrupted the 
realization of a neat binary between citizen and subject,  and ultimately lead to the 
unraveling of apartheid’s colonial ambitions: its will to denationalization.  From this 
vantage point, the genealogy of the  violence against the Cradock Four targets a 
concrete enemy, the figure that brings to crisis  apartheid’s  state formation and state 
reform. In its particular forms, this predicament emerges in the concrete political 
conflicts between those who govern and those who are governed. We are talking then 
about the governmentalization of apartheid, of a political war rather than a military 
war, fought on the terrain of the partisan in repetition and difference to the partisan 
wars that we have recalled in its colonial pasts. 
 
The war in the 1980’s was also a different kind of war. It was a war that marked the 
end of one war and an attempt to forge the terms of another. It was the war fought in 
the last convulsions of a defeat. As the realization that the frontier lines of a racialized 
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South Africa and an ethnicized constellation of  neighbouring native political 
communities was an idea that kept coming apart as soon as it came together. Fighting 
against an absolute enemy—the communist, in turn sublimated a concrete enemy—
the figure of the urban native, neither properly citizen nor properly subject. 
 
The repeal of the Influx Control laws in 1986, almost exactly a year after the killing 
of the Cradock Four, marked the formal end to the hope of apartheid as a bifurcated 
state and the initiation of the secret attempts to renegotiate the terms of minority 
domination over the majority, a renegotiation of the central political question in South 
Africa’s history which defined its battle lines: the settler- native relationship. 
Ultimately not a question to be understood in the brutality of the political violence, 
but in the colonial genealogy of the political objectives that underwrote it: a vision of 
political community that would seek to resolve the question of the native and the 
settler by dissolving both the native and the settler in order to violently rebirth them:  
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